Keywords: Risk and safety
“Target species complex” concept: Strengthening environmental risk assessment of engineered gene drives
35531J.B. Connolly, Y. Devos, D.C.M. Glandorf, and J. Romeis, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 2026-03-30 19:11:30.
The recent opinion piece of Christophe Boëte critiqued the concept of the target species complex (TSC) in environmental risk assessment (ERA) of engineered gene drives (EGDs) (1). While constructive debate is essential, the piece misrepresents the purpose of TSC and conflates unrelated mechanisms, creating misconceptions that merit clarification. Malaria-transmitting mosquitoes often belong to species complexes, comprising vector and nonvector species, where hybridization can be detected in laboratory settings and occasionally in the field (2–4). Low-threshold EGDs are self-sustaining and nonlocalizing (5). Should such EGD be released in a species complex where target genomic sequences are conserved, in the event of interspecific mating in the field vertical gene drive transfer (VGDT) to nonvector species could occur, potentially harming biodiversity protection goals. Conversely, VGDT to vector species could advance health objectives (6).
Spatial confinement of gene drives: Assessing risk of failure using global sensitivity analysis
35459Cole D. Butler, Alun L. Lloyd, bioRxiv, 2026-02-19 09:59:30.
Gene drives allow pest populations to be genetically modified to reduce their harm on agriculture and human health. The genetic modification, or payload, spreads within a target population at rates exceeding normal Mendelian inheritance. While gene drives have demonstrated immense potential in laboratory populations, they present unique challenges. Foremost among these challenges is spatial confinement, or ensuring that the payload remains confined to target populations. However, there is an inherent tension between gene drive spread and spatial confinement: increasing the spreading efficiency of a gene drive increases the risk of escape, while engineering confinement mechanisms increases the risk of gene drive extinction. In this work, we explore spatial outcomes in gene drives designed for spatial confinement and the dependence of these outcomes on target organism dispersal and payload fitness cost. We use a stochastic spatial model to compute the probability of failure for each gene drive, and use techniques from global sensitivity analysis to quantify the contribution of dispersal and fitness cost to variance in gene drive performance. Our findings reveal how spatial outcomes are affected by key parameters, and how this sensitivity varies tremendously between different gene drives. These spatial properties can be used to classify gene drive behavior and are useful to determine suitability for a particular application.
Gene drives, species complexes, and the risks of collateral damage
35296C. Boëte, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 122. 2025-11-09 18:26:26.
The development of engineered gene drive systems continues to garner significant interest. Theoretically, these systems could spread traits in a target species (an approach known as population replacement) or eliminate a population within a few generations (population suppression). Some researchers have promoted this disruptive technology for potential applications ranging from public health (e.g., malaria control) to conservation (e.g., protection of endangered species, elimination of invasive ones) to agriculture (e.g., pest control). But in the case of a gene drive intended to target a specific species, the risk of affecting non-target species must be taken into account, and researchers must strive to minimize collateral damage. Hybridization between a target and a non-target species could result in unintended gene flow, as could the horizontal transfer of the gene drive cassette (1). While some researchers have proposed the “Target Species Complex” (TSC) framework to account for off-target effects, the concept is unlikely to provide a safeguard. Rather, it risks reframing collateral impacts as intentional outcomes, narrowing, rather than broadening, the scope of ecological and regulatory considerations. Researchers must therefore make sure to incorporate risk assessments that take into account the effects on numerous species and make a concerted effort to understand the downstream effects.
Should genetically modified wildlife be banned? Scientists weigh the risks
35235Mariana Lenharo, Nature, 2025-10-10 16:01:10.
The global conservation community is debating whether to ban the release of genetically modified organisms into the wild. Dozens of non-governmental organizations have called for a moratorium on field applications of synthetic biology — a technology being studied as a tool to fight diseases, control pests and help endangered species — saying that the approach has unpredictable consequences. But some researchers argue that an outright ban is too restrictive, and could have negative consequences for human health and biodiversity. A proposal for a ban will face a vote next week at a congress of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in Abu Dhabi. The IUCN brings together governments and civil-society organizations to guide global conservation policy. Although decisions made by its members are not legally binding, they do influence legislation in many countries, says biologist Piero Genovesi, head of the Wildlife Service at the Italian Institute for Environmental Protection and Research in Rome. If members vote in favour of the proposed ban, it “could have stronger impacts in areas like Europe or Australia, where there are many lines of research focused on developing new tools based on synthetic biology for improving the efficacy of conservation action”, Genovesi says. He is among more than 240 scientists who have so far signed an open letter asking IUCN members to reject the moratorium.
Should we edit nature?
35176David Farrier, Aeon, 2025-09-26 14:10:35.
At the end of August 1939, the German archaeologist Otto Völzing discovered around 200 fragments of carved mammoth ivory at the back of a cave in southern Germany. With war just a week away, Völzing’s find was hurriedly collected in a box, where it lay unnoticed in a museum archive for decades. It wasn’t until the 1960s, when the shards were inventoried, that something astonishing emerged out of the heap of broken pieces. They formed an incomplete figurine, with a chimeric mix of features: the body of person, and the head and forearms of a cave lion. Subsequent excavations in the 1970s found further pieces of what has come to be called the Lion-Man of Hohlenstein-Stadel. Carved from a mammoth tusk around 40,000 years ago, it is one of the earliest examples of the human capacity to imagine forms that don’t exist in nature. Every age of human history since the Lion-Man has tried to think beyond nature. In Hesiod’s Theogony, composed around 700 BCE, the chimera was a compound being with the head of a lion, the body of a dragon, and a snake’s-head tail (and an extra goat’s head protruding from its back for good measure). In W B Yeats’s poem ‘The Second Coming’ (1920), a similar ‘rough beast’ is a harbinger of ruin. In our own time, the chimeras are something different. Living things in every part of the biosphere have been forced by climate change, pollution and the spread of non-native species to adapt their bodies and behaviours to a human planet. They may not have visibly merged forms like the Lion-Man, but they do bear the impression of another species: us.
Comparison of the standard and boosted sterile insect techniques for the suppression of Aedes albopictus populations under semi-field conditions
35085Marlène Dupraz, Renaud Lancelot, Gorgui Diouf, et al., Parasite, 32. 2025-08-28 18:38:54.
Innovative control tools are needed against Aedes mosquitoes. The boosted sterile insect technique (bSIT) consists of treating sterile males with a biocide prior to their release to contaminate larval habitats. We compared the efficacy of SIT and boosted SIT to prevent the emergence of adult Aedes albopictus in large cages. We tested two sterile-to-fertile male ratios: 5:1 (SIT5) and 1:1 (SIT1), with and without pyriproxyfen enhancement (bSIT or SIT). The eggs were collected in ovitraps and the immature stages were monitored until adult emergence or up to 15 days after hatching to estimate the relative risk (RR) of adult emergence compared to the control category. The concentration of pyriproxyfen in the ovitrap water did not change when sterile males were released with females or alone (χ2 = 0.99, df = 1, p = 0.547). This concentration was higher when the sterile-to-fertile male ratio was increased from 1:1 to 5:1: χ2 = 18.8, df = 1, p = 0.006. All four treatment categories were effective in suppressing mosquito populations. With a relative risk RR = 0.194 95% CI [0.128; 0.275], SIT5 was the most effective. Boosted SIT was not as effective as SIT. However, bSIT1 (RR = 0.418 [0.351; 0.492]) and bSIT5 (RR = 0.512 [0.431; 0.596]) were equally effective. Boosted males directly vectored pyriproxyfen to breeding sites. Boosted SIT was more effective than SIT alone with a low sterile-to-fertile male ratio. Under operational conditions, it could be initially deployed to suppress the target population and then switched to standard SIT.
EPA assessing risk of releasing genetically engineered mosquitoes
35046Gary West, Capital Press, 2025-08-22 17:02:34.
The Environmental Protection Agency has convened a scientific panel to help assess whether genetically engineered mosquitoes could pose a risk to humans. In a paper released Aug. 21, the EPA said that as science advances it expects more proposals to control mosquitoes by releasing males with an implanted trait that prevents their offspring from surviving. Male mosquitoes don’t bite humans, only female mosquitoes bite. But if a female mosquito picks up the genetic flaw, such as a new protein, the protein could be passed onto humans, according to the EPA. The EPA expects the number of genetically engineered female mosquitoes to be low, and it hasn’t determined whether the proteins would be hazardous to humans. But it’s looking to identify the best way to confirm a female mosquito’s salvia doesn’t have novel proteins. The test will help the EPA to assess the risk of exposure to humans. “Female mosquitoes bite humans as a means of reproductive survival and, as a result, this interaction results in a plausible pathway of exposure to novel proteins,” the EPA stated.
Experimental Test of Evolutionary Safety of a CRISPR-Cas9 Gene-Drive Element
34958Michael S Overton, Sean E Guy, Xingsen Chen, et al., bioRxiv, 2025-07-08 13:24:10.
CRISPR-Cas9 gene drives (CCGDs) are powerful tools for genetic control of wild populations, with applications from disease eradication to species conservation. However, Cas9 alone and in a complex with gRNA can cause double-stranded DNA breaks at off-target sites, which could increase the mutational load and lead to unintended loss-of-heterozygosity (LOH) events. These undesired effects raise potential concerns about the long-term evolutionary safety of CCGDs, but the magnitude of these effects is unknown. To measure how the presence of a CCGD or a Cas9 alone in the genome affects the rates of LOH events and de novo mutations, we carried out a mutation accumulation experiment in yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae. We found no detectable effects on the genome-wide rates of mutations or LOH events. Our power calculations suggest that CCGD or Cas9 affect these rates by less than 30%, which is much less than natural variation for these traits in yeast. A more detailed examination shows that CCGD or Cas9 may alter the lengths and genomic distributions of LOH events, but the statistical support for these effects is weak. Thus, our results demonstrate that CCGDs impose at most a weak additional mutational burden in the yeast model. Although mutagenic effects of gene drives need to be further evaluated in other systems, our results add credence to the proposition that the evolutionary risks posed by well designed gene drives are likely acceptable.
Applying the Protective Precautionary Principle to the Ethical Use of Gene Drive Technology for Anopheles gambiae Suppression in Malaria Control
34879Nucharee Wongsamut, Journal of Applied Animal Ethics Research, 2025-06-02 18:16:36.
Malaria contributes to poverty and illness, which further hinder productivity and income generation. Therefore, combating malaria is crucial for breaking the vicious cycle of poverty. Genome editing technologies, such as gene drives designed to suppress Anopheles gambiae mosquito populations, the vector for malaria, have emerged as potential tools in this fight. However, a significant ethical question arises: under what conditions is the use of gene drive technology to suppress Anopheles gambiae mosquito populations justified? This article argues that the Protective Precautionary Principle can serve as a suitable framework for morally assessing such cases. Within this framework, the use of gene drive technology for Anopheles gambiae population suppression would be permissible for laboratory research only. This limited scope minimizes the risk of unforeseen negative consequences, particularly for disadvantaged populations who may have fewer resources to protect themselves from such effects.
Wolbachia: A bacterial weapon against dengue fever- a narrative review of risk factors for dengue fever outbreaks
34743Safaei, S., Derakhshan-Sefidi, M., Karimi, A., New Microbes and New Infections, 65. 2025-04-04 14:53:55.
Arboviruses constitute the largest known group of viruses and are responsible for various infections that impose significant socioeconomic burdens worldwide, particularly due to their link with insect-borne diseases. The increasing incidence of dengue fever in non-endemic regions underscores the urgent need for innovative strategies to combat this public health threat. Wolbachia, a bacterium, presents a promising biological control method against mosquito vectors, offering a novel approach to managing dengue fever. We systematically investigated biomedical databases (PubMed, Web of Science, Google Scholar, Science Direct, and Embase) using “AND” as a Boolean operator with keywords such as “dengue fever,” “dengue virus,” “risk factors,” “Wolbachia,” and “outbreak.” We prioritized articles that offered significant insights into the risk factors contributing to the outbreak of dengue fever and provided an overview of Wolbachia's characteristics and functions in disease management, considering studies published until December 25, 2024. Field experiments have shown that introducing Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes can effectively reduce mosquito populations and lower dengue transmission rates, signifying its potential as a practical approach for controlling this disease.
Gene drives. Technologies for spreading genetic modifications in populations. TAB-Fokus
34652König, H., Kolleck, A., Sauter, A., TAB-Fokus, 48. 2025-03-21 07:04:16.
Gene drives have the potential to help solve major challenges, including the fight against invasive species or vector-borne diseases such as malaria. These hopes are offset by technical and scientific challenges as well as environmental risks. The policy brief TAB-Fokus no. 48 on the opportunities and risks of a technology for spreading desirable traits in populations summarises the most important results of the TA project for the German Bundestag on four pages (and is also available as a web version - see relation in KITopen). Detailed results can be found in the final report - see relation in KITopen).
Making sex deadly for insects could control pests that carry disease and harm crops
34559Bill Sullivan, The Conversation, 2025-03-04 17:08:29.
Insects do a lot more harm than ruining picnics. Some insects spread devastating diseases, while others cause staggering economic losses in agriculture. To control some of these pests, scientists are developing males that make sex a deadly event. The stakes are high. Mosquitoes carry viruses such as dengue, West Nile and Zika, as well as parasites that cause malaria. Researchers estimate that mosquitoes have caused the deaths of 52 billion people overall – nearly half of all the humans that have ever lived. Other insects cause major crop damage, jeopardizing the food supply and driving up prices. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 20% to 40% of global crop production is lost to pests annually at a cost of US$70 billion. Pesticides have been the front-line defense against insects, but many bugs have evolved resistance to these chemicals. Some pesticides can indiscriminately kill beneficial insects, harm the environment and endanger human and animal health. Some researchers worry that certain pesticides can cause cancer or have damaging effects on human nervous and endocrine systems. I’m a microbiology researcher studying infectious disease. New solutions that do not harm humans and the environment to control disease-carrying insects and agricultural pests could lead to fewer people contracting dangerous diseases. In the past few years, a variety of genetic engineering approaches have emerged as promising tactics to combat problematic insects.
3 reasons why the release of GM mosquitoes in Queensland is risky
34554Dr. Perran Stott-Ross, University of Melbourne, 2025-03-04 11:14:23.
The British company Oxitec, in partnership with Australia's CSIRO, has announced plans to release genetically modified (GM) mosquitoes in Queensland. The initiative aims to reduce transmission of the dengue virus, as well as other pathogens spread by the Aedes aegypti mosquito by reducing the size of the mosquito population. The announcement has received significant attention from the public – there's even a petition to the Queensland Parliament to block the release. While these mosquitoes are unlikely to cause adverse health impacts as some have suggested, there are still legitimate reasons for concern. Here is why we should be wary of releasing GM mosquitoes in Australia. Only female mosquitoes drink blood to feed their eggs, meaning only female mosquitoes spread disease to humans. The mosquitoes developed by Oxitec are a Mexican strain of Aedes aegypti, genetically engineered to express a gene that's lethal to females. This means only male mosquitoes can survive and reproduce in the wild. Male mosquitoes don’t bite so they can’t spread disease, but they can still mate with wild Australian female mosquitoes and pass on their genes – both the lethal gene and other genes naturally occur in the Mexican strain of Aedes aegypti. This technique has advantages over similar technologies because it is effective across multiple generations, making the population reduction last longer. It will also only target Aedes aegypti and won’t affect other mosquito species directly. The mosquitoes will also carry a fluorescent gene making them easy to identify. The GM mosquitoes will be sold to businesses and the public, allowing anyone in Queensland to release them on their own property. They can be raised by adding water to a container and placing it outside. Eventually, male mosquitoes will emerge to mate with the wild population. The technology is already used overseas with trials showing drastic reductions in mosquito populations, but the situation in Australia is markedly different and so carries different risks.
For the Sake of 600,000 Children, Science Must Be Bold
34053Laurie Zoloth, The New York Times, 2024-12-16 14:36:13.
Bold ideas in science research used to thrill us; now they seem pretty threatening. When I have written about the ethics of genetically engineered mosquitoes to combat malaria, many of my friends have expressed alarm. “What if it goes badly wrong?” they ask. What if there are unintended consequences that ripple across ecosystems? What if this is one of those technologies that cross the line from innovative to utterly world-destroying And yet, one could also ask, what if we do nothing? For that question, at least we have an answer. A report last week from the World Health Organization reveals that 597,000 people died of malaria last year, overwhelmingly children under age 5, and an estimated 263 million people were sickened. Thousands of families cradled a baby dying from a preventable fever; thousands of pregnancies ended in stillbirth or maternal death. For a time in the early 2000s, it seemed as if the world was gaining ground against malaria, but progress has stalled, cases have risen and the hopes for its near-elimination by 2030 have been scuttled. Global warming, armed conflict and lack of funding are all factors. And while new vaccines certainly will help, they are limited in their effectiveness (they reduce the risk of severe malaria by 30 percent and require four separate clinic visits). For much of the world’s poor, we still rely on the 19th-century technology of bed nets and insecticide. For the past two decades, scientists have explored whether a new technology known as a gene drive might hold the tantalizing promise of eliminating malaria by targeting the mosquitoes that carry the deadly parasite. The reason the gene drive is so potentially revolutionary — but disturbing — is that it uses genetic engineering to introduce changes in mosquitoes that do not stop with one generation, but are preferentially inherited by all future generations.
Wolbachia-based emerging strategies for control of vector-transmitted disease
32708Diego Montenegro, Gerardo Cortés-Cortés, María Guadalupe Balbuena-Alonso, et al., Acta Tropica, 260. 2024-10-22 17:28:54.
Dengue fever is a mosquito-transmitted disease of great public health importance. Dengue lacks adequate vaccine protection and insecticide-based methods of mosquito control are proving increasingly ineffective. Here we review the emerging use of mosquitoes transinfected with the obligate intracellular bacterium Wolbachia pipientis for vector control. Wolbachia often induces cytoplasmic incompatibility in its mosquito hosts, resulting in infertile progeny between an infected male and an uninfected female. Wolbachia infection also suppresses the replication of pathogens in the mosquito, a process known as “pathogen blocking”. Two strategies have emerged. The first one releases Wolbachia carriers (both male and female) to replace the wild mosquito population, a process driven by cytoplasmic incompatibility and that becomes irreversible once a threshold is reached. This suppresses disease transmission mainly by pathogen blocking and frequently requires a single intervention. The second strategy floods the field population with an exclusively male population of Wolbachia-carrying mosquitoes to generate infertile hybrid progeny. In this case, transmission suppression depends largely on decreasing the population density of mosquitoes driven by infertility and requires continued mosquito release. The efficacy of both Wolbachia-based approaches has been conclusively demonstrated by randomized and non-randomized studies of deployments across the world. However, results conducted in one setting cannot be directly or easily extrapolated to other settings because dengue incidence is highly affected by the conditions into which the mosquitoes are released. Compared to traditional vector control methods, Wolbachia-based approaches are much more environmentally friendly and can be effective in the medium/long term. On the flip side, they are much more complex and cost-intensive operations, requiring a substantial investment, infrastructure, trained personnel, coordination between agencies, and community engagement. Finally, we discuss recent evidence suggesting that the release of Wolbachia-transinfected mosquitoes has a moderate potential risk of spreading potentially dangerous genes in the environment.
Russia’s Latest Target in Africa: U.S.-Funded Anti-Malaria Programs
32704Elian Peltier, The New York Times, 2024-10-22 15:00:57.
The scientists sifting through thousands of genetically modified mosquito larvae in a laboratory in Burkina Faso were trying to stop the spread of malaria, one of the biggest killers on the African continent. But in the pro-Russian propaganda telling of their work, the scientists, helped by funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, were not protecting local people against malaria, they were infecting them. “Since these mosquitoes have arrived in Burkina, we’ve noticed an increase of malaria and dengue fever,” Egountchi Behanzin, a French-Togolese activist who often posts pro-Russian content, said in an interview. Mr. Behanzin could not cite any scientific evidence, and researchers say there are no grounds for such a claim. But his anti-Western messages, and his praise for Russia in Africa, are shared daily among his more than 600,000 followers on social media. His posts are seen as only one element in a recent pro-Russian disinformation operation that is targeting U.S.-funded health care programs in Africa. The attacks come at a time when ambitious initiatives and vaccines are being rolled out on a continent shaken by several epidemics, including a deadly outbreak of mpox. The apparent aim is to undermine public trust and bolster Russia’s steady attempt to weaken Western interests in Africa, according to U.S. and European officials.
Ghana publishes its guidelines on Genome Editing
28538Anonymous, BusinessGhana, 2023-11-28 11:06:04.
Ghana's National Biosafety Authority (NBA) has published its guidelines on Genome Editing and Gene Stacks with regards Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) joining Nigeria, Kenya, and Malawi, as the fourth country in Africa with the guidelines. Genome editing is an emerging and affordable biotechnology tool that has great promise to deliver high-yielding crop varieties, able to withstand various stresses such as droughts, floods, insect pests, or diseases and possessed quality traits for use as food, feed, or for processing. "Biotechnology is a fast-developing business with new trends of technologies and when the law was being passed, there was nothing like Genome editing, gene drive, or synthetic biotechnology, but we have them now."
Conceptual risk assessment of mosquito population modification gene-drive systems to control malaria transmission: preliminary hazards list workshops
28220A. Kormos, G. Dimopoulos, E. Bier, G. C. Lanzaro, J. M. Marshall and A. A. James, Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology, 11. 2023-10-26 14:54:57.
The field-testing and eventual adoption of genetically-engineered mosquitoes (GEMs) to control vector-borne pathogen transmission will require them meeting safety criteria specified by regulatory authorities in regions where the technology is being considered for use and other locales that might be impacted. Preliminary risk considerations by researchers and developers may be useful for planning the baseline data collection and field research used to address the anticipated safety concerns. Part of this process is to identify potential hazards (defined as the inherent ability of an entity to cause harm) and their harms, and then chart the pathways to harm and evaluate their probability as part of a risk assessment. The University of California Malaria Initiative (UCMI) participated in a series of workshops held to identify potential hazards specific to mosquito population modification strains carrying gene-drive systems coupled to anti-parasite effector genes and their use in a hypothetical island field trial. The hazards identified were placed within the broader context of previous efforts discussed in the scientific literature. Five risk areas were considered i) pathogens, infections and diseases, and the impacts of GEMs on human and animal health, ii) invasiveness and persistence of GEMs, and interactions of GEMs with target organisms, iii) interactions of GEMs with non-target organisms including horizontal gene transfer, iv) impacts of techniques used for the management of GEMs and v) evolutionary and stability considerations. A preliminary hazards list (PHL) was developed and is made available here. This PHL is useful for internal project risk evaluation and is available to regulators at prospective field sites. UCMI project scientists affirm that the subsequent processes associated with the comprehensive risk assessment for the application of this technology should be driven by the stakeholders at the proposed field site and areas that could be affected by this intervention strategy.
General science-technology orientation, specific benefit–risk assessment frame, and public acceptance of gene drive biotechnology
28225X. Liu, C. L. Goldsmith, K. E. Kang, A. Vedlitz, Z. N. Adelman, L. W. Buchman, E. Heitman and R. F. Medina, Risk Analysis, 2023-10-23 15:04:31.
Abstract With limited understanding of most new biotechnologies, how do citizens form their opinion and what factors influence their attitudes about these innovations? In this study, we use gene drive biotechnology in agricultural pest management as an example and theoretically propose that given low levels of knowledge and awareness, citizens? acceptance of, or opposition to, gene drive is significantly shaped by two predisposition factors: individuals? general orientation toward science and technology, and their specific benefit-risk assessment frame. Empirically, we employ data collected from a recent US nationally representative public opinion survey (N = 1220) and conduct statistical analyses to test the hypotheses derived from our theoretical expectations. Our statistical analyses, based on various model specifications and controlling for individual-level covariates and state-fixed effects, show that citizens with a more favorable general orientation toward science and technology are more likely to accept gene drive. Our data analyses also demonstrate that citizens? specific gene drive assessment frame?consisting of a potential benefit dimension and a potential risk dimension, significantly shapes their attitudes as well?specifically, people emphasizing more on the benefit dimension are more likely to accept gene drive, whereas those who place more importance on the risk dimension tend to oppose it. We discuss contributions of our study and make suggestions for future research in the conclusion.
Benefits and risks of gene drives for invasive plant management – the case for common tansy
28162L. Croghan, A. G. Smith, M. A. Tancos, N. O. Anderson and R. L. Becker, Frontiers in Agronomy, 5. 2023-10-20 12:05:59.
Invasive plants cause significant environmental and economic damage, but land managers have few control options. Common tansy (Tanacetum vulgare) is prevalent in many US states and is one of the most reported invasive plants in Minnesota. Controlling common tansy poses a challenge due to its extensive distribution and association with diverse plant communities. A gene drive is being explored as a genetic biocontrol method for the management of several non-native invasives, including common tansy in North America. Gene drives have emerged as a novel biotechnology application with potential to improve public health, promote conservation, and increase agricultural productivity. In common tansy, gene drives could be developed to target genes that would reduce or eliminate female fertility and consequently inhibit common tansy seed production. Using common tansy as an example, we outline risks associated with the use of gene drive technology for invasive plant control and explain how risks may be mitigated. Understanding potential benefits and risks associated with gene drives in the early stages of development is crucial. Mitigating risks, receiving stakeholder input, and navigating the regulatory environment will play an important role in gene drive development and deployment.
Engineered and natural gene drives: mechanistically the same, yet not same in kind
27995R. F. Medina and J. Kuzma, Nature Communications, 14:5994. 2023-09-26 08:18:08.
We propose the use of the terms natural gene drive (NGD) and engineered gene drive (EGD) arguing against James et al.1, who think both should be included within the term “gene drive”, based on their mechanistic similarities. Thanks to CRISPR-Cas-based gene editing, engineered gene drive has suddenly become feasible as a potential cost-effective pest control tool that could help us resolve wicked challenges2,3 . In nature, several organisms harbor genes that “selfishly” drive themselves into populations. This natural gene drive uses similar mechanisms to the ones use today to drive engineered genes into laboratory populations4 article we disagree with James et al.1 .In this who have recently proposed that because natural and engineered gene drives are mechanistically indistinguishable from a molecular standpoint, they should both be referred as “gene drives” because “a gene drive is a gene drive.” We instead propose that two terms be used to distinguish between natural and engineered gene drives, we second Wells and Steinbrecher5 arguments, and propose to use the terms natural gene drive (NGD) and engineered gene drive (EGD).
Proposed Changes to the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules (NIH Guidelines)
27609National Institutes of Health, Federal Register, 2023-08-10 08:09:09.
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) seeks input on a proposal to revise the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules (NIH Guidelines) to include specific considerations and requirements for conducting research involving gene drive modified organisms (GDMO) in contained research settings. NIH is proposing to update the NIH Guidelines to clarify minimum containment requirements, propose considerations for performing risk assessments, and define additional institutional responsibilities regarding Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) and Biosafety Officers (BSOs). The proposed revisions are specific to GDMO research subject to the NIH Guidelines, conducted in contained settings and are consistent with the recommendations of the NIH Novel and Exceptional Technology Research Advisory Committee report, Gene Drives in Biomedical Research (NExTRAC Report). NIH does not currently support research involving potential field release of GDMOs and the NIH Guidelines pertain to contained research; accordingly, no changes regarding potential field release are being proposed in this Notice. NIH is also proposing revisions to the NIH Guidelines to harmonize with the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL), 6th edition regarding the Risk Group (RG) categorization of West Nile Virus (WNV) and Saint Louis Encephalitis Virus (SLEV).
Routes of Introduction of Anopheles gambiae Into Remote Islands in the Indian Ocean
26612R. E. Ditter, M. Campos, M. W. Crepeau, J. Pinto, A. Toilibou, Y. Amina, Y. Lee, A. J. Cornel and G. C. Lanzaro, 2023-07-07 13:23:28.
The malaria vector Anopheles gambiae s.s., is a primary malaria vector throughout sub-Saharan Africa including the islands of the Comoros archipelago (Anjouan, Grande Comore, Mayotte and Mohéli). These islands are located at the northern end of the Mozambique Channel in eastern Africa. Previous studies have shown a relatively high degree of genetic isolation between island and mainland populations of A. gambiae, but the origin of the island populations remains unclear. Here, we analyzed phylogenetic relationships among island and mainland populations using complete mitochondrial genome sequences of individual A. gambiae specimens. We investigated the source population of A. gambiaefor each island, determined the number of introductions and estimated when they occurred, and explored evidence for contemporary gene flow between island and mainland populations. Phylogenetic analysis and haplotype networks were constructed from mitogenome sequences of 258 A. gambiae from the four islands. In addition, 112 individuals from seven countries across sub-Saharan Africa and Madagascar were included to identify potential source populations. Our results suggest that introduction events of A. gambiae into the Comoros archipelago were rare and recent events and that there is no evidence of contemporary migration between the islands and mainland Africa. This study further supports the suitability of these oceanic islands as appropriate sites for conducting field trial releases of genetically engineered mosquitoes (GEMs).
Defining transformation events for gene drive in species complexes
25001J. B. Connolly, IOBC-WPRS Bulletin, 163:8-20. 2023-04-13 15:11:40.
Engineered gene drives (EGDs) that allow the super-Mendelian inheritance of genetic traits could one day be used to reduce the vectorial capacity of Anopheles species that transmit human malaria in Africa. Many Anopheles species belong to complexes of closely related sibling species that can produce fertile interspecific hybrid females. In cases where the genomic target locus of the EGD is conserved amongst sibling species from the same complex as the released target species, it would therefore be plausible that the EGD could be vertically transmitted from the target species to sibling species by interspecific mating. To differentiate genetically modified organisms, the term ‘transformation event’ is used, based on the specific genomic location of the transgenic construct, as a result of random genomic integration. In contrast, an EGD is generated via its precise and reproducible insertion in its specific genomic target locus. These considerations pose two key questions for the use of EGD in species complexes: (i) what does the definition of “transformation event” mean in the context of vertical gene drive transfer of the EGD to sibling species in species complexes and (ii) does de novo transformation of an EGD into a sibling species constitute the same transformation event as introgression by backcrossing into a sibling species of an EGD that had been originally transformed in the target species? While definitions of the term transformation event that have been provided by national and intergovernmental organisations are somewhat ambiguous, they do provide scope for broad interpretation of vertical gene drive transfer of a specific EGD to different sibling species of the target species as the same transformation event. There also appears to be some consensus that definitions of transformation event support the notion that de novo transformations of an EGD in sibling species constitute the same transformation events as introgression by backcrossing into sibling species of an EGD that had been originally inserted in the target species.
A gene drive is a gene drive: the debate over lumping or splitting definitions
24910S. L. James, D. A. O'Brochta, F. Randazzo and O. Akbari, Nature Communications, 2023-03-29 12:22:20.
Gene drive technologies are being considered as a new approach to address a variety of currently intractable global problems, including to prevent disease transmission, reduce crop loss, and preserve biodiversity1. There are some outside the genetics research community who argue that wide use of the term “gene drive” to encompass selfish genetic elements found either in extant organisms (natural gene drives) or assembled in the laboratory (synthetic gene drives) will discourage the necessary scrutiny of risks that may be associated with the introduction of synthetic gene drives into free-living populations of target organisms2,3. Here we argue that the current definition is both scientifically sound and promotes good governance.
Gene Drives: Target Malaria is underestimating the risks
24867C. Then, Testbiotech, 2023-03-17 07:55:56.
The Target Malaria consortium has for several years been planning to conduct field trials using genetically engineered mosquitoes in Burkina Faso. The aim is to transfer artificial gene constructs, i. e. the so-called ‘X-shredder’, into wild populations of the mosquitoes. This gene construct is meant to reduce the number of female offspring, and thus bring about a decline in the overall population of mosquitoes (Anopheles gambiae) known to transmit malaria. However, as recent research shows, the planned releases are based on flawed data and incorrect assumptions.
Assessing the hybridization potential between a hypothetical gene drive-modified Drosophila suzukii strain and non-target Drosophila species
24990J. Romeis, S. Wolf, J. Collatz, J. Enkerli and F. Widmer, IOBC-WPRS Bulletin, 163:108. 2023-03-13 14:49:23.
Genetically engineered gene drives (GD) are a potentially powerful tool to control pest insects by population suppression or even elimination. Before living GD modified insects can be released into the environment, they must pass an environmental risk assessment (ERA). A key question to be addressed is the potential acquisition of functional GD elements by nontarget species as this may lead to the loss of those species and to a disruption of the ecosystem services they provide. The main route for gene flow is through hybridization between the GD insect strain and closely related species that co-occur in the area of release. Using the invasive Drosophila suzukii as a case study, we demonstrate how the potential for hybridization can be assessed.
Engagement on risk assessment for gene drive mosquitoes by EFSA and Target Malaria
24794S. Hartley, A. Kokotovich, Y. Devos and J. Mumford, Environmental Science and Policy, 142:183-193. 2023-02-27 11:12:07.
As engineered gene drive technologies continue to advance, many actors are actively considering how environmental risk assessments (RAs) for gene drive organisms should be conducted, and how stakeholder engagement opportunities should be provided. There is, however, a lack of clarity concerning what constitutes engagement on gene drive RA and, furthermore, what forms of engagement already exist around gene drive RA. To address this gap, we reflect on the actions of a risk assessor (the European Food Safety Authority, EFSA) and a gene drive developer (Target Malaria) to understand: 1) the RA-related decisions that each are making concerning gene drive technology for mosquitoes and other harmful insects, 2) the existing role of engagement in those decisions, and 3) the implications for our understandings of engagement and RA. We found, first, that both EFSA and Target Malaria have already made many RA-related decisions, even though any preparation and evaluation of a formal RA for gene drive mosquitoes remains far off. This finding supports the idea that gene drive RA involves multiple processes and decisions in different forms across the entire technology and regulatory development process. Second, we found that both EFSA and Target Malaria have already integrated engagement into their respective RA-related decisions in different ways, reflecting their different roles. We conclude by considering how EFSA and Target Malaria could improve their existing RA-related engagement by explicitly considering disciplinary diversity and worldview diversity in their related decision making.
Environmental, Socio-economic, and Health Impact Assessment (ESHIA) for Gene Drive Organisms
24428isaaa Inc. and Outreach Network for Gene Drive Research, ISAAA, 2023-01-11 10:31:02.
Understanding the possible positive and negative impacts that gene drive organisms could have on the environment and people is essential before these technologies are considered for release, whether for research purposes or for use. Different impacts are assessed through different tools and methodologies. While environmental risks are evaluated through specific risk assessments, other dimensions, such as positive and negative impacts on a social, economic, and health level can be assessed through impact assessments. These environmental, socio-economic and health impact assessments can complement the information provided by environmental risk assessments.
Exploring the value of a global gene drive project registry
24279R. I. Taitingfong, C. Triplett, V. N. Vásquez, R. M. Rajagopalan, R. Raban, A. Roberts, G. Terradas, B. Baumgartner, C. Emerson, F. Gould, F. Okumu, C. E. Schairer, H. C. Bossin, L. Buchman, K. J. Campbell, A. Clark, J. Delborne, K. Esvelt, J. Fisher, R., Nature Biotechnology, 2022-12-15 14:15:40.
Recent calls to establish a global project registry before releasing any gene-drive-modified organisms (GDOs) have suggested a registry could be valuable to coordinate research, collect data to monitor and evaluate potential ecological impacts, and facilitate transparent communication with community stakeholders and the general public. Here, we report the results of a multidisciplinary expert workshop on GDO registries convened on 8–9 December 2020 involving 70 participants from 14 countries. Participants had expertise in gene drive design, conservation and population modeling, social science, stakeholder engagement, governance and regulation, international policy, and vector control; they represented 45 organizations, spanning national and local governmental agencies, international organizations, nonprofit organizations, universities, and district offices overseeing local vector control. The workshop aimed to gather perspectives on a central question: “In what ways could a gene-drive project registry both contribute to and detract from the fair development, testing and use of GDOs?” We specifically queried the perceived purpose of a registry, the information that would need to be included, and the perceived value of a registry. Three primary findings emerged from the discussion: first, many participants agreed a registry could serve a coordinating function for multidisciplinary and multisector work activities; second, doing so may require different design elements, depending on the target end-user group and intended purpose for that group; and third, these different information requirements lead to concerns about information sharing via a registry, suggesting potential obstacles to achieving transparency through such a mechanism. We conclude that any development of a gene-drive project registry requires careful and inclusive deliberation, including with potential end-users, to ensure that registry design is optimal.
Experts urge caution over biotech that can wipe out insect pests
24153L. Fauvel, Phys Org, 2022-12-09 07:09:45.
Dozens of scientists, experts and campaigners called for a ban on the release of genetically-edited organisms into the wild, in a statement Friday warning of potentially severe risks to the world's pollinators. The appeal was launched at crunch biodiversity talks in Montreal, where delegates from almost all the world's countries were meeting to negotiate a strategy to halt human environmental destruction, which threatens the natural life support systems of the planet. A host of new genome-editing tools that modify the genetic material of living beings have emerged in recent years, and are being researched and developed largely to target insects and plants in agriculture. Supporters argue that they could help human health, agriculture and even species conservation. But their use in the wild carries "understudied risks which could accelerate the decline of pollinator populations and put entire food webs at risk," according to the letter drafted by the French non-governmental organization Pollinis.
Bioinformatic and literature assessment of toxicity and allergenicity of a CRISPR-Cas9 engineered gene drive to control the human malaria mosquito vector Anopheles gambiae
24161A. Qureshi and J. B. Connolly, Malaria Journal, 2022-12-06 07:52:06.
Population suppression gene drive is currently being evaluated, including via environmental risk assessment (ERA), for malaria vector control. One such gene drive involves the dsxFCRISPRh transgene encoding (i) hCas9 endonuclease, (i) T1 guide RNA (gRNA) targeting the doublesex locus, and (iii) DsRed fluorescent marker protein, in genetically modified mosquitoes (GMMs). Problem formulation, the first stage of ERA, for environmental releases of dsxFCRISPRh previously identified nine potential harms to the environment or health that could occur, should expressed products of the transgene cause allergenicity or toxicity. Amino acid sequences of hCas9 and DsRed were interrogated against those of toxins or allergens from NCBI, UniProt, COMPARE and AllergenOnline bioinformatic databases and the gRNA was compared with microRNAs from the miRBase database for potential impacts on gene expression associated with toxicity or allergenicity. PubMed was also searched for any evidence of toxicity or allergenicity of Cas9 or DsRed, or of the donor organisms from which these products were originally derive While Cas9 nuclease activity can be toxic to some cell types in vitro and hCas9 was found to share homology with the prokaryotic toxin VapC, there was no evidence of a risk of toxicity to humans and other animals from hCas9. Although hCas9 did contain an 8-mer epitope found in the latex allergen Hev b 9, the full amino acid sequence of hCas9 was not homologous to any known allergens. Combined with a lack of evidence in the literature of Cas9 allergenicity, this indicated negligible risk to humans of allergenicity from hCas9. No matches were found between the gRNA and microRNAs from either Anopheles or humans. Moreover, potential exposure to dsxFCRISPRh transgenic proteins from environmental releases was assessed as negligible.Bioinformatic and literature assessments found no convincing evidence to suggest that transgenic products expressed from dsxFCRISPRh were allergens or toxins, indicating that environmental releases of this population suppression gene drive for malaria vector control should not result in any increased allergenicity or toxicity in humans or animals. These results should also inform evaluations of other GMMs being developed for vector control and in vivo clinical applications of CRISPR-Cas9.
East African policy dialogue on research of genetically modified mosquitoes for malaria control and elimination
24112C. Mugoya, Target Malaria, 2022-12-02 09:27:43.
The East African Community Secretariat, in collaboration with the East African Health Research Commission; NEPAD, AFIDEP and IFAKARA Health Institute recently convened an East African regional dialogue in Dar es salaam, Tanzania from 17-19 November 2022 to deliberate the way forward on the legal and regulatory frameworks guiding research on genetically modified mosquitoes to solve the problem of malaria in the East African region. The dialogue was attended by legislators from the seven countries of the East African Community partner states – Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda and South Sudan, policy makers, government officials, and health experts including biotechnology/biosafety regulators.
No Environmental Release of Gene Drive Organisms
24114Anonymous, STOP GENE DRIVES, 2022-11-30 09:32:55.
We urge governments to prevent the environmental release of gene drive organisms and to establish a global moratorium on the release of gene drive organisms at the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Gene drives work against natural rules of inheritance forcing nearly 100% instead of the usual 50% of offspring to inherit their genetically engineered traits. Whereas existing biosafety systems are designed to limit the spread and persistence of living modified organisms to mitigate against adverse impacts, gene drives are intended to spread genetic modifications to alter species and ecosystems. This would undermine the integrity of the UN Cartagena Protocol and international and national biosafety systems, including the procedures for Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) of countries and Free, Prior and Informed consent (FPIC) of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.
WORLDWIDE: EXPERTS ON GENE DRIVES
23840Stop Gene Drive, STOP GENE DRIVES, 2022-11-07 09:51:54.
We are travelling the world speaking to some of the world’s leading thinkers, activists and academics on the impact of gene drives. We interviewed more than 20 experts from around the world
GMOs in Africa: Status, adoption and public acceptance
27490L. A. Gbadegesin, E. A. Ayeni, C. K. Tettey, V. A. Uyanga, O. O. Aluko, J. K. Ahiakpa, C. O. Okoye, J. I. Mbadianya, M. A. Adekoya, R. O. Aminu, F. P. Oyawole and P. Odufuwa, Food Control, 141:109193. 2022-11-01 13:46:04.
Globally, genetically modified (GM) crops contribute to food security by increasing crop yield, quality and shelf-life. The commercialisation and adoption of GM crops in many developed countries raised hope of improving food security and livelihood. Africa, a developing continent facing malnutrition, food crises and inadequate food production technologies has been slow to accept GM crops. The hesitancy to accept GM crops emanates from unfavourable policies shaped by public opinion, despite its potential for achieving the zero-hunger agenda. Impeding factors hampering the adoption of GM technology necessitate biosecurity regulations on GM crops to monitor the crop biosafety, environmental and health concerns. Herein, we reviewed GM crops status and adoption in Africa and possible constraints to their acceptance amidst some commercialised GM crops in African countries. Efforts aimed at improving GM adoption in Africa should include the provision of adequate monitoring and surveillance system, science-based policies, political will and a robust public education on GM technology.
What are gene drivers and why do 300,000 people want them banned?
23828Anika, Social Bites, 2022-10-21 23:39:53.
Ecologists in Action and Madrid Agroecologico submitted 300,000 citizen signatures to the Ministry of Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge, asking Minister Teresa Ribera to give Spain a boost. International moratorium on technology for the release of organisms modified with gene drives (OIG) It will be discussed during the negotiations of the XV Conference on the Convention on Biological Diversity to be held in December. During the delivery of the signatures, the participants risks to human health and the environment of this new gene technology. Activists claimed with a banner that this genetic engineering technology contained an international moratorium and “danger” for environmentalists.
GeneConvene Global Collaborative | Laboratory Containment of Arthropods Capable of Gene Drive: Best Practices and Recommendations
23739Hector Quemada, GeneConvene Global Collaborative, 2022-10-13 14:19:28.
This webinar is presented by members of the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene's American Committee of Medical Entomologists who were involved in drafting a recent Addendum to the ASTMH's Arthropod Containment Guidelines that specifically consider arthropods with gene drive systems. https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/vbz.2021.0035
ISAAA Policy Brief: Risk Assessment for Gene Drive Organisms
23562Anonymous, ISAAA, 2022-08-31 14:52:33.
Gene drive is a genetic phenomenon that occurs in nature and causes a selected trait to spread rapidly through a species via sexual reproduction over generations, potentially becoming increasingly common within a specific species. Gene drive systems are being developed in the laboratory to replicate this natural phenomenon in order to help tackle major challenges such as malaria. In this way, a desired change is passed on to up to 100% of offspring, rather than at the more usual rate of 50%. This technology is currently under research, and the risks and benefits of each potential application are being thoroughly investigated.
Natural selfish genetic elements should not be defined as gene drives
23435M. A. Wells and R. A. Steinbrecher, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119:e2201142119. 2022-08-16 07:53:39.
Gene drives are increasingly discussed in the political realm,and how the term is defined therefore has important impli-cations. The opinion piece from Alphey et al. (1) identifies alack of consensus on the definition and makes explicitchanges in how the terminology is being used by someresearchers. As such it is a timely invitation for debate.The definition of the term“gene drive”Alphey et al. (1)propose would include naturally occurring selfish geneticelements (SGEs) and natural processes causing biasedinheritance. We disagree with this aspect of the proposal,which does not reflect the original use of the term, whichrelated to engineered system
What do we mean by “Target Organism” in Target Malaria’s gene drive research?
23336J. B. Connolly, Target Malaria, 2022-07-27 08:46:32.
In the wild and in laboratory settings, sibling mosquito species can successfully mate to produce viable offspring, regardless of whether they are vectors or not. Importantly, females, but not males, of these offspring can be fertile. Nonetheless, the likelihood of finding such hybrid mosquitoes in field samples varies greatly between different combinations of species. According to some field studies, typically, only about 0.1% of mosquito collected in the wild could be An. gambiae s.s./An. coluzzii hybrids. In addition, some species that do not overlap geographically, and therefore would not come into direct contact, cannot produce hybrids in the field. This includes An. melas, which is found along the coast of West Africa, and An. bwambae, which is restricted to hot springs in the Toro District of Uganda. This means that the gene drive could eventually transfer to all sibling species of the complex, both by direct hybridisation between geographically-overlapping species and, indirectly, by transferring from one species to another overlapping ones like stepping-stones until the gene drive was transferred to all species of the complex, including to the likes of An. melas and An. bwambae
Public deliberation and the regulation of gene drive in the USA
23131W. F. West, L. W. Buchman and R. F. Medina, Science and Public Policy, scac032. 2022-06-27 10:41:33.
Gene drive is a new form of biotechnology designed to bias the inheritance of selected traits in animal or plant species that reproduce sexually and have relatively short reproductive cycles. Unlike traditional breeding techniques and other forms of biotechnology, gene drive is designed to spread in wild populations. As such, the prospect of its application raises ecological and socioeconomic concerns that the current system of biotechnology regulation in the USA is ill-equipped to address. Foremost among the proposals for reform is the need for deliberative participation in decision-making by stakeholders representing a broader range of interests and analytical perspectives. As appealing as they are in the abstract, these recommendations overlook both practical and political challenges to democratic governance in administration that have received little attention.
Who decides whether to use gene drives against malaria-carrying mosquitoes?
22730T. H. Saey, ScienceNews, 2022-06-03 08:12:18.
The gene drive interferes with the insects’ ability to reproduce. It wiped out captive populations of mosquitoes in eight to 12 generations (SN: 10/27/18, p. 6) in a small lab study. In 2021, the technology worked in the large cages in Terni, Italy, too. Within as little as five to 10 years, this gene drive could be ready to test in the wild. The first experimental release could be rolled out in Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana or Uganda. In those locations, researchers are working with a nonprofit research consortium called Target Malaria to develop the gene drive carriers along with other genetically engineered mosquitoes to fight malaria. This research is driven by the idea that every tool available must be used to fight malaria, which sickened close to 241 million people in 2020 and killed 670,000 worldwide, mostly in Africa. Children 5 years old and younger accounted for about 80 percent of the continent’s malaria deaths, the World Health Organization says. Because of malaria’s huge toll, large investments have been made to fight the disease, yielding preventive drugs, insecticide-treated bed nets and even malaria vaccines — one was recently recommended for use in sub-Saharan Africa (SN: 12/18/21 & 1/1/22, p. 32). These efforts are helping. But mosquitoes are developing resistance to insecticides, and some anti-malaria drugs may no longer work well.
Recommendations for environmental risk assessment of gene drive applications for malaria vector control
22586J. B. Connolly, J. D. Mumford, D. C. M. Glandorf, S. Hartley, O. T. Lewis, S. W. Evans, G. Turner, C. Beech, N. Sykes, M. B. Coulibaly, J. Romeis, J. L. Teem, W. Tonui, B. Lovett, A. Mankad, A. Mnzava, S. Fuchs, T. D. Hackett, W. G. Landis, J. M. Marshall, Malar J, 21:152. 2022-05-25 09:36:02.
Building on an exercise that identified potential harms from simulated investigational releases of a population suppression gene drive for malaria vector control, a series of online workshops identified nine recommendations to advance future environmental risk assessment of gene drive applications.
Self-Deleting Genes Could Control Mosquitoes And Prevent Vector-Borne Diseases
22493A. Russell, Texas AM TODAY, 2022-05-11 07:33:02.
Texas A&M AgriLife Research scientists are testing a technology to make temporary genetic modifications in mosquitoes that self-delete over time. The mechanism to make temporary genetic changes could be important for scientists hoping to modify mosquitoes in ways that help manage populations and prevent vector-borne diseases like West Nile virus without permanently altering wild populations’ genetic makeup. An article detailing their test results is published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences’ PNAS Nexus. The authors, Zach Adelman and Kevin Myles, both professors in the Texas A&M University College of Agriculture and Life Sciences Department of Entomology, describe a method for programming the removal of edited genes within populations of mosquitoes over multiple generations. The method is a first step toward building safeguards for genetic modifications developed to control populations of mosquitoes and the vector-borne diseases they carry. The idea is to test proposed changes without making the changes permanent and without the risk of transmitting them to wild populations, Adelman said.
Self-eliminating Genes Tested on Disease-carrying Mosquitoes
22292M. Taylor, Laboratory Equipment, 2022-05-09 08:25:47.
There’s good reason why CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing is not allowed at the germline. While international commissions are working hard to make this a possibility, potential unknown effects further down the ancestry line raise concerns about the process. The insect equivalent of this—gene drive transgene research—hasn’t been a cause of much concern for researchers working on genetic control of vector populations, especially disease-carrying mosquitoes. Scientists from Texas A&M, however, think the potential affects should be always be considered and have now devised a technology to make all genetic modifications in mosquitoes temporary—until a time when adequate testing ensures safety. Zach Adelman, author of a new paper on the research and a professor at Texas A&M, says many of today’s insect genetic control strategies are based on highly invasive, self-propagating transgenes that can rapidly spread the trait into other populations of mosquitoes. Adelman’s method, however, allows proposed genetic changes to be tested on a temporary basis—without the risk of transmitting them to wild populations. The temporary genetic modifications self-delete over multiple generations of mosquitoes.
Self-eliminating genes tested on mosquitoes
21924A. Russell, AGRILIFE Today, 2022-04-27 09:13:46.
Texas A&M AgriLife Research scientists have tested a technology to make temporary genetic modifications in mosquitoes. The modifications self-delete over time. Texas A&M AgriLife Research scientists published an article detailing a mechanism to make temporary genetic alterations to mosquitoes. The mechanism to make temporary genetic changes could be important for scientists hoping to modify mosquitoes in ways that help manage populations and prevent vector-borne diseases like West Nile virus without permanently altering wild populations’ genetic makeup.
UC Davis — Malaria Gene Drive Feasibility Analysis
21563Good Ventures, Good Ventures, 2022-03-31 12:24:36.
Open Philanthropy recommended a grant of $10,248,967 over three years to UC Davis to support subsequent stages of a feasibility analysis of a potential test of gene drives for malaria control on the adjoining West African islands of São Tomé and Príncipe. The work, led by Dr. Greg Lanzaro and colleagues, will focus on a potential gene drive application that would reduce or inhibit the ability of mosquitoes to transmit the malarial parasite, without impacting the size of the mosquito population on the islands. As part of the preliminary feasibility analysis, which Open Philanthropy supported in February 2020, Dr. Lanzaro’s team developed working relationships with local communities, established an ethics advisory board, developed a communication plan, and conducted appropriate safety tests.
UC San Diego Biology Lab Receives $1.4M Grant to Fight Malaria Spread
21561E. Dameron, UC San Diego News Center, 2022-03-30 12:17:33.
Scientists at the University of California San Diego are hard at work on new genetic technologies intended for use in curbing mosquito populations, fighting the spread of malaria and mitigating the hazards associated with the deployment of gene-editing systems in the wild. That work is now being bolstered by a $1.4 million grant from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. “My lab, historically, was a fruit fly lab,” said Ethan Bier, distinguished professor of developmental biology at UC San Diego and science director for the Tata Institute for Genetics and Society. “About five years ago in collaboration with the laboratory of Anthony James at UC Irvine, we started transferring some of our genetic strategies into mosquitoes. We’re very fortunate that the Gates Foundation is supporting the continuation of that work.”
The power of gene editing
20973The Economist, The Economist, 2022-03-17 07:27:42.
Technologies such as genetic modification and ‘CRISPR’ will cure hereditary diseases, produce disease-resistant crops and enable the breeding of malaria-free mosquitos. But advances bring ethical and practical dilemmas. Genetically modified food is banned in the EU, and doctors worry that screening for genetic diseases may pave the way for more controversial uses, such as creating so-called designer babies. This film looks at the risks and rewards of gene editing.
Could species-focused suppression of Aedes aegypti, the yellow fever mosquito, and Aedes albopictus, the tiger mosquito, affect interacting predators? An evidence synthesis from the literature
20971J. A. S. Bonds, C. M. Collins and L.-C. Gouagna, Pest Management Science, 2022-03-16 07:20:33.
The risks of Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus nuisance and vector-borne diseases are rising and the adverse effects of broad-spectrum insecticide application has promoted species-specific techniques, such as sterile insect technique (SIT) and other genetic strategies, as contenders in their control operations. When specific vector suppression is proposed, potential effects on predators and wider ecosystem are some of the first stakeholder questions. These are not the only Aedes vectors of human diseases, but are those for which SIT and genetic strategies are of most interest. They vary ecologically and in habitat origin, but both have behaviourally human-adapted forms with expanding ranges. The aquatic life stages are where predation is strongest due to greater resource predictability and limited escape opportunity. These vectors' anthropic forms usually use ephemeral water bodies and man-made containers as larval habitats; predators that occur in these are mobile, opportunistic and generalist. No literature indicates that any predator depends on larvae of either species. As adults, foraging theory predicts these mosquitoes are of low profitability to predators. Energy expended hunting and consuming will mostly outweigh their energetic benefit. Moreover, as adult biomass is mobile and largely disaggregated, any predator is likely to be a generalist and opportunist. This work, which summarises much of the literature currently available on the predators of Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus, indicates it is highly unlikely that any predator species depends on them. Species-specific vector control to reduce nuisance and disease is thus likely to be of negligible or limited impact on non-target predators
Rescue by gene swamping as a gene drive deployment strategy
20587K. D. Harris and G. Greenbaum, bioRxiv, 2022.03.08.483503. 2022-03-08 11:25:49.
Gene drives are genetic constructs that can spread deleterious alleles with potential application to population suppression of harmful species. Given that a gene drive can potentially spill over to other populations or even other species, control measures and fail-safes strategies must be considered. Gene drives are designed to generate a rapid demographic decline, while at the same time generating a dynamic change in the population’s genetics. Since these evolutionary and demographic processes are linked and are expected to occur at a similar time-scale during gene drive spread, feedback between these processes may significantly affect the outcome of deployment. To study this feedback and to understand how it affects gene drive spillovers, we developed a gene drive model that combines evolutionary and demographic dynamics in a two-population setting. The model demonstrates how feedback between evolutionary and demographic dynamics can generate additional outcomes to those generated by the evolutionary dynamics alone. We identify an outcome of particular interest, where the short-term suppression of the target population is followed by gene swamping and loss of the gene drive. This outcome could be useful for designing gene drive deployments that temporarily suppress the population, but ultimately do not remain in the population. Using our model, we demonstrate the robustness of this outcome to spillover and to the evolution of resistance, and suggest that it could be used as a fail-safe strategy for gene drive deployment.Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.
Adult mosquito predation and potential impact on the sterile insect technique
21014N. S. Bimbilé Somda, H. Maïga, W. Mamai, T. Bakhoum, T. Wallner, S. B. Poda, H. Yamada and J. Bouyer, Scientific Reports, 12:2561. 2022-02-15 06:32:02.
The sterile insect technique is a promising environmentally friendly method for mosquito control. This technique involves releasing laboratory-produced sterile males into a target field site, and its effectiveness may be affected by the extent of adult mosquito predation. Sterile males undergo several treatments. Therefore, it is vital to understand which treatments are essential in minimizing risks to predation once released. The present study investigates the predation propensity of four mantis species (Phyllocrania paradoxa, Hymenopus coronatus, Blepharopsis mendica, Deroplatys desiccata) and two gecko species (Phelsuma standingi, P. laticauda) on adult Aedes aegypti, Ae. albopictus and Anopheles arabiensis mosquitoes in a laboratory setting. First, any inherent predation preferences regarding mosquito species and sex were evaluated. Subsequently, the effects of chilling, marking, and irradiation, on predation rates were assessed. The selected predators effectively preyed on all mosquito species regardless of the treatment. Predation propensity varied over days for the same individuals and between predator individuals. Overall, there was no impact of laboratory treatments of sterile males on the relative risk of predation by the test predators, unless purposely exposed to double the required sterilizing irradiation dose. Further investigations on standardized predation trials may lead to additional quality control tools for irradiated mosquitoes.
Conditions for Investment in Genetic Biocontrol of Pest Vertebrates in Australia
20264L. Carter, A. Mankad, S. Campbell, W. Ruscoe, K. P. Oh, P. R. Brown, M. Byrne, M. Tizard and T. Strive, Frontiers in Agronomy, 3. 2022-01-31 08:46:53.
Managing pest vertebrate species in Australia is a significant challenge for government, industry, research sectors and land-managers. Innovative tools such as genetic biocontrol offers decision-makers a potentially effective means of reducing the impact of pest species incursions. To determine the conditions for investment in genetic biocontrol, we applied qualitative engagement methodologies to identify and integrate existing knowledge of pest species research and management in Australia. Two facilitated workshops were held to determine key topics related to genetic biocontrol technologies for selected pest species. The topics explored during workshop discussions included: identifying existing knowledge gaps; risk perceptions; social and ethical considerations and; industry and business considerations. The workshops' aim was to assess the potential, the priorities and the risk parameters among expert stakeholders and decision-makers for using genetic biocontrol approaches to reduce the impacts of key pest species in Australia. This paper reports on the design, process and outcomes of each workshop to inform the creation of a decision framework. Stakeholders were cautiously optimistic of pursuing continued research and development for vertebrate pest management in Australia. However, employing an appropriate, transparent process for incorporating diverse stakeholder perspectives on genetic biocontrol technologies is essential to ensure their development and use remains supported. This outcome will require meaningful investment in both social science investigations and well-considered engagement processes concurrent with biotechnology development globally.
IMPACTOS AMBIENTAIS DA TÉCNICA DE GENE DRIVE PARA O CONTROLE DE EPIDEMIAS: ALCANCES E LIMITES DO PRINCÍPIO DA PRECAUÇÃO
23875N. R. Furtado, PERI Revista de Filosofia, 13. 2022-01-19 09:24:19.
The paper discusses the application of the precautionary principle in the management of environmental risks arising from the use of gene drives to control epidemics. Gene drives consist of a technique for creating genetically modified organisms, which are released into an ecosystem with the aim of spreading certain genetic elements and prevailing over native organisms. Among the possible uses of this technique are the control of epidemics. Despite its benefits, assessing the impact of gene drives on the environment proves to be a challenge. In the field of biotechnology, the socalled precautionary principle was formulated as a strategy to ground decisions whose consequences are uncertain. However, its application raises discussions about the ability to prevent damage from new technologies. Its critics argue that the precautionary mentality could lead to inaction, obstructing scientific development. Thus, this article highlights the contributions of such principle to guide the use of gene drives, while reflecting on its limits, confronting it with an alternative risk management model: the proactionary principle.
Insect Allies – Assessment of a Viral Approach to Plant Genome Editing
20036K. Pfeifer, J. L. Frieß and B. Giese, Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management, 2022-01-12 09:38:06.
The DARPA program Insect Allies has already sparked scientific debate concerning technology assessment-related issues, among which the most prevalent is that of dual use potential. As apart from the issues concerning peaceful applications, the technology also provides the blueprint for a potential bioweapon as further evidenced by a recent publication. However, the combination of a virus-induced genetic modification of crop plants in the field using genetically modified insect vectors poses an increased risk potential in comparison to the hitherto existing use of genetically modified organisms. The technology's high depth of intervention enables a number of sources for hazard and a by trend high exposure, but it is also encumbered with notable deficits in knowledge. These issues call for a thorough technology assessment. This article aims to provide an initial characterization from a technology assessment perspective, focusing on potential sources of risk for this novel invasive environmental biotechnology at an early stage of research and development. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.© 2022 The Authors. Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Society of Environmental Toxicology & Chemistry (SETAC).
iGEM and Gene Drives: A Case Study for Governance
20040P. Millett, T. Alexanian, M. J. Palmer, S. W. Evans, T. Kuiken and K. Oye, Health Security, 2022-01-11 09:49:06.
Gene drives have already challenged governance systems. In this case study, we explore the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition's experiences in gene drive-related research and lessons in developing, revising, and implementing a governance system. iGEM's experiences and lessons are distilled into 6 key insights for future gene drive policy development in the United States: (1) gene drives deserve special attention because of their potential for widescale impact and remaining uncertainty about how to evaluate intergenerational and transboundary risks; (2) an adaptive risk management approach is logical for gene drives because of the rapidly changing technical environment; (3) review by individual technical experts is limited and may fail to incorporate other forms of expertise and, therefore, must be complemented with a range of alternative governance methods; (4) current laboratory biosafety and biosecurity review processes may not capture gene drive research or its components in practice even if they are covered theoretically; (5) risk management for research and development must incorporate discussions of values and broader implications of the work; and (6) a regular technology horizon scanning capacity is needed for the early identification of advances that could pose governance system challenges.
The Need for a Tiered Registry for US Gene Drive Governance
20003K. L. Warmbrod, A. L. Kobokovich, R. West, G. K. Gronvall and M. Montague, Health Security, 2022-01-10 10:08:26.
A great deal of attention has been focused on the potential risks of gene drives, the kinds of biosafety protections they may require, and how they may be reversed; however, less attention has been paid to the systems that would be useful to have in place in the future, when multiple gene drives may be fielded in multiple species, environments, and countries.4-7 The need for coordinated governance of these technologies will become more pressing as gene drive technologies advance and more drives are created to address other vector-borne diseases like the West Nile virus, agricultural pest management, or invasive species. Gene drives carry different inherent risks compared with other genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Existing governance mechanisms for traditional GMOs are insufficient for oversight of gene drives, which require different systems to assess their usefulness and safety. To address the needs for enhanced oversight, we propose a tiered registry system, similar to the clinical trials databases, which can provide government officials, researchers, biotechnology companies, and the public with useful information about ongoing gene drive research or previously released gene drives. Such a resource would enable scientists to confirm that new gene drives would not interfere with existing drives, provide the public with the information needed to make informed decisions concerning consent for release of gene drives, provide researchers with technical information needed to prevent collisions of independent projects modifying the same organism, and provide regulators with information critical for effective oversight. We propose that the US government should implement such a registry for gene drives in the United States, which does not have a robust gene drive regulatory system in place and is not party to the international treaty most relevant for international gene drive regulation, the Convention on Biological Diversity.8 In this commentary, we describe current efforts to safely regulate gene drive and similar genetic technologies worldwide and how the United States could build a tiered registry database that is specifically designed to regulate such technologies throughout a drive's life cycle.
An Introduction to Containment Recommendations for Gene Drive Mosquitoes and the Laboratory Rearing of Genetically Engineered Mosquitoes in Africa
20044S. Higgs, Vector-Borne and Zoonotic Diseases, 2022-01-06 10:04:57.
The prospect of using genetically engineered arthropods to reduce the incidence of vector-borne diseases either indirectly by suppressing vector populations or directly by replacing wild-type vector species with less competent ones has long been discussed; however, only in the past few years has this become feasible. The advent of CRISPR/Cas9-based gene drive and its application to mosquitoes have been a critical factor in bringing the dream to reality, but with opportunity also comes responsibility. Safe and secure handling of genetically engineered arthropods under laboratory/insectary conditions was considered in the original and revised ACGs, and under field conditions by Benedict et al. (2008). Although not discussed in these ACGs, hence the need for this addendum, Benedict et al. (2018) discussed containment and management of gene drive arthropods as distinct from genetically modified mosquitoes under laboratory conditions. A prerequisite for the application of engineered mosquitoes for mosquito-borne disease control is the rearing of these mosquitoes in countries where releases will ultimately occur. In 2018, three companion articles were published in VBZ that discussed this very issue (Mumford et al. 2018, Quinlan et al. 2018a, 2018b), with James et al. (2020) discussing efficacy and safety criteria for advancing gene drive-modified mosquitoes to field testing. In this issue of VBZ, we publish two highly relevant articles that coincidentally, although submitted independently, are complementary.
Stakeholder Views on Engagement, Trust, Performance, and Risk Considerations About Use of Gene Drive Technology in Agricultural Pest Management
19900C. L. Goldsmith, K. E. Kang, E. Heitman, Z. N. Adelman, L. W. Buchman, D. Kerns, X. Liu, R. F. Medina and A. Vedlitz, Health Security, 2021-12-31 08:17:50.
Gene drive is an experimental technique that may make it possible to alter the genetic traits of whole populations of a species through the genetic modification of a relatively small number of individuals. This technology is sufficiently new that literature on the understanding and views of stakeholders and the public regarding the use of gene drive organisms in agricultural pest management is just beginning to emerge. Our team conducted a 2-pronged engagement process with Texas gene drive agricultural stakeholders to ascertain their values, beliefs, and preferences about the efficacy, safety, and risk management considerations of gene drive technology as a potential tool for agricultural pest management. We found that a majority of stakeholders support gene drive research and its potential use for managing agricultural pests. Our work with stakeholders confirms both their willingness to be engaged and the importance they place on stakeholder and public engagement regarding these issues, as well as the need to address these issues before use of gene drive as a pest management mechanism will be accepted and trusted.
Facilitating the Conversation: Gene Drive Classification
19766J. Overcash and A. Golnar, Health Security, 2021-12-29 13:09:10.
Gene drives are an emerging technology with tremendous potential to impact public health, agriculture, and conservation. While gene drives can be described simply as selfish genetic elements (natural or engineered) that are inherited at non-Mendelian rates, upon closer inspection, engineered gene drive technology is a complex class of biotechnology that uses a diverse number of genetic features to bias rates of inheritance. As a complex technology, gene drives can be difficult to comprehend, not only for the public and stakeholders, but also to risk assessors, risk managers, and decisionmakers not familiar with gene drive literature. To address this difficulty, we describe a gene drive classification system based on 5 functional characteristics. These characteristics include a gene drive's objective, mechanism, release threshold, range, and persistence. The aggregate of the gene drive's characteristics can be described as the gene drive's architecture. Establishing a classification system to define different gene drive technologies should make them more comprehensible to the public and provide a framework to guide regulatory evaluation and decisionmaking.
Laboratory Biosafety in Handling Genetically Modified Mosquitoes
19963J. Charles, Genetically Modified and other Innovative Vector Control Technologies, 2021-12-21 11:19:52.
One of the novel approaches in controlling vector-borne diseases is to release genetically modified mosquitoes in nature. Trial studies are done in different phases by the researches, both in the laboratory and in the fields. Before a GM mosquito is validated to be ready for field release, the same has to rigorously go through several phase studies, and Phase I being the laboratory is the most significant to set the future of the GM mosquito for future investigations. Though the risk of handling GM mosquitoes in laboratory is low, nevertheless there is a prescribed list of DOs and DON’Ts, and the laboratory workers are needed to strictly follow the SOPs or basic principles of biosafety like handling administrative controls, using biosafety equipment, wearing personal protective equipment, etc. The laboratory also should have a proper design as per the risk assessment. Accordingly, the biosafety laboratories (BSL) are classified into four types: type 1, 2, 3 and 4. The risks are assessed as per the factors in the host, vector and donor sequences and the environmental factors and their activities in such environments. As GMMs are of low risk, BSL 1 and 2 are enough for their manipulation, but occasionally BSL 3 may be needed. There may be chances of spillage on the working surfaces during manipulation of the genes which can be remedied by the spill management protocols. Biological wastes may be generated in all areas of manipulation. These can be properly treated by either chemical disinfection or autoclaving and disposed of by incineration. These wastes should be segregated in colour-coded bags before disposal. There may be some risks while transporting GMMs to distant places. They should be packed securely in triple-layer pack and sent for disposal following IATA and other road rules. For each process of the manipulation of gene, a separate standard operating procedure (SOP) should be maintained which has to be updated whenever any change in the procedure is made.
Safety Assessment of Novel Genetic Technologies for Vector Control: National and International Perspectives
19961V. Ahuja, Genetically Modified and other Innovative Vector Control Technologies, 2021-12-21 11:15:26.
Novel genetic technologies provide an alternative approach for control of vectors particularly those carrying deadly pathogens. Genetic control technologies aim to either suppress target populations or modify the vector by introducing a heritable factor that reduces or blocks their ability to transmit the diseases. These technologies are thus referred to as population suppression or population modification approaches. Both these approaches offer significant advantages for vector control; however, there are associated biosafety concerns related to possible ecosystem interactions. Therefore, extensive testing on a case-by-case basis is required before these can be used as a public health intervention. This paper provides details of the international initiatives towards development of guidelines and status of regulations in India.
Measuring Public Attitudes to Releases of Transgenic Mosquitoes for Disease Control, with Special Reference to Dengue and Malaria
19958L. A. De Las Llagas and M. S. T. Gunigundo, Genetically Modified and other Innovative Vector Control Technologies, 2021-12-21 11:10:05.
Since the advent of DDT in public health and agriculture, science leaped forward with revolutionary technology such as gene drive or editing, thus making it possible to develop alternative approaches to address vector-borne diseases. However, their utilization and sustenance in public life are dependent on public attitude, i.e., societal awareness and social acceptance. In the face of strong skepticism against genetically modified organisms in both developed and developing countries, public acceptance is therefore a requirement (Boete and Beisel 2013, and Bohannon 2002, as cited in De Souza et al. Understanding the requirements and factors necessary for the acceptance of genetically modified mosquitoes as a potential malaria control tool in Ghana: a questionnaire survey, AsPac J Biol Biotechnol 21(3):76–88, 2013).
Arthropods of Medical Importance: Need for Genetic and Other Innovative Vector Control Technologies, with Emphasis on Eco-biosocial and Environmental Considerations.
19923B. K. Tyagi, Genetically Modified and other Innovative Vector Control Technologies, 2021-12-21 09:22:08.
Among the world’s known vector groups, viz. arthropods, snails and rodents, the most important vectors originate from arthropods, the jointed legs. Arthropods are doubtlessly regarded as the most dominant creatures on the Earth due largely to their remarkable structural and behavioural diversity, besides humongous species preponderance. Of course, some of these arthropods are serious pests and/or vectors of human and animal diseases—deadly, debilitating and economy destructing. According to an estimate, arthropod species make approximately 80% of the global biological diversity. Born some 350–400 million years ago, they have of course achieved, to the utter envy of all other animal forms, a formidable genetic diversity and robustness so much so that they have virtually captivated pivotal human attention for centuries. They serve as a spectacular model of bioprospecting or laboratory experiments mostly because they are found in abundance, breed prodigiously and are exceptionally easier to culture or cultivate. For the aforesaid reasons, arthropods are also the easy target for genetic manipulations such as the transgenesis (using the release of insect carrying dominant lethal (RIDL) gene system or gene drive-based genome editing, e.g. CRISPR/Cas9, to suppress or replace the vector population) or paratransgenesis (e.g. deploying endosymbiont Wolbachia-induced cytoplasmic incompatibility for replacing natural vector population). In particular, the advent of CRISPR technology has excited the potential to engineer new game-changing technologies and innovative systems that can be used to control wild populations of mosquitoes. Two developments of particular interest are a self-limiting system termed precision-guided sterile insect technique (pgSIT) and a homing-based gene drive (HGD). The unique features of these systems can make them valuable tools to control vector mosquitoes in the future. All these biotechnological advancements in vector control are designed to fit well in the multi-methodical integrated vector management (IVM) strategy.
Genetically Modified and other Innovative Vector Control Technologies
19912B. K. Tyagi, SpringerLink, 2021-12-21 08:48:19.
This book comprehensively covers the latest development in developing and deploying the genetically modified vectors, particularly Anopheles and Aedes mosquitoes responsible for transmitting malaria parasites and dengue viruses, the most deadly and/or debilitating among all the vector-borne diseases. It is considered timely and commensurate to bring about a book dealing with the various ecological, biological and social as well as regulatory aspects for the deployment of genetically modified vectors in special context with the biosafety of humans, his associates, and the environment. Written by an array of specialists and experts in various subjects of genetically modified organisms, this book centrally addresses the (i) basic principles of the genetic manipulation of vectors and they are potential impact on human and the environment, (ii) ecological, biological, ethical, legal and social implications of the use of genetically modified vectors, (iii) identification of potential hazards; assessment and management of risks for human and environment; risk/benefit analysis, (iv) principles and practices for the assessment and management of biosecurity and biosafety in laboratories (and in the field), (v) guiding principles for creation and management of institutional or national biosafety review boards and ethics review committees, and (vi) development and application of a biosafety regulatory framework and its related legal principles at national levels for securing the development and use of vector control methods based on genetic modification strategies.
Safe Application of Genetically Modified Mosquito (GMM) to Combat Dengue and Chikungunya Depends on Socioeconomic Status and Social Acceptance in the Developing Countries: A Comprehensive Analysis
19898M. N. Islam, Genetically Modified and other Innovative Vector Control Technologies, 2021-12-21 08:16:32.
The emerging and re-emerging vector-borne diseases are a serious public health problem throughout the world. It has been observed that more than 100 countries and approximately half of the world’s population are at risk on vector-borne diseases (VBDs). The global burden of the vector-borne diseases is unacceptably high. It alludes toward their functional inappropriateness, untimeliness, and irrelevance in controlling vectors and vector-borne diseases. Modern technologies, coupled with other appropriate ones within the precincts of integrated vector management (IVM), can tide over this situation posed by conventional, mostly insecticide-based, methodologies. A lot of challenges, obstacles, and interruptive factors have warranted urgent deployment of new approaches for the control of VBDs keeping in mind the inbuilt ethical, social, and regulatory issues. Genetically modified mosquito (GMM) technology is a complex and highly sophisticated biotechnological intervention for suppression of vector populations. Wolbachia-associated sterile insect technique (SIT) has been proved highly significant and effective for replacement of mosquito populations. Adopting a highly sophisticated GMM technology to suppress or replace the mosquito populations’ density is a big question in developing countries because their priority is directed to foremost fulfill the basic human rights to sustain. Yet, notwithstanding foreseeable bottlenecks, of paramount importance is the need to deploy GMM technology with due consideration to socioeconomic factors and availability of advanced biotechnological facilities during the application of GMM in the developing countries.
New molecular genetic techniques: regulatory and societal considerations
19403Nielsen, K. M., AREA-WIDE INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT: Development and Field Application, 2021-11-29 18:07:46.
A rapidly expanding toolbox of techniques available for genome editing provides the basis for a new continuum in types of modifications that can be introduced into a genome and blur the bimodal GMO vs. non-GMO (genetically modified organism) divide. Site-directed nucleases (SDN) are now used to modify existing nucleotides within genomes instead of adding recombined DNA as transgenes. Moreover, new gene drive approaches are in development based on SDNs. A number of potential drive applications have been reported, but uncertainties in trait stability and limitations in knowledge of the affected system at various temporal and spatial levels slow down their current uses. Adoption of new genome targeted technology takes place in a social context. The context will vary between countries and cultures, expressed in values, ethics, politics and priorities - that are translated into different regulatory approaches. Some developed products using new genome editing techniques clearly fall under internationally negotiated regulations of GMOs. However, other product outcomes of editing techniques challenge our current understanding and definition of GMOs. There is an urgent need for further research, for building international consensus and harmonizing regulatory approaches to facilitate categorization, predictability, transparency, trust and trade.
Genome editing and its applications for insect pest control: Curse or blessing?
19401Hacker, I. , and Schetelig, M. F, AREA-WIDE INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT: Development and Field Application, 2021-11-29 18:00:39.
Gene and genome editing are described as cutting-edge research tools with the potential to tackle urgent global challenges in the management of agricultural pests and human disease vectors such as mosquitoes. The field is defined by the chances and challenges to interlink the disciplines of insect genomics, molecular biology, and pest control together with the need for clear risk assessment, policy development and public approval of the application of such novel technologies. The goal is to generate innovative and sustainable pest control solutions applied in the best interest for the environment and human society. Here, starting from available genome editing technologies, the current strategies and applications for insect pest control are discussed, including approaches to overcome the evolution of resistance alleles and other potential pitfalls to be expected from selective pressures resulting from gene drive applications. They are supplemented by views on regulatory, policy and ethical considerations that in our opinion will be necessary to define how the different tools can be used in the future in a safe and responsible way.
Gene drives in malaria control: what we need to know
19289R. Mudziwapasi, M. C. Changara, A. Ndudzo, T. Kaseke, F. Godobo, F. L. Mtemeli, R. Shoko, F. Songwe, S. Ndlovu and S. Sandra Mlambo, Biotechnology and Biotechnological Equipment, 35:1623-1631. 2021-11-15 13:42:40.
Gene drives are being used to enhance a DNA sequence?s likelihood of passing between generations via sexual reproduction. Gene drives can be deployed to manipulate natural populations. They can be used to suppress populations by reducing the number of individuals in a population or to modify populations. There are more than 3000 mosquito species in the world, some of which are vectors of diseases. Malaria is a typical disease whose vectors are mosquitoes. It affects mostly tropical countries. It kills many people annually, many of whom are children. Interventions currently in use, such as indoor residual spraying and mosquito nets, are proving insufficient to eradicate malaria. Gene drives can be used in different ways to control mosquito populations or to eliminate mosquito species, thereby reducing malaria cases and deaths. This can occur through population replacement or suppression. However, before the elimination of any mosquito species for malaria control, it is necessary to consider the effects of such an action. Additionally, there is a need to review the options available for the control of mosquitoes and to create awareness of the benefits and risks of such an action. This paper, therefore, looks at the role of mosquitoes in the environment, the methods of controlling mosquitoes and malaria and necessary considerations when using gene drives inter alia.
Genome Editing Tools and Gene Drives: A Brief Overview (1st ed.).
19295R. Mudziwapasi, R. Chekera, C. Z. Ncube, I. Shoko, B. Ncube, T. Moyo, J. G. Chimbo, J. Dube, F. F. Mashiri, M. A. Mubani, D. Maruta, C. Chimbo, M. Masuku, R. Shoko, R. P. Nyamusamba and F. N. Jomane, CRC Press, 2021-10-21 14:20:34.
Genome-editing methods are becoming routine tools for molecular and cell biologists. Such tools include ZFNs, CRISPR, megaTALs and TALENs. These tools are revolutionizing the creation of precisely manipulated genomes to modify the characteristics of organisms or cells. Additionally, gene drives have altered the way we understand inheritance laws. They give us the ability to have total control of the inheritance of traits of choice and importance. This succinct volume summarizes the history, principles and applications – as well as the advantages and disadvantages – of each of these tools and various kinds of gene drives. The book is part of a program to produce books helpful to students and faculties of science at colleges and universities. This volume in the Pocket Guides to Biomedical Sciences series will help demystify these technologies. The book fills the gap between established conventional methods and the novel and exciting newly introduced tools of genome editing and gene drives. It will help young scientists understand the emerging genome-editing tools and gene drives, thereby promoting related research and adoption.
Ecological vulnerability analysis for suppression of Drosophila suzukii by gene drives
19082C. R. Lalyer, L. Sigsgaard and B. Giese, Global Ecology and Conservation, 32:e01883. 2021-10-17 20:44:52.
Synthetic gene drives are transgenic constructs that aim to bias heredity and thereby influence the characteristics and fate of populations regarding abundance and evolution. Aside from irreversible effects in ecosystems that could be triggered by the release of a gene drive, research on confinable drives or even the reversibility of gene drives is underway and shows first success under laboratory conditions. However, their effectiveness under realistic conditions is not entirely clear unless first test releases have taken place. Since a potentially irreversible intervention into ecosystems is created, a prospective assessment is needed. We present an approach of prospective ecological vulnerability analysis for the proposed control of the invasive pest Drosophila suzukii by using gene drives. The analysis considers the accidental spread of the gene drive to the native habitat of Drosophila suzukii, with a focus on Japan. It contains a mapping of potential impacts as a consequence of the suppression of the insect. Multiple cascading effects were identified including the potential spread of the gene drive in geographic range or potential hybridization with non-target species. Determining the vulnerability of an ecosystem requires information regarding specific characteristics at different organizational levels. The vulnerability analysis of an affected ecosystem will initially serve to identify gaps in knowledge. Reducing complexity and breaking down the potential events that might arise from a gene drive population suppression enables to better understand endpoints i.e. concrete effects. Three potential effects have been selected for a specific analysis of the vulnerability of populations and species. A high vulnerability was obtained for the suppression of non-target (native) populations of Drosophila suzukii as well as for a decrease in specialized parasitoid abundance. The paper proposes the outline of a comprehensive prospective approach to understand the susceptibility of an ecosystem to unintended and irreversible harm.
GeneConvene Global Collaborative Webinar Series | Decision and Analysis Tools for Complex Problems
18961Hector Quemada and David O'Brochta, GeneConvene Global Collaborative, 2021-10-13 20:07:26.
The challenges associated with the multiple phases of testing and possible deployment of gene drive-containing organisms appear to have similarities to those associated with various aspects of invasive species management. Preventing unwanted spread of the target species as well as monitoring and surveillance over large spatial scales are just two. Managing invasive species depends on making decisions based on an incomplete and sometimes very limited understanding of the relevant community ecology and the ever-present risk of unintended consequences. Can the deep experiences of those involved in invasive species management be leveraged against challenges in the gene drive domain? This webinar series will begin to explore that question.
Calling the latest gene technologies ‘natural’ is a semantic distraction — they must still be regulated
18752J. A. Heinemann, D. J. Paull, S. Walker and B. Kurenbach, The Conversation, 2021-09-22 13:41:22.
Legislators around the world are being asked to reconsider how to regulate the latest developments in gene technology, genome editing and gene silencing. Both the European Court of Justice and the New Zealand High Court have ruled that genome editing techniques should remain under the regulations specific to genetically modified organisms. But a few other countries, including Australia, have exempted some uses of these techniques from their regulations, based on similarities to what occurs in nature. The main argument is that the biochemical processes of editing are like the processes that cause natural mutations. The “equivalent to nature” narrative blurs the boundary between natural processes and technology.
New report demands moratorium on gene drives
18792GM Watch, GM Watch, 2021-09-21 13:49:44.
To help the public understand what's at stake, the Germany-based NGO Save Our Seeds (SOS) has published a report, "Gene Drives: The New Dimension of Genetic Engineering", which can be downloaded as a pdf document. The report provides a scientifically founded overview of how gene drive systems work, their possible areas of application, and the scientific discussion about their risks. It summarises the status of legislation and regulation at the German, European and global levels and recommends urgent political measures. The report explains how gene drives could be used in agriculture – research is focused on controlling pests and weeds and reversing the herbicide resistance in weeds that was caused and exacerbated by the spread of GM herbicide-tolerant crops. Not coincidentally, the report also notes that gene drives could be employed as bioweapons – for example, to eradicate beneficial insects in a region. The report points out, "The US military‘s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is one of the largest funders of gene drive research and is financially involved in almost every gene drive research project."
Gene Drive Organisms: A new dimension of genetic engineering
18790V. Henn and M. Imken, Save Our Seeds, 2021-09-21 13:42:53.
Enabled by new genetic engineering techniques such as CRISPR/Cas9, so-called gene drives have been developed in recent years that enable humans to spread new genes throughout the genome of wild animal populations. Gene drives force the inheritance of newly introduced genes to be inherited by all offspring, even if this lowers the survival chances of the affected species. In the most extreme case, gene drive technology could drive an entire species to extinction or replace wild populations with genetically modified organisms.
The viral era
18352B. Giese, EMBO reports, 22:e53229. 2021-09-06 13:54:36.
New biotechnologies such as gene drives and engineered viruses herald a viral era that would give humans exceptional power over any organism at the level of the genotype. In synthetic biology, orthogonality—in the sense of lack of interference—between different systems or system components is sought for new creations. Current approaches to controlling gene drives also aim for orthogonality, but at a higher level of organisms, populations and species. To keep information under control, orthogonality and reversibility have to be guaranteed before any releases. As with chemical substances, where persistence and bioaccumulation are reasons for concern, the same should apply to genetic information released into nature
The international governance of gene drive organisms
18320F. Rabitz, Environmental Politics, 2021-08-29 13:07:16.
Gene Drive Organisms (GDOs) are a proposed biotechnological intervention that might generate significant benefits for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity while also raising critical biosafety issues. Despite their inevitable transboundary effects, their implications for international institutions remain undertheorized. This text develops a theoretical analysis of international GDO governance. First, it elaborates the problem-structural characteristics of GDOs that turn them into a novel and distinct governance challenge, focusing on leverage, cost-benefit distributions, irreversibility, as well as uncertainty and unpredictability. Second, it derives the implications of problem structure for institutional design by focusing on pre-release risk assessment and authorization, as well as post-release monitoring and liability. Third, it uses these institutional implications for benchmarking the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the focal point in international biotechnology regulation, for effective GDO governance. The text concludes that institutional reforms are required for folding GDOs into international biodiversity policy.
Gene Drives – Engineering the Wild
17825L. Sharratt, Sentinel, 2021-07-13 14:52:05.
So far, genetically engineered organisms have been mostly limited to agricultural use, with partial success. Around the world, a few major crops (mostly corn, soy, and cotton) are genetically engineered, predominantly for herbicide tolerance and insect resistance. However, the newer techniques of genome editing (also called gene editing) mean that a much wider variety of organisms can now be genetically engineered, including for many purposes outside of food and farming. This increased power is most dramatically illustrated in the development of gene drive technology. Unlike genetically engineered plants and animals intended for confined use in agricultural production, gene drive organisms are expressly designed for intentional, long-lived release into the wild. Gene drives are a technology through which a few individual genetically engineered organisms would be deployed to intentionally push new genes through an entire population of a species in the wild or in a farm ecosystem. Through the gene drive mechanism, new genes would be inherited by all offspring in subsequent generations, not just the expected half in normal inheritance. When gene drive organisms reproduce, specific traits as well as the gene drive mechanism itself would be passed on. Making such spreading genetic changes to an organism, or eliminating it in the wild, could disrupt whole ecosystems in ways that are difficult or impossible to predict or reverse.
Autocatalytic-protection for an unknown locus CRISPR-Cas countermeasure for undesired mutagenic chain reactions
17969E. Schonfeld, E. Schonfeld and D. Schonfeld, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 528:110831. 2021-07-11 13:41:33.
The mutagenic chain reaction (MCR) is a genetic tool to use a CRISPR–Cas construct to introduce a homing endonuclease, allowing gene drive to influence whole populations in a minimal number of generations (Esvelt et al., 2014, Gantz and Bier, 2015, Gantz and Bier, 2016). The question arises: if an active genetic terror event is released into a population, could we prevent the total spread of the undesired allele (Gantz, et al., 2015, Webber et al., 2015)? Thus far, effective protection methods require knowledge of the terror locus (Grunwald et al., 2019). Here we introduce a novel approach, an autocatalytic-Protection for an Unknown Locus (a-PUL), whose aim is to spread through a population and arrest and decrease an active terror event’s spread without any prior knowledge of the terror-modified locus, thus allowing later natural selection and ERACR drives to restore the normal locus (Hammond et al., 2017). a-PUL, using a mutagenic chain reaction, includes (i) a segment encoding a non-Cas9 endonuclease capable of homology-directed repair suggested as Type II endonuclease Cpf1 (Cas12a), (ii) a ubiquitously-expressed gene encoding a gRNA (gRNA1) with a U4AU4 3′-overhang specific to Cpf1 and with crRNA specific to some desired genomic sequence of non-coding DNA, (iii) a ubiquitously-expressed gene encoding two gRNAs (gRNA2/gRNA3) both with tracrRNA specific to Cas9 and crRNA specific to two distinct sites of the Cas9 locus, and (iv) homology arms flanking the Cpf1/gRNA1/gRNA2/gRNA3 cassette that are identical to the region surrounding the target cut directed by gRNA1 (Khan, 2016, Zetsche et al., 2015). We demonstrate the proof-of-concept and efficacy of our protection construct through a Graphical Markov model and computer simulation.
Earth system interventions as technologies of the Anthropocene
17730J. L. Reynolds, Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 40:132-146. 2021-07-10 15:16:46.
Earth system interventions (ESIs)—intentional large-scale interventions in Earth systems—are not entirely new. However, in response to threats to sustainability, particularly from climate change and biodiversity loss, some scientists and others are researching, developing, and using new, largely technological ESIs. These include carbon dioxide removal, solar geoengineering, in situ genetically modified organisms, gene drive organisms, de-extinction, and high-tech ecosystem restoration. Some emerging ESIs appear to be effective and feasible, both technically and economically, and may be necessary to achieve important sustainability and human welfare objectives. They also pose serious environmental risks. This paper identifies more than a dozen social, political, and ethical challenges that are common across many of the emerging technological ESIs. Governance could mitigate and manage these issues, and it would be made more effective and robust by understanding and treating new ESIs as such and as a potentially transformative set of innovations in human-Earth system relations.
Africa Turning to Gene Drive Technology for Malaria Elimination
17669M. Hearty, Science Africa, 2021-07-09 20:02:22.
With Africa accounting for nine out of ten malaria cases globally, the continent is turning to gene drive technology to control the disease. This is according to a decision made by African leaders at the 29th Summit of Heads of States and Governments of the African Union held in Addis Ababa. There are 3500 to 4000 mosquito species worldwide and 837 of the species are in Africa, with only 3 species transmitting malaria in sub-Saharan Africa. Speaking during a virtual conference by the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) , Dr Abdoulaye Diabate, Head of Medical Entomology and Parasitology at the Research Institute in health Sciences in Burkina Faso who presented on Gene Drive for Malaria Control and Elimination in Africa said that two options for genetic control of mosquito-borne infectious diseases identified were population suppression and population replacement. “Population suppression involves releasing of modified mosquitoes into the population, and this can cause transient or permanent suppression. With the population replacement method, modified mosquitoes released into the population can lead to the spread of a gene that blocks malaria transmission,” the Medical Entomologist stated.
West African countries working together to develop framework to regulate genetically engineered mosquitos: Target Malaria
17663Anonymous, Global News, 2021-07-08 19:50:08.
Abdoulaye Diabaté, principal investigator for Target Malaria, says West African countries like Burkina Faso, Mali and Benin are working with the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to develop a pan-West African framework to regulate gene drive mosquitos.
‘Nigeria has capacity for safe application of modern biotechnology’
17298M. Adewale, The Guardian, 2021-06-09 11:00:41.
Director-general of the National Biosafety Management Agency (NBMA), Dr. Rufus Ebegba, has declared that Nigeria has the capacity to deploy safe biotechnology products for agricultural development and environmental safety. Ebegba, who gave the assurance at the opening of a two-day retreat on agricultural biotechnology for media practitioners and extension workers yesterday in Kano, explained that Nigeria possessed the institutional capacity and policy framework to ensure the application of modern technology, especially on agricultural production with the potential to accelerate food security and reduce import dependency. He stressed that the establishment of the NBDA, which necessitated the development of national policy on biotechnology in 2001 and the enactment of the agency, mandated to ensure the safety of modern biotechnology products, has positioned the country with the knowledge to deploy Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) products. Ebegba stressed that part of the core responsibility of NBDA was to ensure the regulation of biotechnology and the safety of GMO products for human health and the environment.
European Parliament calls for ban on gene drive technology
17296Save Our Seeds, Save Our Seeds, 2021-06-09 10:56:17.
The European Parliament yesterday confirmedi it‘s precautionary stance towards the use of a new genetic engineering technology called gene drive. In its report on the EU’s Biodiversity Strategy for 2030, adopted at the European Parliament’s plenary on 08.06.2021, Parliamentarians demand that „no releases of genetically engineered gene drive organisms should be allowed, including for nature conservation purposes, in line with the precautionary principle.“ Mareike Imken, coordinator of the European Stop Gene Drive Campaign welcomes this decision and comments: „With its position today, the European Parliament recognizes that this technology raises a series of scientific, regulatory, societal and ethical questions and concerns. As its use could severely harm biodiversity, the European Parliament calls to postpone any environmental releases until these questions have been addressed and settled. This is an important message that should feed into the ongoing discussions about global regulations at the next meeting of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in September in Marseille and those of the Convention on Biological Diversity in October in Kunming, China.“ 27 civil society and science organisations from across the EU had sent a letter to Parliamentarians in support of the amendment ahead of the vote. It „provides reasonable suggestions on how to implement the European Parliament’s previous position in its resolution on the 15th meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP15) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2019/2824(RSP)“. In that previous position, adopted in January 2020, the European Parliament had called “on the Commission and the Member States to call for a global moratorium at the COP15 on releases of gene drive organisms into nature, including field trials, in order to prevent these new technologies from being released prematurely and to uphold the precautionary principle, which is enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as well as the CBD“.
Analysis of off-target effects in CRISPR-based gene drives in the human malaria mosquito
17141W. T. Garrood, N. Kranjc, K. Petri, D. Y. Kim, J. A. Guo, A. M. Hammond, I. Morianou, V. Pattanayak, J. K. Joung, A. Crisanti and A. Simoni, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118:e2004838117. 2021-05-31 13:24:14.
CRISPR-Cas9 nuclease-based gene drives have been developed toward the aim of control of the human malaria vector Anopheles gambiae. Gene drives are based on an active source of Cas9 nuclease in the germline that promotes super-Mendelian inheritance of the transgene by homology-directed repair (“homing”). Understanding whether CRISPR-induced off-target mutations are generated in Anopheles mosquitoes is an important aspect of risk assessment before any potential field release of this technology. We compared the frequencies and the propensity of off-target events to occur in four different gene-drive strains, including a deliberately promiscuous set-up, using a nongermline restricted promoter for SpCas9 and a guide RNA with many closely related sites (two or more mismatches) across the mosquito genome. Under this scenario we observed off-target mutations at frequencies no greater than 1.42%. We witnessed no evidence that CRISPR-induced off-target mutations were able to accumulate (or drive) in a mosquito population, despite multiple generations’ exposure to the CRISPR-Cas9 nuclease construct. Furthermore, judicious design of the guide RNA used for homing of the CRISPR construct, combined with tight temporal constriction of Cas9 expression to the germline, rendered off-target mutations undetectable. The findings of this study represent an important milestone for the understanding and managing of CRISPR-Cas9 specificity in mosquitoes, and demonstrates that CRISPR off-target editing in the context of a mosquito gene drive can be reduced to minimal levels.All raw amplicon sequencing files have been deposited in the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) BioProject (accession code PRJNA665154).
Driving genetic destruction
16899Anonymous, Alliance for Natural Health, 2021-04-29 17:41:37.
Genetically-engineered (GE) mosquitoes have been released in a number of countries, including the US. We’ve known for some time that these experiments have not gone to plan, but a new paper provides a better understanding of how they’ve went awry, and provides a harrowing warning for what could go wrong with a new era of gene editing known as “gene drives” in which the genetics of entire species can be tampered with. This could create a nightmare scenario where, instead of a disease-carrying mosquito population being controlled or eliminated, unpredicted changes occur that make them even more virulent and dangerous. Current GE experiments involve altering the genetics of mosquitoes to be “self-limiting,” meaning that offspring inherit a gene that prevents them from surviving to adulthood, thus driving the population down. The goal is to limit the spread of diseases like dengue and yellow fever. But what has happened is that a certain percentage of the offspring of the GE mosquitoes are surviving and integrating into the gene pool of the local population. Scientists note this will have unpredictable consequences and could lead to more pathogenic disease strains—the very opposite of what these experiments were supposed to accomplish.
Oxitec Receives Landmark Biosafety Approval for New Fall Armyworm Control Solution
16810Oxitec, Oxitec, 2021-04-15 16:03:00.
Approval of Oxitec’s Friendly™ fall armyworm technology by the Brazilian government’s regulatory agency CTNBio confirms that it is safe for people, animals and the environment. Oxitec’s Friendly™ fall armyworm is a new, safe, and sustainable solution to one of the world’s most devastating crop pests. CTNBio’s decision is a significant step towards deployment on commercial corn fields in Brazil. This is the world’s first commercial biosafety approval of an agricultural Friendly™ insect solution, following the regulatory approval in Brazil for Oxitec’s Friendly™ Aedes aegypti mosquito in 2020
Experimenting with co-development: a qualitative study of gene drive research for malaria control in Mali
16639S. Hartley, K. Ledingham, R. Owen, S. Leonelli, S. Diarra and S. Diop, Social Science and Medicine, 2021-03-21 14:37:21.
Our findings suggest co-development is opening up previously expert-dominated spaces as researchers attempt to take responsibility for the societal implications of their work. However, its main function is as a project management tool to enable and instrumentally support technological development, field trials and eventual deployment. This function extends into areas which are traditionally the responsibility of the state, such as regulatory development, facilitated by Mali’s fragile political and economic situation. Paradoxically, co-development simultaneously depoliticises gene drive, masking power relations and closing down substantive debate and agency. Characterised by extreme poverty, conflict and weak institutions, Mali may become a site for technological experimentation where there is little interrogation of gene drive or its governance.
Commercial Release of Genetically Modified Crops in Africa: Interface Between Biosafety Regulatory Systems and Varietal Release Systems
27487O. Akinbo, S. Obukosia, J. Ouedraogo, W. Sinebo, M. Savadogo, S. Timpo, R. Mbabazi, K. Maredia, D. Makinde and A. Ambali, Frontier in Plant Sciences, 12. 2021-03-21 13:38:05.
African countries face key challenges in the deployment of GM crops due to incongruities in the processes for effective and efficient commercial release while simultaneously ensuring food and environmental safety. Against the backdrop of the preceding scenario, and for the effective and efficient commercial release of GM crops for cultivation by farmers, while simultaneously ensuring food and environmental safety, there is a need for the close collaboration of and the interplay between the biosafety competent authorities and the variety release authorities. The commercial release of genetically modified (GM) crops for cultivation requires the approval of biosafety regulatory packages. The evaluation and approval of lead events fall under the jurisdiction of competent national authorities for biosafety (which may be ministries, autonomous authorities, or agencies). The evaluation of lead events fundamentally comprises a review of environmental, food, and feed safety data as provided for in the Biosafety Acts, implementing regulations, and, in some cases, the involvement of other relevant legal instruments. Although the lead GM event may be commercially released for farmers to cultivate, it is often introgressed into locally adapted and farmer preferred non-GM cultivars that are already released and grown by the farmers. The introduction of new biotechnology products to farmers is a process that includes comprehensive testing in the laboratory, greenhouse, and field over some time. The process provides answers to questions about the safety of the products before being introduced into the environment and marketplace. This is the first step in regulatory approvals. The output of the research and development phase of the product development cycle is the identification of a safe and best performing event for advancement to regulatory testing, likely commercialization, and general release. The process of the commercial release of new crop varieties in countries with established formal seed systems is guided by well-defined procedures and approval systems and regulated by the Seed Acts and implemented regulations. In countries with seed laws, no crop varieties are approved for commercial cultivation prior to the fulfillment of the national performance trials and the distinctness, uniformity, and stability tests, as well as prior to the approval by the National Variety Release Committee. This review outlines key challenges faced by African countries in the deployment of GM crops and cites lessons learned as well as best practices from countries that have successfully commercialized genetically engineered crops.
Differentiated impacts of human interventions on nature: Scaling the conversation on regulation of gene technologies
18750J. A. Heinemann, D. J. Paull, S. Walker and B. Kurenbach, Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene, 9. 2021-03-17 13:35:29.
Biotechnology describes a range of human activities in medicine, agriculture, and environmental management. One biotechnology in particular, gene technology, continues to evolve both in capacity and potential to benefit and harm society. The purpose of this article is to offer a policy bridge from unproductive descriptions of gene technology to useful methods for identifying sources of significant biological and socioeconomic risk in complex food systems. Farmers and the public could be voluntarily and involuntarily interacting with new techniques of genome editing and gene silencing in entirely new ways, limiting the usefulness of previous gene technology histories to predict safety. What we believe is a more consistent, verifiable, and practical approach is to identify the critical control points that emerge where the scale effects of a human activity diverge between risk and safety. These critical control points are where technical experts can collaborate with publics with different expertise to identify and manage the technology. The use of technical terminology describing biochemical-level phenomena discourages publics that are not technical experts from contesting the embedded cultural perspectives and uncertainty in “scientific” concepts and prejudice the risk discourse by ignoring other issues of significance to society. From our perspective as gene technologists, we confront the use of pseudo-scale language in risk discourse and propose an escape path from clashes over whether risks that arise spontaneously (from nature) can be perfectly mimicked by gene technology to a discussion on how to best control the risks created by human activity. Scale is conceptually implicit and explicit in gene technology regulation, but there is no agreement about what scales are most useful to managing risk and social expectations. Both differentiated governance (risk-tiered) and responsible research and innovation models could accommodate the critical control points mechanism that we describe.
Population genomics of invasive rodents on islands: Genetic consequences of colonization and prospects for localized synthetic gene drive
16657K. P. Oh, A. B. Shiels, L. Shiels, D. V. Blondel, K. J. Campbell, J. R. Saah, A. L. Lloyd, P. Q. Thomas, F. Gould, Z. Abdo, J. R. Godwin and A. J. Piaggio, Evolutionary Applications, 2021-02-22 17:41:41.
Here we used pooled whole-genome sequencing of invasive mouse (Mus musculus) populations on four islands along with paired putative source populations to test genetic predictions of island colonization and characterize locally fixed Cas9 genomic targets. Patterns of variation across the genome reflected marked reductions in allelic diversity in island populations and moderate to high degrees of differentiation from nearby source populations despite relatively recent colonization. Locally fixed Cas9 sites in female fertility genes were observed in all island populations, including a small number with multiplexing potential. In practice, rigorous sampling of presumptive LFA will be essential to fully assess risk of resistance alleles. These results should serve to guide development of improved, spatially limited gene drive design in future applications.
Emergent challenges for CRISPR: biosafety, biosecurity, patenting, and regulatory issues
19398Braddick, D. , and Ramarohetra, R. F., Genome Engineering Via Crispr-Cas9 System, 2021-02-18 17:46:33.
The recent advancements of CRISPR-Cas technologies have transformed this simple and efficient gene editing technique into an extraordinarily powerful tool. The most anticipated applications could create novel therapeutics against mankind's most serious afflictions and help eradicate vector-based diseases. However, with these desired benefits come new ethical questions and potential threats. CRISPR technologies are not yet fully developed toward delivering all of their promises, and suffer from biosafety problems in human products and biosecurity threats arising from its potential dual use and errant gene drives. Furthermore, the future innovations of CRISPR technologies may encounter non-scientific challenges in patentability and unclear legal regulations at the national and international levels. This chapter will discuss these issues, and where possible, will highlight the currently proposed solutions that could mitigate the threats, and could address the problems that hold back CRISPR's full potential.
Scientifically framed gene drive communication perceived as credible but riskier
16406E. A. MacDonald, E. D. Edwards, J. Balanovic and F. Medvecky, People and Nature, 2021-02-17 18:23:29.
Framing is a communication technique in which certain beliefs or values are emphasized that resonate with the target audience. Framing may increase how much people objectively think about new information and update their opinions; framing may mitigate emo
A Code of Ethics for Gene Drive Research
16379G. J. Annas, C. L. Beisel, K. Clement, A. Crisanti, S. Francis, M. Galardini, R. Galizi, J. Grünewald, G. Immobile, A. S. Khalil, R. Müller, V. Pattanayak, K. Petri, L. Paul, L. Pinello, A. Simoni, C. Taxiarchi and J. K. Joung, The CRISPR Journal, 4:19:1-8. 2021-02-10 14:57:13.
A code of ethics can be a useful tool for all parties involved in the development and regulation of gene drives and can be used to help ensure that a balanced analysis of risks, benefits, and values is taken into consideration for the interest of society and humanity. We have developed a code of ethics for gene drive research with the hope that this code will encourage the development of an international framework that includes ethical guidance of gene drive research and is incorporated into scientific practice by gaining broad agreement and adherence.
Les Européens très critiques vis-à-vis du forçage génétique
16231L. Duboua-Lorsch, EURACTIV, 2021-01-29 16:38:41.
Cette technique, qui vise à éradiquer ou modifier certaines espèces dites nuisibles, sera au cœur des négociations cette année, alors que se profile la COP15 sur la biodiversité. maginez un monde débarrassé d’insectes porteurs de maladies, de parasites agricoles, d’espèces envahissantes… Les possibilités semblent infinies avec la nouvelle technique du « gene drive », en français forçage génétique. Née au début des années 2000, cette technique de modification génétique permet à un gène d’être transmis de manière quasi-systématique à ses descendants. En quelques générations seulement, l’ensemble d’une espèce sauvage peut être remplacée par ces nouveaux individus génétiquement forcés.
GENE DRIVE ACCEPTANCE SURVEY
16233YouGov, Pollinis, 2021-01-27 16:47:37.
This representative survey was conducted by the international market research institute YouGov and polled 8.826 citizens from 8 EU countries in December 2020. It was commissioned by WeMove Europe, Save Our Seeds (Germany), Skiftet (Sweden), France Nature Environnement (FNE) (France), POLLINIS (France), OGM Dangers (France), Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz (BUND) (Germany), Deutscher Naturschutzring (DNR) (Germany), Umweltinstitut München (Germany), Za Zemiata (Bulgaria). Deviations from 100% are due to rounding.
Playing God and tampering with nature: popular labels for real concerns in synthetic biology
16201L. Carter, A. Mankad, E. V. Hobman and N. B. Porter, Transgenic Research, 2021-01-27 15:26:41.
We present the findings from a large Australian study (N = 4593) which suggests ‘playing God’ objections and their variants can be multilayered and, at times, accompanied by meaningful information about risk perceptions. We use qualitative analysis of ope
RNAi-based products: A sustainable alternative to hazardous pesticides
16211Ghent University, Phys Org, 2021-01-27 13:59:48.
RNAi-based biocontrol is a great alternative to hazardous pesticides and can contribute towards reversing the alarming decline in farmland birds and beneficial insects (especially pollinating ones). RNAi is a well-known natural biological process in most
Exploring Gene Drive Technologies in Agriculture, Biodiversity and Human Disease
15963The GBIRd Partnership and The GeneConvene Global Collaborative, Gene Drive Research Forum, 2021-01-14 21:37:12.
The GBIRd Partnership and The GeneConvene Global Collaborative recently collaborated through The Gene Drive Research Forum, to create and produce an engaging conversation between Drs. Fred Gould and Charles Godfray about gene drive technologies – the potential benefits and complicating factors for agriculture, biodiversity, and human disease.
Laboratory biosafety manual, fourth edition
34044Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (Laboratory biosafety manual, fourth edition and associated monographs), Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO, 2020-12-21 00:00:00.
New GE unintentionally leaves traces in cells
15620C. Then, Testbiotech, 2020-12-18 16:22:58.
A new scientific publication shows that CRISPR/Cas gene scissor applications in animals unintentionally leave traces. The findings are not related to unintended changes in the DNA, which have often been described, but to gene regulation, i.e. epigenetics. The effects are heritable and may, for example, result in disruption of embryonic development. The new scientific publication describes CRISPR/Cas experiments with mice in which their DNA is cut and additional genetic information inserted. Besides intended changes in DNA in the target region, the findings also showed unintended changes in so-called epigenetic markers that control gene regulation. The effects were heritable and could still be identified after ten generations. According to the authors, the effects can also be used to identify CRISPR/Cas gene scissor applications.
Scientists paved the way for field trials of gene-driven organisms
15559K. Winslet, FLORIDA News Times, 2020-12-17 15:01:59.
The recent rise of gene drive research, accelerated by CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing technology, has brought about a wave of transformation throughout science.Developed with selected traits that have been genetically engineered to spread throughout the population, Gene Drive Organisms (GDOs) provide solutions to a variety of difficult health and environmental challenges, from control to protection of dengue and malaria. A crop against plant pests that has the power to dramatically change the way it develops.But before these gene-drive organisms move from laboratory to field testing, scientists are proposing courses for responsible testing of this powerful technology. These issues are addressed in the new Policy Forum article on Biotechnology Governance, “Core Commitment for Field Trials of Gene Drive Organisms,” published December 18, 2020. Science By more than 40 researchers, including several scientists at the University of California, San Diego.“Gene drives have led to rapid research, so we need to take a step back and think about its application and its impact on humankind,” said Akbari, the lead author of the article. Associate Professor, Faculty of Biological Sciences, University of California, San Diego. “A new initiative to tackle field testing is to ensure that testing is conducted safely, transparent, publicly accountable, and scientifically, politically and socially robust.”
Technical Support to Burkina Faso on Gene Drive Stage 2 Dossier Review
15557AUDA-NEPAD, AUDA-NEPAD, 2020-12-17 14:58:32.
AUDA-NEPAD in partnership with the National Biosafety Agency (ANB) in Burkina Faso organised a training workshop to support to the National Biosafety Committee (NBC) on stage 2 dossier review, on December 3 – 5, 2020, in Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso. In addition to the NBC members, and based on recommendations from previous in-country consultations, the meeting audience was extended to include researchers, faculty members and PhD students. The meeting brought together 25 participants. Amongst the countries piloting the gene drive research in the continent, Burkina Faso has successfully completed the activities in stage 1 of the process nd is now contemplating to commence stage 2. An application has been prepared and submitted to the national regulatory agency, following a successful pre-review by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC).
Gene Drive-Modified Organisms: Developing Practical Risk Assessment Guidance
15554Y. Devos, M. B. Bonsall, L. G. Firbank, J. Mumford, F. Nogué and E. A. Wimmer, Trends in Biotechnology, 2020-12-17 14:48:35.
Risk assessors, risk managers, developers, potential applicants, and other stakeholders at many levels discuss the need for new or further risk assessment guidance for deliberate environmental releases of gene drive-modified organisms. However, preparing useful and practical guidance entails challenges, to which we offer recommendations based on our experience drafting guidance.
Scientists Set a Path for Field Trials of Gene Drive Organisms
15551M. Aguilera, UC San Diego News Center, 2020-12-17 14:41:55.
The modern rise of gene drive research, accelerated by CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing technology, has led to transformational waves rippling across science. Gene drive organisms (GDOs), developed with select traits that are genetically engineered to spread through a population, have the power to dramatically alter the way society develops solutions to a range of daunting health and environmental challenges, from controlling dengue fever and malaria to protecting crops against plant pests. But before these gene drive organisms move from the laboratory to testing in the field, scientists are proposing a course for responsible testing of this powerful technology. These issues are addressed in a new Policy Forum article on biotechnology governance, “Core commitments for field trials of gene drive organisms,” published Dec. 18, 2020 in Science by more than 40 researchers, including several University of California San Diego scientists.
Burkina Faso Stakeholders consultations on Gene Drive Technology for integrated vector management towards malaria elimination
15384AUDA-NEPAD, AUDA-NEPAD, 2020-12-08 15:09:47.
Under its flagship Integrated Vector Management (IVM) Programme, African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) in partnership with the National biosafety agency (ANB) of Burkina Faso organized an information sharing workshop on the applications of "Gene Drive" technology and facilitated discussions for the establishment of a consultative group on integrated vector management in Burkina Faso. The meeting was held from November 30th to December 1st, in Ouagadougou and brought together healthcare, environmental and biosafety regulators and other decision makers from different relevant institutions in the country.
Evaluating Gene Drive Approaches for Public Benefit
15296M. R. Santos, GMOs: Implications for Biodiversity Conservation and Ecological Processes, 2020-12-02 17:14:49.
Gene drive approaches—those which bias inheritance of a genetic element in a population of sexually reproducing organisms—have the potential to provide important public benefits. The spread of selected genetic elements in wild populations of organisms may help address certain challenges, such as transmission of vector-borne human and animal diseases and biodiversity loss due to invasive animals. Adapting various naturally occurring gene drive mechanisms to these aims is a long-standing research area, and recent advances in genetics have made engineering gene drive systems significantly more technically feasible. Gene drive approaches would act through changes in natural environments, thus robust methods to evaluate potential research and use are important.
Engineered Gene Drives and their Value in the Control of Vector-Borne Diseases, Weeds, Pests, and Invasive Species
15294K. Hefferon and R. Herring, GMOs: Implications for Biodiversity Conservation and Ecological Processes, 2020-12-02 17:10:55.
Genetic engineering has created potential for moving medical and agricultural research and application frontiers forward in unprecedented ways. Despite its accepted use as a powerful tool in medical research, genetic modification and genome editing technologies remain controversial in large-scale ecological intervention and open-field agriculture. Gene drive is a technology based on genome editing that enables a trait to be pushed through a given population at a greater than expected rate. While gene drives show enormous promise as a way to address a number of challenges, such as the reduction of populations of disease-spreading pests and invasive species, they also incite great social unease because of unknown risks. The following chapter describes the mechanics of gene drives and how they could be utilized to control vector-borne diseases, weeds, and crop pests and even protect populations of endangered species. Limitations and risks associated with gene drive technologies, such as containment strategies and potential resistance, are discussed. Finally, the social impacts of gene drives with respect to international governance and public acceptance are considered.
Engineered Gene Drives: Ecological, Environmental, and Societal Concerns
15292J. Kuzma, GMOs: Implications for Biodiversity Conservation and Ecological Processes, 2020-12-02 17:07:26.
This chapter overviews the types, purposes, and potential impacts of gene drive organisms (GDOs) and discusses challenges with foreseeing and assessing these impacts prior to their environmental release. It concludes with a few examples of risk analysis methods and governance systems that scholars have proposed to cope with the novelty of GDOs and uncertainties associated with their use. With GDOs poised for release in the near future, it is urgent that technologists, ecologists, social scientists, ethicists, stakeholders, and publics work together to grapple with the immense challenges associated with assessments of GDOs and the design of governance systems to ensure their responsible development and potential use.
Genetically Engineered Fish: Potential Impacts on Aquaculture, Biodiversity, and the Environment
15290R. A. Dunham and B. Su, GMOs: Implications for Biodiversity Conservation and Ecological Processes, 2020-12-02 17:03:48.
Studies on transgenic fish for the aquaculture industry have focused on improving growth rates, enhancing disease resistance, altering body composition, acting as biological factories for medical proteins, and even altering temperature tolerance and coloration. The future impact of transgenesis will likely be quite large. Growth hormone-transgenic salmon has been approved for human consumption and has been introduced to the market in Canada and soon to the USA. This is the first human consumption of approved transgenic meat. Transgene insertion has many pleiotropic effects. Several studies have projected the fitness of transgenic fish to be low, in general, compared to non-transgenic and wild fish; thus, their environmental risk is likely low and they would have minimal, if any, long-term impact on ecosystems or biodiversity. However, there have been no actual escapements; thus, only projections of risk are available based on small-scale experiments and the characteristics of transgenic fish compared to controls. An active area of research is repressible transgenic sterilization and sterilization using gene editing, both of which would allow application of transgenic fish with only short-term consequences for ecosystems in the worst-case scenario. Transgenic technology could also be potentially used to reduce or eliminate populations of nuisance species.
Invasive Species Control and Resolution of Wildlife Damage Conflicts: A Framework for Chemical and Genetically Based Management Methods
15286L. Clark, J. Eisemann, J. Godwin, K. E. Horak, K. Oh, J. O’Hare, A. Piaggio, K. Pepin and E. Ruell, GMOs: Implications for Biodiversity Conservation and Ecological Processes, 2020-12-02 16:52:40.
Vertebrate wildlife damage management relates to developing and employing methods to mitigate against damage caused by wildlife in the areas of food production, property damage, and animal or human health and safety. Of the many management tools available
GMOs: Implications for Biodiversity Conservation and Ecological Processes
15283Chaurasia, Anurag , Hawksworth, David L., Pessoa de Miranda, Manoela., GMOs: Implications for Biodiversity Conservation and Ecological Processes, 2020-12-02 16:45:05.
This book covers a broad spectrum of topics related to GMOs and allied new gene-based technologies, biodiversity, and ecosystem processes, bringing together the contributions of researchers and regulators from around the world. The aim is to offer a clear view of the benefits and effects of genetically modified crops, insects, and other animals on the soil microbiome and ecological processes. Contributors examine issues related to the development of risk assessment procedures and regulations designed to maximize benefits while minimizing risks. Beyond the scientific challenges of GMOs, the book explores the broad and contentious terrain of ethical considerations. The contributors discuss such questions as the unintended, possibly unforeseen, consequences of releasing GMOs into ecosystems, and the likelihood that the full effects of GMOs could take years, even decades, of close monitoring to become evident. The importance of developing a precautionary approach is stressed.
FNIH Panel on Gene Drive Regulation Emphasizes Need for Local Community Engagement
15222C. Rizk, GenomeWeb, 2020-11-19 21:16:21.
Genetically modified organisms are another topic of deep debate, with some activists agitating for and getting governments to implement deep restrictions on modified crops. More recently, GMO crops have started to regain public favor, particularly in countries where boosting the levels of nutrients in staple crops could provide a benefit for children, or where certain genome modifications could increase crop yields. But reversing public biases and, more importantly, governmental regulations against GMOs won't be a simple matter, even if scientists can show a benefit to the modifications. So, when it comes to the development of the gene drive — another gene modification technology meant to promote the spread of certain genes in organisms such as mosquitoes in order to control or eradicate their populations in a controlled manner — many researchers are determined to foster debate that focuses on the science, includes local communities in the discussion, and leads to governance and regulations that will benefit both the environment and human health.
Engineering biological diversity: the international governance of synthetic biology, gene drives, and de-extinction for conservation
15251J. L. Reynolds, Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 49:1-6. 2020-11-17 18:23:24.
In the face of insufficient progress in conserving and restoring biodiversity, the in situ use of advanced genetic modification, gene drives, and other biotechnologies for conservation purposes are being considered, researched, and developed. This paper introduces the methods, applications, environmental risks, and social challenges of ‘conservationist synthetic biology’; reviews existing governance, with an emphasis on international instruments, institutions, and processes; and offers observations of the politics of developing further governance. The most important multilateral environmental agreement is the Convention on Biological Diversity. Governance of such conservationist synthetic biology is vital but gaps remain. The further development of governance is a political process, and conservationist synthetic biology has a political landscape that is atypical for emerging technologies.
Further guidance required for assessment of gene drive technology, says EFSA
15137Euractiv, The World News Monitor, 2020-11-16 16:25:26.
Existing guidelines are adequate for evaluating risks associated with gene-drive modified insects, but further guidance is needed for some areas, most notably for environmental risk assessments. The evaluation was requested to explore the issue ahead of the consideration of any possible applications of the technology and is also designed to support the EU in discussions on the biosafety of GMOs in international fora such as the United Nations. It found that while existing guidelines are sufficient for evaluating risks associated with technology, further guidance is needed for some areas, such as molecular characterisation, environmental risk assessment and post-market environmental monitoring.
Mutagenic chain reaction cannot be sufficiently controlled
15135Christoph Then, Testbiotech, 2020-11-16 16:21:27.
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has published the results of its public consultation on the risks of so-called gene drive organisms. Testbiotech accuses the authority of disguising the real dimension of the risks. Gene drives are designed to spread artificial genetic constructs throughout populations of wild species much faster than would be expected naturally. Currently, gene drives are being developed with the aid of tools such as the CRISPR/Cas gene scissors. There are plans, e.g. to apply gene drives in insects (flies and mosquitoes) or rodents (rats or mice). The aim is to replace or eradicate natural populations. Once started the process cannot be controlled effectively or reliably. The damage to humans, the environment and nature could be severe.
Outcome of a public consultation on the draft adequacy and sufficiency evaluation of existing EFSA guidelines for the molecular characterisation, environmental risk assessment and post-market environmental monitoring of genetically modified insects containing engineered gene drives
15040European Food Safety Authority, Y. Devos, M. B. Bonsall, F. Nogué, K. Paraskevopoulos, E. A. Wimmer and L. G. Firbank, EFSA Supporting Publications, 17:1939E. 2020-11-12 19:10:10.
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) carried out an online public consultation to receive input from interested parties/persons on the draftscientific opinion on the adequacy and sufficiencyevaluation of existing guidelines for the molecular characterisation (MC), environmental risk assessment (ERA) and post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) of genetically modified insects containing engineered gene drives. This draft scientific opinion was endorsed by the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) for public consultation on 29 January 2020, and prepared by EFSA'sGene Drive expert Working Group and scientific officers. The public consultation was open from 17 February 2020 until 24 April 2020.
Gene drives, species, and compassion for individuals in conservation biology
15072Y. Rohwer, Ethics, Policy and Environment, 2020-11-10 18:20:29.
In this paper I argue that these compassionate conservationists have a moral obligation to support the investigation and development of genetic modification technologies because of their potential to minimize suffering and eliminate killing in conservation. Furthermore, I will end the paper by suggesting that these genetic technologies can help avoid actions that could be damaging to one's moral character.
NIH NExTRAC (Novel and Exceptional Technology and Research Advisory Committee) | Workshop
15015NIH Office of Science Policy, National Institutes of Health (NIH), 2020-11-09 19:56:25.
NExTRAC provides advice to the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) on matters related to the conduct and oversight of research involving emerging technologies in biomedical science. NExTRAC also makes recommendations on research involving the use of, and developments in, emerging biotechnologies and will address scientific, safety, ethical, and social issues associated with areas of emerging biotechnology research for which the NIH requests advice or guidance. One of the technologies this committee is considering is gene drive. The November 2020 meeting was a workshop: GENE DRIVES: BIOSAFETY GUIDANCE AND CONDITIONS FOR FIELD RELEASE RESEARCH
When Extinction is Warranted: Invasive Species, Suppression-Drives, and the Worst-Case Scenario
15050A. C. Thresher, Ethics, Policy and Environment, 2020-11-09 19:31:52.
The focus of this paper is on one such risk ? the danger of a suppression-drive escaping containment and wiping out the target species globally. Here, I argue that in most cases this risk is significant enough to warrant holding off on the technology. In some cases, however, we can bypass the precautionary principle by using a dominance approach that hinges on what I term the ?Worst-Case Clause?. This clause, in turn, provides us with a litmus test that can be fruitfully used to determine what species are viable targets for suppression-drives in the wild. Using this metric in concert with other considerations, I suggest that only three species are currently possible viable targets ? the European rabbit, ship rat, and Caribbean Tree Frog.
Brave New Planet: Reshaping Nature Through Gene Drives
15047E. Lander, Brave New Planet, 2020-11-09 19:26:24.
A new technology, called gene drives, has the power to spread any genetic instructions you wish across an entire animal or plant species in the wild. It might let us restore ecosystems ravaged by invasive species, or help species adapt to climate change. And, it might save millions of children from dying of malaria. But could altering nature in this way, and on this scale, have unintended consequences? And, when it comes reshaping ecosystems, who needs to say yes?
The ethical way to alter organisms
15033K. Esvelt, Boston Globe, 2020-11-09 15:42:31.
As my colleagues and I first described in 2014, we can use CRISPR genome editing to duplicate the most powerful form of “gene drive,” a ubiquitous natural phenomenon that happens when a genetic change is inherited more frequently than usual. Encode the CRISPR machinery next to a useful edit we’ve made in the genome, and genome editing will reoccur in every generation, replacing the original with the edited version without limit. In principle, releasing such organisms would gradually alter entire wild populations and associated ecosystems.
Advances in genetic engineering test democracy’s capacity for good decision-making
15027N. Kofler and R. Taitingfong, Boston Globe, 2020-11-09 15:31:50.
New advances in genetic engineering and their application for environmental conservation and public health are further testing our democracy’s capacity for good decision-making. With minimal public input, the Environmental Protection Agency recently approved the release of genetically modified mosquitoes in Florida and Texas. An application for the planting of GM American Chestnut trees, engineered to reproduce and spread in the wild, is currently under review by the US Department of Agriculture. And even more complex and powerful genetic technologies intended for environmental release are in the research pipeline.
GeneConvene Global Collaborative | Research and Innovation for biodiversity: what role for gene drive research?
14968EP Intergroup CCBSD, European Bureau of Conservation and Development, 2020-11-06 19:06:04.
This webinar will provide an overview of how gene drive works and the problems it seeks to solve, introduce the most advanced research projects on gene drive in the sector of public health and conservation and present the work that international and European bodies such as WHO, IUCN and EFSA are carrying out on gene drive. It will also be an opportunity to address any questions participants may have with regards to gene drive and stimulate an open debate on the safe and responsible development of the research in this field.
Inauguration and first meeting of WA-IVM Technical Working Groups
14872AUDA-NEPAD, AUDA-NEPAD News, 2020-10-27 19:37:33.
African Union Development Agency – NEPAD (AUDA-NEPAD) in collaboration with the West Africa Health Organization (WAHO), the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Environment in Cote d’Ivoire, organized the inaugural meeting of WA-IVM Technical Working Groups (TWGs) from 24 – 26 April, 2019, in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. Dr. ABLE, Inspector General of the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene, representing the Minister, co-chaired the opening ceremony with Mr LAVRY, Technical Advisor of the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development.
GeneConvene Global Collaborative Webinar Series | Engineered Gene Drives: Policy and Regulatory Considerations Webinar Series October-December 2020
14808Hector Quemada and David O'Brochta, GeneConvene Global Collaborative, 2020-10-22 19:38:17.
In this series of webinars the regulatory and policy challenges of moving new innovative genetic biocontrol products such as gene drive technologies to the field will be featured. Each seminar is ~60 minutes in length followed by questions and answers.
GeneConvene Global Collaborative Webinar Series | Gene Drive Policy and Regulatory Considerations 2020
14677Hector Quemada and David O'Brochta, GeneConvene Global Collaborative, 2020-10-13 17:50:24.
This is series of webinars the regulatory and policy challenges of moving new innovative genetic biocontrol products such as gene drive technologies to the field will be featured.
ESA Position Statement on the Importance of Continued Innovation in Gene Drive Technology
14700Entomological Society of America, Annals of the Entomological Society of America, 2020-10-13 17:39:58.
The risks and benefits of GDTs should be considered with the risks and benefits of continuing current pest control interventions, which may be comparatively less effective or pose exposure risks to human health and the environment.
GeneConvene Global Collaborative Webinar Series | Gene Drive Policy and Regulatory Consideration
14670Hector Quemada and David O'Brochta, GeneConvene Global Collaborative, 2020-10-13 17:34:35.
This is series of webinars the regulatory and policy challenges of moving new innovative genetic biocontrol products such as gene drive technologies to the field will be featured.
Risks of releasing gene drives mosquitoes – a possible future scenario
15143Testbiotech, 2020-09-17 17:01:45.
Genetically engineering the genome of an organism with gene drive means that it will be replicated in every following generation. This allows the altered gene to spread rapidly throughout natural populations, which may be decimated or even eradicated. The video contains both factual and fictional content (the latter marked as „possible future scenario“). The fictional content shows the possible future consequences of using gene drive technology - and is intended to stimulate broad public debate. Civil society needs to engage intensively with issues around new developments in the field of biotechnology and genetic engineering.
Scientists Evaluate Environmental Impacts of Gene Drive Organisms
14334Staff, American Laboratory, 2020-09-04 18:06:56.
Researcher Marion Dolezel, from the Environment Agency Austria, and a team of international scientists published in the open-access journal BioRisk, discuss the potential risks and impacts on the environment.
Responsible innovation in biotechnology: Stakeholder attitudes and implications for research policy
15225P. Roberts, J. Herkert and J. Kuzma, Elementa, 2020-09-01 21:17:09.
Using a mixed methods approach, we analyzed the attitudes of different biotechnology stakeholders, particularly those working in areas related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agriculture and the environment, towards the principles and practices of RI. Homogenous focus groups (organized by stakeholder affiliation) and pre- and post-focus group surveys were used to measure attitudes towards RI. We designed the survey questions according to the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and examined the agreement of stakeholders with policy core beliefs (general principles of RI) and secondary beliefs (implementation practices of RI). Qualitative analysis of focus-groups revealed barriers for implementing RI practices.
Global Governing Bodies: A Pathway for Gene Drive Governance for Vector Mosquito Control
13605A. Kelsey, D. Stillinger, T. B. Pham, J. Murphy, S. Firth and R. Carballar-Lejarazú, American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 2020-08-05 12:34:11.
We examined the current institutions and governing bodies among various continents that could have an impact on gene drive governance or the potential to adapt to its future use. Possible governance strategies also are proposed that seek to bridge gaps and promote an ethically sound policy framework. Ideally, governance strategies should be developed before or at the same pace as gene drive research to anticipate field releases and maximize their impact as a public health tool.
Exploring gene drive’s role in fight against malaria
13536J. Conrow, Genetic Literacy Project, 2020-08-02 17:02:28.
J. Conrow (2020) Genetic Literacy Project. An international initiative has formed to ensure that gene drive technology gets a chance to prove its mettle in the quest to control malaria.
Efficient population modification gene-drive rescue system in the malaria mosquito Anopheles stephensi
13593A. Adolfi, V. M. Gantz, N. Jasinskiene, H.-F. Lee, K. Hwang, E. A. Bulger, A. Ramaiah, J. B. Bennett, G. Terradas, J. J. Emerson, J. M. Marshall, E. Bier and A. A. James, bioRxiv, 2020.08.02.233056. 2020-08-02 12:59:26.
We developed the first recoded gene-drive rescue system for population modification in the malaria vector, Anopheles stephensi, that relieves the load in females caused by integration of the drive into the kynurenine hydroxylase gene by rescuing its function. Non-functional resistant alleles are eliminated via a dominantly-acting maternal effect combined with slower-acting standard negative selection, and a functional resistant allele does not prevent drive invasion.
Biotechnologies in pest wasp control: taking the sting out of pest management for Māori businesses?
14710S. Palmer and O. R. Mercier, New Genetics and Society, 2020-07-31 19:13:18.
A Maori-centered mixed-method study gauged the perceptions of eight Maori businesses about the potential use of five specific new biotechnological controls in pest management.
Après les OGM, la nouvelle technique du forçage génétique inquiète écologistes et scientifiques
13595H. Leussier, Reporterre, 2020-07-28 13:04:33.
Les organismes issus du forçage génétique peuvent transmettre, sans autre intervention humaine, des gènes modifiés à tous leurs descendants. Cette technique permettrait d’éradiquer des espèces nuisibles, comme certains moustiques vecteurs de la malaria. Mais des associations, des scientifiques et des responsables politiques, inquiets de potentiels effets dévastateurs, réclament un moratoire international.
Lettre ouverte a Monsieur le Premier Ministre demandant l’interdiction de la production, de l’utilisation et de la dissémination de tout OGM issu du forçage génétique
13447A. Bossu, N. Laarman, D. Houdebine, H. Le Meur, F. Jacquemart and F. Warlop, Open Letter, 2020-07-22 15:04:01.
A. Bossu, N. Laarman, D. Houdebine, H. Le Meur, F. Jacquemart and F. Warlop (2020). Open Letter. An open letter from French civil society organizations urging the French Parliament to support a resolution at the upcoming Convention on Biodiversity that would call for a moratorium on the release of organisms containing engineered gene drive technologies.
Release of genetically modified mosquitoes in the Florida Keys put on hold
13355D. Goodhue, Miami Herald, 2020-07-21 19:27:08.
Opponents of a plan to release millions of genetically modified mosquitoes in the Florida Keys landed a temporary win on Tuesday.
EPA approves field trials of genetically modified mosquito
13449A. Wernick, WBFO npr, 2020-07-17 16:18:01.
The Environmental Protection Agency has given biotech company Oxitec the go-ahead to test the effectiveness of genetically modified mosquitoes in parts of Florida and Texas. Oxitec has been developing genetically modified mosquitoes in hopes of reducing local populations of mosquitoes that carry dengue fever, yellow fever and the Zika virus. About 750,000 people die each year from mosquito-borne illnesses, making the insect indirectly responsible for more human deaths than any other animal in the world.
Genome Editing in Food and Farming: Risks and unexpected consequences
13186J. Cotter and D. Perls, Canadian Biotechnology Action Network, 2020-07-14 17:53:41.
J. Cotter and D. Perls (2020). Canadian Biotechnology Action Network. In this report, we provide an overview of genome editing techniques being explored in agriculture, and the range of potential unexpected effects that can arise from them. The report draws on recent scientific publications, in a rapidly evolving field of research including gene drive and genetic biocontrol.
Genome Editing 2020: Ethics and Human Rights in Germline Editing in Humans and Gene Drives in Mosquitoes
13198G. J. Annas, American Journal of Law and Medicine, 46:143-165. 2020-07-12 18:17:19.
G. J. Annas (2020). American Journal of Law and Medicine. doi: 10.1177/0098858820933492. I begin with a discussion of so far disastrously unsuccessful attempts to regulate germline editing in humans, including a summary of the first application of germline genome editing in humans and its aftermath. I then turn to a discussion of setting ethical standards for a genomic technology that has not yet been deployed in nature—gene drives. Finally, I end by suggesting that human rights can and should be directly applicable to defining the ethics of genomic research.
CSOs raise alarm over genetically-engineered mosquitoes in Nigeria
13179A. Oboh, Vanguard, 2020-07-11 17:41:57.
No fewer than 75 civil society organisations, CSOs, across the world have raised the alarm over moves to release genetically-modified mosquitoes in Nigeria, noting that the country was about to be used as a guinea pig for the project, which will endanger humans, biodiversity and to ecosystem balance. The CSOs noted that the shortcoming of transgenic mosquitoes was evident from the experiments done in Brazil and in Burkina Faso.
Groups warn against release of genetically-engineered mosquitoes in Nigeria
13172C. Onyesi, Daily Post, 2020-07-07 14:52:15.
C. Onyesi (2020). Daily Post. Over 75 Civil Society Organizations from Nigeria, Africa and the world have condemned moves to open the way for the release of genetically modified mosquitoes in Nigeria.
Malaria: Over 75 CSOs raise alarm over plans to release nautically engineered mosquitoes
13174News Agency of Nigeria, WorldStage, 2020-07-06 14:56:01.
Mre than 75 Environmental Civil Society Organisations from Nigeria, Africa and other countries have condemned moves to open way for release of genetically modified mosquitoes to control malaria infection. The News Agency of Nigeria (NAN), reports that at a virtual meeting of the West African Integrated Vector Management Programme, on June 6, Mr Rufus Ebegba, Vice Chairman of the Programme said: “There is the need to accelerate the development of regulatory pathways for genetically based vector control methods such as transgenic mosquitoes.”
NGOs call for moratorium on controversial ‘gene drive organisms’
13170N. Foote, EURACTIV, 2020-07-03 14:50:12.
https://borgenproject.org/3-innovative-technologies-stopping-malaria/
Who is afraid of genetically modified mosquitoes?
12738G. Odogwu, The PUNCH, 2020-06-25 13:27:54.
Genetically Modified Organisms have raised concerns in our clime, the same way they have in other countries of the world – where a clear line is drawn between the pro and the anti-GMO citizens. Nonetheless, this modern biotechnological technique is still at its infancy here. As of the moment, we can only boast of the development of the PBR cowpea as the only genetically modified food crop to be approved by the Nigerian government.
Mosquito district workshop focuses on Keys trials
12732S. Matthis, KEYSWEEKLY, 2020-06-25 13:21:52.
Now that the Oxitec “Friendly Mosquito” trials have been approved by the federal and state governments, it’s up to the Florida Keys Mosquito Control District to decide if, when and where to embrace the technology said to decrease the chances of mosquito-borne diseases such as dengue fever (there are two new cases in the Keys; see sidebar) and zika.
Genetically modified mosquitoes to be released in Florida and Texas
12735O. Ron, The Jerusalem Post, 2020-06-24 13:24:12.
A plan to release 750 million genetically modified mosquitoes in Florida and Texas has been approved, The Guardian reported. According to the plan, the Aedes aegypti mosquitoes will be released into the wild, as they contain a special protein that would kill female offspring, which are the ones who bite, and thus preventing the spread of such illnesses as dengue fever and Zika.
Before genetically modified mosquitoes are released, we need a better EPA
12720N. Kofler and J. Kuzma, The Boston Globe, 2020-06-22 13:07:55.
While the attention of the American public has rightfully been focused on the COVID-19 pandemic, its associated racial disparities, and broader issues of structural racism, the US government made a serious public health decision — one that could affect our health and our environment for generations to come. Last month, the US Environmental Protection Agency approved the release of genetically modified mosquitoes. Under a 2-year Experimental Use Permit, a company called Oxitec has been granted permission to release over 1 billion genetically modified mosquitoes across 6,600 acres in Florida and Texas.
Are Genetically Modified Mosquitoes Coming To Florida?
12726M. Taylor, Y100, 2020-06-19 13:13:35.
I'm not even going to lie, mosquitoes should be classified under domestic terrorism. The flying, biting bugs you can barely see wreak havoc on my life every single summer. I'm not sure if I'm allergic to them, but whenever I'm bit by them, that area of my skin swells up. It's the most annoying feeling in the world.
The Florida Keys are one step closer to getting genetically modified mosquitoes
12723D. Goodhue, Miami Herald, 2020-06-19 13:10:57.
An international biotech company is one step closer to being able to release genetically modified mosquitoes in the Florida Keys. The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services this week granted Oxitec an experimental use permit to release potentially millions of lab-made male Aedes aegypti mosquitoes throughout Monroe County. The goal is to wipe out the Keys population of the invasive bugs, which carry diseases like dengue fever, Zika and yellow fever. The Florida Department of Health reported a case of dengue fever in the Keys in March.
ENSSER | Gene Drive Webinar Series
12568European Network of Scientists for Social and Environmental Responsibility, 2020-06-16 20:50:52.
This series of five Webinars by some of the authors of the interdisciplinary Gene Drive Report (2019) and were organised by four organisations of independent scientists: the European Network of Scientists for Social and Environmental Responsibility (ENSSER), Critical Scientists Switzerland (CSS), Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler (VDW), Sciences Citoyennes (SC). The series was aimed at a lay audience and were intended to address these questions. Does it really work? Is it being applied? What problems do gene drives address? What side effects can they have? Who has an interest in this? Should we do it? Are gene drives regulated by law? Are they a wise solution to these problems? Who decides?
Species Extinction & the Case for a Global Moratorium on Gene Drives
12454M. Imken, ARC, 2020-06-14 20:33:30.
One million species are currently threatened with extinction, and humanity faces the challenge of stopping the sixth mass extinction in the history of our planet. Yet a new technology called Gene Drive enables human beings to reprogram wild species by genetic engineering and to drive these species to self-destruction and extinction.
Conservation implications of disease control
12540J. C. Buck, S. B. Weinstein, G. Titcomb and H. S. Young, Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 6. 2020-06-08 15:44:22.
Infectious diseases have indelibly altered human history and, in doing so, have shaped the ecology and conservation of the natural world. Attempts to control diseases often result in adverse environmental impacts, including habitat degradation and unintended outcomes such as effects on non-target species. However, in instances where the most effective strategy is to physically avoid specific species or habitats, disease can also provide critical de facto conservation benefits to organisms and ecosystems. Increasingly, new genome-editing technologies offer the potential to eradicate long-term health scourges, which disproportionately affect people in developing countries. It will be critical to incorporate an understanding of the ecological consequences of disease control - including those mediated by changes in human behavior - into management strategies, and to do so without propagating environmental injustice. In this way, scientists, resource managers, and health practitioners can help to ensure that gains for human health do not result in losses for the natural world.
Gene drives: benefits, risks, and possible applications
12414A. Deplazes-Zemp, U. Grossniklaus, F. Lefort, P. Müller, J. Romeis, A. Rüegsegger, N. Schoenenberger and E. Spehn, Swiss Academies Factsheets, 15. 2020-06-05 19:48:13.
Gene drives are genetic elements that skew the pattern of inheritance of a given characteristic in sexually reproducing organisms. They can be used to spread a characteristic that can alter or even reduce the numbers of individuals in wild populations of a certain species. As they spread by being inherited from one generation to the next, they could persist in populations long-term. The spreading property of gene drives could be a source of great potential in areas as diverse as the control of disease vectors, invasive species, agricultural pests and predators of endangered species. However, the same property may make containment challenging and therefore may also pose novel environmental risks. The evaluation, distribution of risks and benefits and the fact that gene drives may be seen as a particularly profound interference with nature raises further novel ethical considerations.
Genetically modified mosquitoes could be released in Florida and Texas beginning this summer – silver bullet or jumping the gun?
12409B. Allan, C. Stone, H. Tuten, J. Kuzma and N. Kofler, The Conversation, 2020-06-03 18:53:50.
On May 1, 2020, the company Oxitec received an experimental use permit from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to release millions of GM mosquitoes (labeled by Oxitec as OX5034) every week over the next two years in Florida and Texas. Females of this mosquito species, Aedes aegypti, transmit dengue, chikungunya, yellow fever and Zika viruses. When these lab-bred GM males are released and mate with wild females, their female offspring die. Continual, large-scale releases of these OX5034 GM males should eventually cause the temporary collapse of a wild population. However, as vector biologists, geneticists, policy experts and bioethicists, we are concerned that current government oversight and scientific evaluation of GM mosquitoes do not ensure their responsible deployment.
Gene Drives: Pursuing opportunities, minimizing risk
11966K. L. Warmbrod, A. Kobokovich, R. West, G. Ray, M. Trotochaud and M. Montague, Center for Health Security, 2020-05-18 18:14:50.
This study analyzed the current state of gene drive technologies, the ways in which they might be deployed in the field, and the state of regulatory policy governing their development.
Beyond limits – the pitfalls of global gene drives for environmental risk assessment in the European Union
11458M. Dolezel, C. Lüthi and H. Gaugitsch, BioRisk, 15:1-29. 2020-05-04 14:58:37.
We evaluate the novel features of GDOs and outline the resulting challenges for the environmental risk assessment.
The development of complex and controversial innovations. Genetically modified mosquitoes for malaria eradication
11431V. Cisnetto and J. Barlow, Research Policy, 49:103917. 2020-05-04 13:32:20.
e use a longitudinal process approach and qualitative system dynamics modelling to study the development of genetically modified (GM) mosquitoes for malaria eradication in an African country.
Pest control with genetically modified insects
11238myScience, myScience, 2020-04-21 17:18:07.
To control pests without pesticides, genetically modified organisms of the same species could be used. The latter carry a gene that is passed on with above-average frequency via sexual reproduction. This gene possesses traits that directly weaken the pest, or prevent pathogens from being transmitted. But how can the environmental impact of such gene-drive elements be recorded and assessed? Experts from Agroscope have authored a concept study on this topic.
Report of the ad hoc technical expert group on risk assessment
16095Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Risk Assessment, Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020-04-15 15:54:41.
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol further decided to extend the Online Forum on Risk Assessment and Risk Management to assist the AHTEG and invited submissions of information relevant to the work of the online forum and the AHTEG from Parties, other Governments, and indigenous peoples and local communities. The AHTEG is to submit the outcomes of its work for consideration by the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice at its twenty-fourth meeting, prior to the tenth meeting of the Parties to the Protocol.
GENE DRIVE ORGANISMS: Implications for the environment and nature conservation
16092M. Dolezel, S. Simon, M. Otto, M. Engelhard and W. Zughart, Umweltbundesamt, 2020-04-09 15:46:47.
Recent advances in biotechnology aim at the genetic modification of wild living populations. Some potential applications consider self-propagating genetic elements to generate gene drive organisms (GDOs), also for nature conservation. Due to the potential of GDOs to spread spatially and temporally unlimited, impacts on the environment and ecosystems may be irreversible and are difficult to predict. This technical report summarizes the status of gene drive applications currently discussed in the scientific literature. It outlines their potential implications for the environment and nature conservation and highlights challenges with respect to the environmental risk assessment and post-release monitoring of GDOs, in particular in a context of high complexity and uncertainty.
Editorial Expression of Concern: Transgenic Aedes aegypti Mosquitoes Transfer Genes into a Natural Population
16199B. R. Evans, P. Kotsakiozi, A. L. Costa-Da-Silva, R. S. Ioshino, L. Garziera, M. C. Pedrosa, A. Malavasi, J. F. Virginio, M. L. Capurro and J. R. Powell, Scientific Reports, 10:2. 2020-03-24 15:17:41.
Shortly after publication of this Article in September 2019, the Editors were alerted to concerns regarding the interpretation of the data and some of the conclusions.
Toward the definition of efficacy and safety criteria for advancing gene drive-modified mosquitoes to field testing
7971S. L. James, J. M. Marshall, G. K. Christophides, F. O. Okumu and T. Nolan, Vector Borne and Zoonotic Diseases, 20:237. 2020-03-09 14:54:00.
Mosquitoes containing gene drive systems are being developed as complementary tools to prevent transmission of malaria and other mosquito-borne diseases. As with any new tool, decision makers and other stakeholders will need to balance risks (safety) and benefits (efficacy) when considering the rationale for testing and deploying gene drive-modified mosquito products. Developers will benefit from standards for judging whether an investigational gene drive product meets acceptability criteria for advancing to field trials. Such standards may be formalized as preferred product characteristics and target product profiles, which describe the desired attributes of the product category and of a particular product, respectively. This report summarizes discussions from two scientific workshops aimed at identifying efficacy and safety characteristics that must be minimally met for an investigational gene drive-modified mosquito product to be deemed viable to move from contained testing to field release and the data that will be needed to support an application for first field release.
Risk assessment challenges of synthetic gene drive organisms
12529E. Sirinathsinghji, TWN Biosafety Briefing, 2020-03-01 15:12:11.
What are gene drives about?
7377EFSAchannel, 2020-02-17 14:39:25.
EFSA expert Les Firbank, specialised in sustainable agriculture, talks about gene drives. Recent development in molecular biology are allowing scientists to engineer gene drives and use them to push desirable genes into target populations. How does that work? Learn more about this topic on in our new video.
Regulation of GM Organisms for Invasive Species Control
6701H. J. Mitchell and D. Bartsch, Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology, 7:1-11. 2020-01-21 18:17:37.
Invasive species can cause significant harm to the environment, agriculture, and human health, but there are often very limited tools available to control their populations. Gene drives (GD) have been proposed as a new tool which could be used to control or eliminate such species. Here, GD describes a variety of molecular biology applications which all enable the introduction of genetic elements at a higher than expected frequency. These elements can change the genotypes in target populations rapidly with consequences either for (intrinsic) fitness or host-parasite interaction, or both. Beneficial applications are foreseen for human and animal health, agriculture, or nature conservation. This rapidly developing technology is likely to have major impacts in the fight against various diseases, pests, and invasive species. The majority of GD applications involve genetic engineering and novel traits. Therefore, applicants and GMO regulators need to interact to achieve the benefits in innovation while cautiously avoiding unacceptable risks. The release into the environment may include transboundary movement and replacement of target populations, with potential impact on human/animal health and the environment. This article summarizes knowledge-based discussions to identify information gaps and analyzes scenarios for responsible introduction of GD organisms into the environment. It aims to connect the latest scientific developments with regulatory approaches and decision-making.
A typology of community and stakeholder engagement based on documented examples in the field of novel vector control
6032C. E. Schairer, R. Taitingfong, O. S. Akbari and C. S. Bloss, PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases, 13:e0007863. 2019-12-30 20:46:44.
Background Despite broad consensus on the importance of community and stakeholder engagement (CSE) for guiding the development, regulation, field testing, and deployment of emerging vector control technologies (such as genetically engineered insects), the types of activities pursued have varied widely, as have the outcomes. We looked to previous CSE efforts for clarity about appropriate methods and goals. Our analysis yielded a typology of CSE, and related vocabulary, that describes distinctions that funders, organizers, and scholars should make when proposing or evaluating CSE. Methods We compiled available formal documentation of CSE projects, starting with projects mentioned in interviews with 17 key informants. Major features of these examples, including the initiators, target groups, timing, goals, and methods were identified using qualitative coding. Based on these examples, subcategories were developed for a subset of features and applied to the identified cases of CSE in the documents. Co-occurrence of subcategorized features was examined for patterns. Results We identified 14 documented examples CSE projects, which were comprised of 28 distinct CSE activities. We found no clear patterns with respect to timing. However, we found that grouping examples according to whether initiators or targets could enact the immediate desired outcome could help to clarify relationships between goals, methods, and targets.
Gene drives for schistosomiasis transmission control
6341T. Maier, N. J. Wheeler, E. K. O. Namigai, J. Tycko, R. E. Grewelle, Y. Woldeamanuel, K. Klohe, J. Perez-Saez, S. H. Sokolow, G. A. De Leo, T. P. Yoshino, M. Zamanian and J. Reinhard-Rupp, PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases, 13:e0007833. 2019-12-19 18:18:55.
Schistosomiasis is one of the most important and widespread neglected tropical diseases (NTD), with over 200 million people infected in more than 70 countries; the disease has nearly 800 million people at risk in endemic areas. Although mass drug administration is a cost-effective approach to reduce occurrence, extent, and severity of the disease, it does not provide protection to subsequent reinfection. Interventions that target the parasites' intermediate snail hosts are a crucial part of the integrated strategy required to move toward disease elimination. The recent revolution in gene drive technology naturally leads to questions about whether gene drives could be used to efficiently spread schistosome resistance traits in a population of snails and whether gene drives have the potential to contribute to reduced disease transmission in the long run. Responsible implementation of gene drives will require solutions to complex challenges spanning multiple disciplines, from biology to policy. This Review Article presents collected perspectives from practitioners of global health, genome engineering, epidemiology, and snail/schistosome biology and outlines strategies for responsible gene drive technology development, impact measurements of gene drives for schistosomiasis control, and gene drive governance. Success in this arena is a function of many factors, including gene-editing specificity and efficiency, the level of resistance conferred by the gene drive, how fast gene drives may spread in a metapopulation over a complex landscape, ecological sustainability, social equity, and, ultimately, the reduction of infection prevalence in humans. With combined efforts from across the broad global health community, gene drives for schistosomiasis control could fortify our defenses against this devastating disease in the future.
Articulating ‘free, prior and informed consent’ (FPIC) for engineered gene drives
5800George, D. R., T. Kuiken and J. A. Delborne, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 286:20191484.. 2019-12-19 14:30:32.
Recent statements by United Nations bodies point to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) as a potential requirement in the development of engineered gene drive applications. As a concept developed in the context of protecting Indigenous rights to self-determination in land development scenarios, FPIC would need to be extended to apply to the context of ecological editing. Without an explicit framework of application, FPIC could be interpreted as a narrowly framed process of community consultation focused on the social implications of technology, and award little formal or advisory power in decision-making to Indigenous peoples and local communities. In this paper, we argue for an articulation of FPIC that attends to issues of transparency, iterative community-scale consent, and shared power through co-development among Indigenous peoples, local communities, researchers and technology developers. In realizing a comprehensive FPIC process, researchers and developers have an opportunity to incorporate enhanced participation and social guidance mechanisms into the design, development and implementation of engineered gene drive applications.
Exterminator genes: The right to say no to ethics dumping
5654Bassey-Orovwuje, M., J. Thomas and T. Wakeford, Development, 62:121-127. 2019-12-17 18:09:38.
The scientific-industrial complex is promoting a new wave of genetically modified organisms, in particular gene drive organisms, using the same hype with which they tried to persuade society that GMOs would be a magic bullet to solve world hunger. The Gates Foundation claims that GDOs could help wipe out diseases such as malaria. Powerful conservation lobby groups claim GDOs will protect engendered species. Not only are the benefits from GDOs based, like their predecessors, on flawed ecological thinking, but they are backed by the same agri-business interests that have devastated agroecological farming systems. The rights of communities to say ‘no’ to new genetic technologies is being eroded, despite United Nations agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, which call for the free, prior and informed consent of affected communities to be respected. By exporting their field trials to countries with weak regulatory regimes and lowering of the standards of consent the Gates Foundation’s Target Malaria project has already been guilty of ethics dumping. These developments demonstrate the urgent need to democratize the development of new technologies.
A cross-sectional survey of biosafety professionals regarding genetically modified insects
5650O’Brochta, D. A., W. K. Tonui, B. Dass and S. James, Applied Biosafety, 2019:1-9. 2019-12-17 17:57:33.
Background:Genetic technologies such as gene editing and gene drive create challenges for existing frameworks used to assess risk and make regulatory determinations by governments and institutions. Insect genetic technologies including transgenics, gene editing, and gene drive may be particularly challenging because of the large and increasing number of insect species being genetically modified and the degree of familiarity with these organisms and technologies by biosafety officials charged with making containment decisions.Methods:An anonymous online survey of biosafety professionals was distributed to the membership of ABSA International, a global society of biosafety professionals, to investigate their perspectives on their preparedness to meet these new challenges.Results:Existing guidance used to make containment decisions for nongenetically modified insects was widely seen as adequate, and most respondents thought the available guidance for making containment decisions for genetically modified insects with and without gene drives was inadequate. Most respondents reported having less confidence in their decisions concerning containment of genetically modified insects compared to decisions involving genetically modified microbes, (noninsect) animals, and plants.Conclusions:These results reveal a need for additional support for biosafety professionals to improve the quality of and confidence in containment decisions regarding genetically modified insects with and without gene drive. These needs might be addressed by increasing training, updating existing guidance, creating new guidance, and creating a third-party accreditation entity to support institutions. Sixty percent of the respondents said they either would or might use a voluntary third-party accreditation service to support insect containment decisions.
The potential for a released autosomal X-shredder becoming a driving-Y chromosome and invasively suppressing wild populations of malaria mosquitoes
5648Alcalay, Y., S. Fuchs, R. Galizi, F. Bernardini, R. E. Haghighat-Khah, D. B. Rusch, J. R. Adrion, M. W. Hahn, P. Tortosa and P. A. Papathanos, bioRxiv, 2019:860551. 2019-12-17 17:51:02.
Synthetic sex-ratio distorters based on X-chromosome shredding are predicted to be more efficient than sterile males for population suppression of malaria mosquitoes using genetic control. X chromosome shredding operates through the targeted elimination of X-chromosome-bearing gametes during male spermatogenesis, resulting in males that have a high fraction of male offspring. Strains harboring autosomal constructs containing a modified endonuclease I-PpoI have now been developed in the malaria mosquito Anopheles gambiae, resulting in strong sex-ratio distortion towards males. Data are being gathered for these strains for submission of regulatory dossiers for contained use and subsequent field release in West Africa. Since autosomal X shredders are transmitted in a Mendelian fashion and can be selected against their frequency in the population is expected to decline once releases are halted. However, any unintended transfer of the X-shredder to the Y-chromosome could theoretically change these dynamics: This could lead to 100% transmission of the newly Y-linked X-shredder to the predominant male-biased offspring and its insulation from negative selection in females, resulting in its potential spread in the population and ultimately to suppression. Here, we analyze plausible mechanisms whereby an autosomal X-shredder could become linked to the Y-chromosome after release and provide data regarding its potential for activity should it become linked to the Y-chromosome. Our results strongly suggest that Y-chromosome linkage through remobilization of the transposon used for the initial genetic transformation is unlikely, and that, in the unexpected event that the X-shredder becomes linked to the Y-chromosome, expression and activity of the X-shredder would likely be inhibited by meiotic sex chromosome inactivation. We conclude that a functioning X-shredding based Y-drive resulting from a naturally induced transposition or translocation of the transgene onto the Y-chromosome is unlikely.
Plasmodium falciparum (Haemosporodia: Plasmodiidae) and O’nyong-nyong virus development in a transgenic Anopheles gambiae (Diptera: Culicidae) strain
5634Mumford, J. D., C. A. Long, S. C. Weaver, K. Miura, E. Wang, R. Rotenberry, E. M. Dotson and M. Q. Benedict, " Journal of Medical Entomology, 56:936-941. 2019-12-17 16:55:10.
ransgenic Anopheles gambiae Giles (Diptera: Culicidae) mosquitoes have been developed that confer sexual sterility on males that carry a transgene encoding a protein which cuts ribosomal DNA. A relevant risk concern with transgenic mosquitoes is that their capacity to transmit known pathogens could be greater than the unmodified form. In this study, the ability to develop two human pathogens in these transgenic mosquitoes carrying a homing endonuclease which is expressed in the testes was compared with its nontransgenic siblings. Infections were performed with Plasmodium falciparum (Welch) and o’nyong-nyong virus (ONNV) and the results between the transgenic and nontransgenic sibling females were compared. There was no difference observed with ONNV isolate SG650 in intrathoracic infections or the 50% oral infectious dose measured at 14 d postinfection or in mean body titers. Some significant differences were observed for leg titers at the medium and highest doses for those individuals in which virus titer could be detected. No consistent difference was observed between the transgenic and nontransgenic comparator females in their ability to develop P. falciparum NF54 strain parasites. This particular transgene caused no significant effect in the ability of mosquitoes to become infected by these two pathogens in this genetic background. These results are discussed in the context of risk to human health if these transgenic individuals were present in the environment.
What risk assessments of genetically modified organisms can learn from institutional analyses of public health risks
5628Rajan, S. R. and D. K. Letourneau, Journal of Biomedicine and Biotechnology, 2012:8. 2019-12-17 16:46:43.
The risks of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are evaluated traditionally by combining hazard identification and exposure estimates to provide decision support for regulatory agencies. We question the utility of the classical risk paradigm and discuss its evolution in GMO risk assessment. First, we consider the problem ofuncertainty, by comparing risk assessment for environmental toxins in the public health domain with genetically modified organisms in the environment; we use the specific comparison of an insecticide to a transgenic, insecticidal food crop. Next, we examine normal accident theory (NAT) as a heuristic to consider runaway effects ofGMOs, such as negative community level consequences of gene flow from transgenic, insecticidal crops. These examples illustrate how risk assessments are made more complex and contentious by both their inherent uncertainty and the inevitability of failure beyond expectation in complex systems. We emphasize the value of conducting decision-support research, embracing uncertainty, increasing transparency, and building interdisciplinary institutions that can address the complex interactions between ecosystems and society. In particular, we argue against black boxing risk analysis, and for a program to educate policy makers about uncertainty and complexity, so that eventually, decision making is not the burden that falls upon scientists but is assumed by the public at large
Gene drives in Africa – A Podcast
5592Wakeford, T., etc Group, 2019-12-16 19:57:27.
In Episode #1 ETC's Tom Wakeford speaks with Ugandan lawyer and advocate Barbara Ntambirweki about gene drives, a powerful new genetic technology that can change species in the wild and make species go extinct.
Genetic frontiers for conservation: An assessment of synthetic biology and biodiversity conservation
16089K. H. Redford, T. Brooks, M., B. W. Nicholas and J. S. A. Macfarlane, International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2019-12-01 15:41:26.
This assessment is the beginning of a process that will lead to the development of an IUCN policy to guide the Union’s Director General, Commissions, and Members. The draft policy will be discussed in many fora before it is brought to vote at the World Conservation Congress in 2020. Far greater public attention to the topic of synthetic biology and biodiversity conservation is essential, given the potential impact of scientific discoveries and policy decisions that may be just over the horizon, and also given the need for broad partnerships to address the challenges that the conservation and synthetic biology communities will inevitably face
An Initial Framework for the Environmental Risk Assessment of Synthetic Biology-Derived Organisms with a Focus on Gene Drives.
16281W. G. Landis, E. A. Brown and S. Eikenbary, Synthetic Biology 2020: Frontiers in Risk Analysis and Governance. Risk, Systems and Decisions., 2019-11-29 17:16:37.
We apply the structure of source-stressor-habitat-effect-impact pathway derived from the relative risk model (Landis and Wiegers 2005) and as was demonstrated to be applicable in the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM) 2016 report Gene Drives on the Horizon. This relative risk model is now calculated employing Bayesian networks and has been applied to forestry management (Ayre and Landis 2012), infectious disease (Ayre et al. 2014), invasive species (Herring et al. 2015), contaminated sites (Landis et al. 2017a; Johns et al. 2017), and watershed management (Hines and Landis 2014; Graham et al. 2019).
Gene Drives and new genetic manipulation in agriculture
5995Terra de Direitos, 2019-10-23 15:43:54.
Gene drives are forms of genetic editing or manipulation of live organisms. They are the most dangerous forms of transgenics which edit genetic characteristics without necessarily including a new gene, but rather manipulating existing genes of live organisms, i.e. live organism genetic information microsurgery. The technique uses enzymes which “cut and paste” (such as CrisPR/Cas9) genes of organisms that reproduce sexually – such as plants like maize and mosquitoes – without necessarily introducing genes from other organisms or synthetic genes. Produced by the National Agroecology Articulation (ANA) Biodiversity Working Group, a body that congregates different social organizations and movements, the video seeks to explain in an educational way how this new biotechnology is looming as a threat to the environment, agricultural biodiversity and society.
A Controversial Swarm Of Genetically Modified Mosquitoes In A Lab In Italy
5527NPR, 2019-10-20 19:41:57.
An international team of scientists is conducting a controversial experiment in Italy. The experiment is designed to test genetically modified mosquitoes that researchers hope could provide a powerful new weapon to fight malaria, which remains one of the world's greatest scourges.
Threshold-Dependent Gene Drives in Wild Populations – A Podcast
6900G. A. Backus and J. A. Delborne, BioScience Talks, 2019-10-08 14:04:47.
By altering the heritability of certain traits, gene drive technologies have the potential to spread desired genes through wild populations. In practice, this could lead to mosquito populations that, for example, bear traits making them resistant to the spread of malaria. Despite the huge potential for improving human well-being, concern exists that gene drives could fail in the wild or spread beyond their intended target populations. Writing in BioScience, Dr. Greg Backus, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of California, Davis, and Jason Delborne, Associate Professor of Science Policy and Society at North Carolina State University's Genetic Engineering and Society Center, describe a potential solution. Threshold-dependent gene drives could limit the spread of wild-released gene drives to target populations, increasing control and reducing the risk of unchecked spread. The authors joined us on this episode of BioScience Talks to discuss the potential of these gene drives—and also some of the questions of controllability, spread, and ecological uncertainty that relate to them. Read the article. Listen to our previous podcast on gene drives.
Efforts to enhance safety measures for CRISPR/Cas-based gene drive technology in Japan
6035T. Tanaka, N. Tanaka, Y. Nagano, H. Kanuka, D. S. Yamamoto, N. Yamamoto, E. Nanba and T. Nishiuch, Journal of Environment and Safety, 2019-10-07 20:47:13.
Gene drive is a powerful system that can spread a desirable genetic trait into an entire species and/or population of a certain region, bypassing Mendelian rules of inheritance. Recently, one of the genome editing technologies, CRISPR/Cas, has been developed, making it easier to use gene drive in many different organisms. However, gene drive has potential risks that impact genetic diversity when organisms produced by CRISPR/Cas-based Gene Drive Technology (CCGDT) are accidentally released; therefore, a high degree of prudence is required when CCGDT is used. In Japan, a Working Group on Gene Drive has been established in the Academic Association for Promotion of Genetic Studies (AAPGS), and a Statement on the Handling of Gene Drive was issued to the public including research institute across Japan, after comprehensive and extensive discussions by the working group in order to reduce risks posed by CCGDT. A national-wide survey on CCGDT was implemented. The survey revealed that those in managerial positions including members and secretariats of institutional review boards on recombinant DNA, and biosafety officers are conscious of CCGDT, and efforts to grasp experimental plans involving CCGDT are made by utilizing an application form for recombinant DNA experiment. In contrast, potential risks of CCGDT are not understood by many researchers. All stakeholders need to disseminate potential risks and preventive measures regarding CCGDT to all researchers who may wish to use this technology. Researchers should use CCGDT upon understanding its potential risks and taking necessary measures. This report refers to how safety measures for CRISPR/Cas-based gene drive technology which has potential risks to ecological system has been discussed and results of national-wide questionnaire survey on gene drive in Japan based on the poster presentation at the Asian Conference on Safety & Education in Laboratory 2018.
Gene Drives: Dynamics and Regulatory Matters-A Report from the Workshop “Evaluation of Spatial and Temporal Control of Gene Drives,” April 4-5, 2019, Vienna
12396B. Giese, J. L. Friess, N. H. Barton, P. W. Messer, F. Debarre, M. F. Schetelig, N. Windbichler, H. Meimberg and C. Boete, Bioessays, 41:3. 2019-10-07 18:26:19.
Gene Drives are regarded as future tools with a high potential for population control. Due to their inherent ability to overcome the rules of Mendelian inheritance, gene drives (GD) may spread genes rapidly through populations of sexually reproducing organisms. A release of organisms carrying a GD would constitute a paradigm shift in the handling of genetically modified organisms because gene drive organisms (GDO) are designed to drive their transgenes into wild populations and thereby increase the number of GDOs. The rapid development in this field and its focus on wild populations demand a prospective risk assessment with a focus on exposure related aspects. Presently, it is unclear how adequate risk management could be guaranteed to limit the spread of GDs in time and space, in order to avoid potential adverse effects in socio‐ecological systems. The recent workshop on the “Evaluation of Spatial and Temporal Control of Gene Drives” hosted by the Institute of Safety/Security and Risk Sciences (ISR) in Vienna aimed at gaining some insight into the potential population dynamic behavior of GDs and appropriate measures of control. Scientists from France, Germany, England, and the USA discussed both topics in this meeting on April 4–5, 2019. This article summarizes results of the workshop.
Gene Drive Mosquitoes: Ethics, Environment and Efficacy
18233L. Wilburn, ScienceInnovationUnion, 2019-09-20 17:06:38.
The Bill and Melinda Gates foundation has recently donated over $75 million to fund gene drive mosquito research by Target Malaria , a consortium that aims to develop technology for malaria control. The first planned release of gene drive mosquitoes is set to happen over the next two years in Burkina Faso, West Africa. But what exactly is gene drive, why do we need it and what are the wider implications of the technology? Malaria is a parasitic disease spread by the bite of the female Anopheles mosquito. Malaria can present as a range of symptoms including, mild fever, muscle pains (which can progress to severe malaria where the patient can experience severe anaemia and bleeding), renal failure, neurological disorders and death. In 2017, there were an estimated 219 million cases and 435,000 deaths attributed to malaria (1). Over 91% of these cases occurred in the Africa region, and children under the age of 5 were at the highest risk of contracting severe malaria. Fortunately, due to interventions such as insecticide-treated bed nets, indoor spraying of insecticides and improved medical infrastructure, from 2010-2017 malaria deaths were reduced by an estimated 28% (1). However, these control efforts may be severely jeopardised due to the rapid emergence of resistance to all insecticide classes and the most effective anti-malarial drugs (2, 3). Currently, there are only five classes of insecticides approved for public health use. In areas such as West Africa, there are multi-resistant mosquitoes which show resistance to all insecticide classes (4). Therefore, if the World Health Organisation (WHO) is to meet its goal of reducing global malaria by 90% by 2030, novel and effective strategies for malaria control must be identified (5). One such proposed strategy is gene drive mosquitoes.
Gene Drive Technologies: Powerful and destructive
5510SWISSAID, 2019-09-16 19:05:21.
Gene drive organisms can put our environment, food and health in danger: this is made clear by the video from SWISSAID, the Alliance for GMO-free Switzerland and the ETC Group.
Genetically engineered mosquitoes out of control
4534GM Watch, GM Watch, 2019-09-11 00:00:00.
According to a new scientific publication, genetically engineered mosquitoes produced by the biotech company Oxitec (Intrexon) have escaped human control after trials in Brazil. They are now spreading in the environment. The yellow fever mosquitoes (Aedes aegypti) are genetically engineered to make it impossible for their offspring to survive. After release they were supposed to mate with female mosquitoes of the species which transmit infectious diseases, such as Dengue fever, to diminish the natural populations.
Transgenic Aedes aegypti Mosquitoes Transfer Genes into a Natural Population
16197B. R. Evans, P. Kotsakiozi, A. L. Costa-da-Silva, R. S. Ioshino, L. Garziera, M. C. Pedrosa, A. Malavasi, J. F. Virginio, M. L. Capurro and J. R. Powell, Scientific Reports, 9:6. 2019-09-10 15:09:04.
We genotyped the release strain and the target Jacobina population before releases began for >21,000 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). Genetic sampling from the target population six, 12, and 27-30 months after releases commenced provides clear evidence that portions of the transgenic strain genome have been incorporated into the target population. Evidently, rare viable hybrid offspring between the release strain and the Jacobina population are sufficiently robust to be able to reproduce in nature. The release strain was developed using a strain originally from Cuba, then outcrossed to a Mexican population. Thus, Jacobina Ae. aegypti are now a mix of three populations. It is unclear how this may affect disease transmission or affect other efforts to control these dangerous vectors. These results highlight the importance of having in place a genetic monitoring program during such releases to detect un-anticipated outcomes.
Gene Drives: Experience with gene drive systems that may inform an environmental risk assessment
4583Rüdelsheim, PKJS, G., COGEM, 2019-09-05 00:00:00.
Gene drives are genetic mechanisms that allow for a trait to be propagated throughout a population; beyond Mendelian inheritance. Active in sexually-reproducing species, they are powerful tools to “drive”; a gene, i.e. increase its frequency, independent of external selection pressure. They have been proposed; as offering solutions for many challenges in public health, agriculture, conservation and others. They have; inspired researchers to use gene drives to combat diseases transmitted by insects such as malaria,; dengue and Zika.; For decennia attempts have been made to use or modify naturally occurring gene drive mechanisms. Yet,; natural gene drives have their limitations. Transposable element-based drives turned out to be not efficient; enough. Moreover, they cannot be directed. Translocation drives are hard to establish and suffer from a; high fitness cost. Others are only active in specific species (e.g. meiotic drive, MEDEA).
Autonomy of Nations and Indigenous Peoples and the Environmental Release of Genetically Engineered Animals with Gene Drives
12398Z. Meghani, Global Policy, 10:554-568. 2019-08-05 18:30:26.
This article contends that the environmental release of genetically engineered (GE) animals with heritable traits that are patented will present a challenge to the efforts of nations and indigenous peoples to engage in self-determination. The environmental release of such animals has been proposed on the grounds that they could function as public health tools or as solutions to the problem of agricultural insect pests. This article brings into focus two political-economic-legal problems that would arise with the environmental release of such organisms. To address those challenges, it is proposed that nations considering the environmental release of GE animals must take into account the underlying circumstances and policy failures that motivate arguments for the use of the modified animals. Moreover, countries must recognize that the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights place on them an obligation to ensure that GE animals with patented heritable traits are not released without the substantive consent of the nations or indigenous peoples that could be affected.
Arthropod Containment Guidelines, Version 3.2
34042American Committee of Medical Entomology; American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, VECTOR-BORNE AND ZOONOTIC DISEASES, Volume 19, Number 3. 2019-06-15 00:00:00.
Gene drive organisms: What Africa should know about actors, motives and threats to biodiversity and food systems
5923Sirinathsinghji, E., African Centre for Biodiversity., 2019-05-13 16:51:45.
In this briefing paper, we set out the key issues that our governments should have addressed with African civil society before endorsing positions and setting the benchmark for Africa-wide policy. In this regard, we point out that, while the impetus for the AU position might well have been gene drive technologies proposed by the Gates-funded Target Malaria consortium, as a tool to reduce the transmission of malaria on the continent, the debate about gene drive organisms goes well beyond gene drive mosquitoes. Plans by gene drive developers target pests, pollinators, weeds and the speeding up of plant breeding programmes. The logic of using these technologies in agriculture relies on the continued deception that exceedingly complex problems in the food system in Africa can be resolved simply by new high-tech innovations, while downplaying their potential risks to biodiversity and livelihoods.
When Policy Meets Practice: The Dilemma for Guidance on Risk Assessment Under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
34344Karen E Hokanson, Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology, 7. 2019-04-30 14:52:07.
An overview of OECD activities related to modern techniques of biotechnology and genome editing
3923Kearns, P, Transgenic Research, 28:41-44. 2019-01-21 00:00:00.
Since commercial use of genetically-engineered (genetically- modified) plants started in 1996, many agricultural products have been developed to improve crop traits. The foods and feeds derived from these commodities have drastically increased worldwide. However, answering health and environmental safety concerns associated with the agricultural use of biotechnology is essential in countries producing the products, as well as in countries using them. To address these concerns, the OECD conducts programmes of work for sharing information, developing tools to facilitate a harmonised approach of risk assessment, and contributing to building consensus between national authorities. This report provides background information on some OECD activities related to safety considerations associated with the use of biotechnology in agriculture (covering applications to crop plants, trees, animals, micro-organisms), including the recent emergence of genome editing techniques.
Arthropod containment guidelines, version 3.2
3920American Committee of Medical Entomology, American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene Vector-Borne and Zoonotic Diseases, 19:3:152-173. 2019-01-18 00:00:00.
In 2003, just a few months after I became editor of Vector-; Borne and Zoonotic Diseases, we published the Arthropod; Containment Guidelines, likely our first of what would become; known as an Open Access publication. The concept to; produce the guidelines resulted from a discussion with staff; from the National Institutes of Health that had been involved; in supporting efforts to develop the capacity to genetically; engineer mosquitoes. What followed was more than a 2-year; effort by members of the American Committee for Medical; Entomology (ACME)—a subgroup of the American Society; of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene (ASTMH). Drafts of the; document were widely circulated among researchers and; vector biologists, and revised several times until a consensus; document was finalized. The guidelines were rapidly embraced; by the international community as the ‘‘go-to’’ reference; document for those working with arthropod vectors in; laboratories, and administrators on committees that oversee; these facilities.
Molecular safeguarding of CRISPR gene drive experiments
3900Champer, JC, Joan; Lee, Yoo Lim; Liu, Chen; Yang, Emily; Wen, Zhaoxin; Clark, Andrew G.; Messer, Philipp W., eLife, 8:e41439. 2019-01-18 00:00:00.
CRISPR-based homing gene drives have sparked both enthusiasm and deep concerns due to their potential for genetically altering entire species. This raises the question about our ability to prevent the unintended spread of such drives from the laboratory into a natural population. Here, we experimentally demonstrate the suitability of synthetic target site drives as well as split drives as flexible safeguarding strategies for gene drive experiments by showing that their performance closely resembles that of standard homing drives in Drosophila melanogaster. Using our split drive system, we further find that maternal deposition of both Cas9 and gRNA is required to form resistance alleles in the early embryo and that maternally-deposited Cas9 alone can power germline drive conversion in individuals that lack a genomic source of Cas9.
Population management using gene drive: molecular design, models ofspread dynamics and assessment of ecological risks
3940Rode, NOE, A.; Bourguet, D.; Courtier-Orgogozo, V.; Debarre, F., Conservation Genetics, 20:671-690. 2019-01-18 00:00:00.
CRISPR gene drive has recently been proposed as a promising technology for population management, including in conservation genetics. The technique would consist in releasing genetically engineered individuals that are designed to rapidly propagate a desired mutation or transgene into wild populations. Potential applications in conservation biology include the control of invasive pest populations that threaten biodiversity (eradication and suppression drives), or the introduction of beneficial mutations in endangered populations (rescue drives). The propagation of a gene drive is affected by different factors that depend on the drive construct (e.g. its fitness effect and timing of expression) or on the target species (e.g. its mating system and population structure). We review potential applications of the different types of gene drives for conservation. We examine the challenges posed by the evolution of resistance to gene drives and review the various molecular and environmental risks associated with gene drives (e.g. propagation to non target populations or species and unintended detrimental ecosystem impacts). We provide some guidelines for future gene drive research and discuss ethical, biosafety and regulation issues.
Gene drives as a response to infection and resistance
3919Hayirli, TCM, P.F., Infection and Drug Resistance, 12:229-234. 2019-01-17 00:00:00.
Vector-borne infectious diseases continue to be a major threat to public health. Although some prevention and treatment modalities exist for these diseases, resistance to such modalities, exacerbated by global climate change, remains a fundamental challenge. Developments in genomic engineering technologies present a new front in battling vector-borne illnesses; however, there is a lack of consensus over the scope and consequences of these approaches. In this article, we use malaria as a case study to address the developments and controversies surrounding gene drives, a novel genomic engineering technology. We draw attention to the themes of infection control, resistance, and reversibility using a science and technology studies framework. Unlike other current prevention and treatment modalities, gene drives have the capacity to alter not only single organisms but also entire species and ecologies. Therefore, broader public and scientific engagement is needed to inform a more inclusive discussion between clinicians, researchers, policy makers, and society.
Safe CRISPR: Challenges and Possible Solutions
3937Pineda, ML, A.; Collins, J. P.; Kiani, S., Trends in Biotechnology, 37:389-401. 2019-01-15 00:00:00.
Applications of CRISPR in human health and in gene drives are at the forefront of biological research as tools. This technology will affect humankind and our environment, so as this technology pushes forward, the design and implementation of safety measures is imperative. Novel technologies and forethought in various applications of CRISPR are essential for using this technology safely. Here, we review environmental and health-related safety concerns associated with using CRISPR and ways proposed to minimize risk.
The EU regulatory framework on genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
3893Bruetschy, C, Transgenic Research, 28:169-174. 2019-01-11 00:00:00.
The European Union (EU) legislation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) aims to ensure a high level of protection for human, animal and environmental health and a well-functioning EU internal market. The framework regulates the release of GMOs into the environment and their use as, or in, food and feed. It has three main pillars: pre-market authorisation based on a prior risk assessment, traceability and labelling. Within this legal framework, the EU has authorised the placing on the market of 118 GMOs so far. These have been obtained through long-standing techniques of genetic modification, namely transgenesis. Following the adoption of the GMO legislation, new techniques of genetic modification, including new mutagenesis techniques, have been developed, which have raised questions regarding the applicability of the GMO legislation and attracted a lot of attention from stakeholders and the general public. This article provides an overview of EU GMO legislation and implementation of the EU Court of Justice ruling on organisms obtained by mutagenesis techniques, issued in July 2018. It also updates on the recent initiatives by the European Commission and EU Member States on new developments in biotechnology. The manuscript is based on the author's contribution at the OECD Conference on Genome Editing, Applications in Agriculture, Implications for Health, Environment and Regulation held in Paris on 28-29 June 2018. It is complemented with updated information.
Precision control of CRISPR-Cas9 using small molecules and light
3912Gangopadhyay, SAC, K. J.; Manna, D.; Lim, D.; Maji, B.; Zhou, Q. X.; Choudhary, A., Biochemistry, 58:234-244. 2019-01-10 00:00:00.
The CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeat)-Cas system is an adaptive immune system of bacteria that has furnished several RNA-guided DNA endonucleases (e.g., Cas9) that are revolutionizing the field of genome engineering. Cas9 is being used to effect genomic alterations as well as in gene drives, where a particular trait may be propagated through a targeted species population over several generations. The ease of targeting catalytically impaired Cas9 to any genomic loci has led to development of technologies for base editing, chromatin imaging and modeling, epigenetic editing, and gene regulation. Unsurprisingly, Cas9 is being developed for numerous applications in biotechnology and biomedical research and as a gene therapy agent for multiple pathologies. There is a need for precise control of Cas9 activity over several dimensions, including those of dose, time, and space in these applications. Such precision controls, which are required of therapeutic agents, are particularly important for Cas9 as off-target effects, chromosomal translocations, immunogenic response, genotoxicity, and embryonic mosaicism are observed at elevated levels and with prolonged activity of Cas9. Here, we provide a perspective on advances in the precision control of Cas9 over aforementioned dimensions using external stimuli (e.g., small molecules or light) for controlled activation, inhibition, or degradation of Cas9.
Promises and perils of gene drives: Navigating the communication of complex, post-normal science
3892Brossard, DB, Pam; Gould, Fred; Wirz, Christopher D., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 116:7692-7697. 2019-01-10 00:00:00.
In November of 2017, an interdisciplinary panel discussed the complexities of gene drive applications as part of the third Sackler Colloquium on “The Science of Science Communication.” The panel brought together a social scientist, life scientist, and journalist to discuss the issue from each of their unique perspectives. This paper builds on the ideas and conversations from the session to provide a more nuanced discussion about the context surrounding responsible communication and decision-making for cases of post-normal science. Deciding to use gene drives to control and suppress pests will involve more than a technical assessment of the risks involved, and responsible decision-making regarding their use will require concerted efforts from multiple actors. We provide a review of gene drives and their potential applications, as well as the role of journalists in communicating the extent of uncertainties around specific projects. We also discuss the roles of public opinion and online environments in public engagement with scientific processes. We conclude with specific recommendations about how to address current challenges and foster more effective communication and decisionmaking for complex, post-normal issues, such as gene drives.
CRISPR ethics: Moral considerations for applications of a powerful tool
3891Brokowski, C. and Adli, M., Journal of Molecular Biology, 431:88-101. 2019-01-09 00:00:00.
With the emergence of CRISPR technology, targeted editing of a wide variety of genomes is no longer an abstract hypothetical, but occurs regularly. As application areas of CRISPR are exceeding beyond research and biomedical therapies, new and existing ethical concerns abound throughout the global community about the appropriate scope of the systems' use. Here we review fundamental ethical issues including the following: 1) the extent to which CRISPR use should be permitted; 2) access to CRISPR applications; 3) whether a regulatory framework(s) for clinical research involving human subjects might accommodate all types of human genome editing, including editing of the germline; and 4) whether international regulations governing inappropriate CRISPR utilization should be crafted and publicized. We conclude that moral decision making should evolve as the science of genomic engineering advances and hold that it would be reasonable for national and supranational legislatures to consider evidence-based regulation of certain CRISPR applications for the betterment of human health and progress. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
CRISPR-Clear: A fieldable detection procedure for potential CRISPR-Cas9 gene drive based bioweapons.
3931Nieuwenweg, ACvG, Martijn M.; Horsting, Angelina; Hegge, Jorrit W; Velders, Aldrik; Saggiomo, Vittorio, ChemRxiv, 2019:1-11. 2019-01-09 00:00:00.
Rapid progression in genetic modification research has made gene editing increasingly cheaper and easier to use. CRISPR-Cas9 for example, allows for the specific alteration of the genome of an organism with relative simplicity and low costs. This raised a worrying question; can genetic modification techniques be used to create novel bioweapons? A specific scenario is the initiation of a synthetic gene drive for malicious purposes. A synthetic gene drive can be used to quickly spread a mutation through an entire population. This mutation could alter vectors in such a way that they will spread human diseases or eradicate essential organisms. Since a gene drive spreads efficiently through a population, timely detection is essential. Thus, a quick and field deployable screening method is needed to counteract the malicious use of gene drives.; ; Here, we show a battery-operated, sensitive screening method, named CRISPR-Clear, for the detection of gene drive modified organisms. CRISPR-Clear is based on the combination of three components: 1) A DNA amplification technique known as loop-mediated isothermal amplification (LAMP) for detecting the presence of a gene drive; b) a portable battery-operated Arduino device which heats up the sample to allow DNA amplification, and c) a naked-eye visualization of the results.; ; We designed and tested six LAMP primers targeting a Cas9 endonuclease-based gene drive, assembled a battery-operated Arduino device and tested the naked-eye visualization method. In addition, we were able to detect the presence of the Cas9 gene, extracted from a transformed bacteria, providing a proof-of-concept of the CRISPR-Clear device.
Gene drives as a new quality in GMO releases-a comparative technology characterization
3911Friess, JLvG, A.; Giese, B., Peerj, 7:e6793. 2019-01-09 00:00:00.
Compared to previous releases of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) which were primarily plants, gene drives represent a paradigm shift in the handling of GMOs: Current regulation of the release of GMOs assumes that for specific periods of time a certain amount of GMOs will be released in a particular region. However, now a type of genetic technology arises whose innermost principle lies in exceeding these limits-the transformation or even eradication of wild populations. The invasive character of gene drives demands a thorough analysis of their functionalities, reliability and potential impact. But such investigations are hindered by the fact that an experimental field test would hardly be reversible. Therefore, an appropriate prospective assessment is of utmost importance for an estimation of the risk potential associated with the application of gene drives. This work is meant to support the inevitable characterization of gene drives by a comparative approach of prospective technology assessment with a focus on potential sources of risk. Therein, the hazard and exposure potential as well as uncertainties with regard to the performance of synthetic gene drives are addressed. Moreover, a quantitative analysis of their invasiveness should enable a differentiated evaluation of their power to transform wild populations.
A Question of Consent: Exterminator Mosquitoes in Burkina Faso
5538ETC group, 2019-01-08 20:10:07.
Target Malaria’s planned release of GMO mosquitos is step toward release of gene drive mosquitoes, a high-risk technology aimed at the elimination of entire species. Hundreds of organizations have demanded a moratorium on the use of this technology outside of strictly-controlled laboratories.
Problem formulation for gene drive mosquitoes designed to reduce malaria transmission in Africa: results from four regional consultations 2016–2018
3950Teem, JLA, Aggrey; Glover, Barbara; Ouedraogo, Jeremy; Makinde, Diran; Roberts, Andrew, Malaria Journal, 18:347. 2019-01-08 00:00:00.
Gene drive mosquitoes have been proposed as a possible means to reduce the transmission of malaria in Africa. Because this technology has no prior use-history at this time, environmental risk assessments for gene drive mosquitoes will benefit from problem formulation—an organized and ordered process to identify protection goals and potential pathways to harm to the environment, or animal or human health. Recognizing this need, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), with support from African and international partners, organized four regional consultative workshops in Africa to initiate this process.
The Release of Genetically Engineered Mosquitoes in Burkina Faso: Bioeconomy of Science, Public Engagement and Trust in Medicine
3890Beisel, UG, J. K., African Studies Review, 62:164-173. 2019-01-08 00:00:00.
Malaria, which is transmitted by mosquitoes, continues to be responsible for a significant number of disease episodes and childhood deaths on the African continent. A variety of mosquito control strategies are currently inplace, but since case numbers are rising again, and drug and insecticide tolerance slow down progress made, there has been a push for innovative strategies. In August 2018, the National Biosafety Agency of Burkina Faso granted approval for the release of a maximum of 10,000 male Anopheles mosquitoes in experimental trials conducted by the multi-country consortium Target Malaria. These mosquitoes are rendered infertile through genetic modification, namely through “re-programming” of endonucleases that “cut through essential genes,” in this case, genes for fertility (Target Malaria 2019). The idea is that through the sterilization of male mosquitoes, the population of malaria-transmitting mosquitoes will be reduced, thereby decreasing the overall number of malaria infections.
Governing extinction in the era of gene editing
3928Monast, JJ, North Carolina Law Review, 97:1329-1358. 2019-01-06 00:00:00.
CRISPR-Cas9 genome-editing technology (“CRISPR”) offers a potential solution for some of the world’s critical conservation challenges. Scientists are harnessing CRISPR to expand genetic diversity of endangered species, control invasive species, or enhance species’ resiliency to a changing climate. Recreating extinct species is now realistic, as is engineering entirely new species. CRISPR also creates opportunities to address vector-borne infectious diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and Zika using gene drive techniques that can spread genetic alterations through populations. ; While CRISPR is a powerful tool to address public health and conservation goals, it could allow scientists to bypass longstanding value choices underlying national and international conservation efforts and foster permanent ecosystem impacts before public policy can react. This Article argues that, while current conservation laws do not directly address many of the specific questions that arise with CRISPR, the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) establishes a framework that can, and should, guide the use of gene editing. The proposal calls for: (1) a presumption against the release of genetically modified organisms that could cause species extinction, (2) exemptions for specific public health and environmental goals, and (3) updates to the ESA to clarify oversight of gene editing.
Using problem formulation for fit-for-purpose pre-market environmental risk assessments of regulated stressors
3908Devos, YC, W.; Devlin, R. H.; Ippolito, A.; Leggatt, R. A.; Romeis, J.; Shaw, R.; Svendsen, C.; Topping, C. J., EFSA Journal, 17:e170708. 2019-01-06 00:00:00.
Pre-market/prospective environmental risk assessments (ERAs) contribute to risk analyses performed to facilitate decisions about the market introduction of regulated stressors. Robust ERAs begin with an explicit problem formulation, which involves among other steps: (1) formally devising plausible pathways to harm that describe how the deployment of a regulated stressor could be harmful; (2) formulating risk hypotheses about the likelihood and severity of such events; (3) identifying the information that will be useful to test the risk hypotheses; and (4) developing a plan to acquire new data for hypothesis testing should tests with existing information be insufficient for decision-making. Here, we apply problem formulation to the assessment of possible adverse effects of RNA interference-based insecticidal genetically modified (GM) plants, GM growth hormone coho salmon, gene drive-modified mosquitoes and classical biological weed control agents on non-target organisms in a prospective manner, and of neonicotinoid insecticides on bees in a retrospective manner. In addition, specific considerations for the problem formulation for the ERA of nanomaterials and for landscape-scale population-level ERAs are given. We argue that applying problem formulation to ERA maximises the usefulness of ERA studies for decision-making, through an iterative process, because: (1) harm is defined explicitly from the start; (2) the construction of risk hypotheses is guided by policy rather than an exhaustive attempt to address any possible differences; (3) existing information is used effectively; (4) new data are collected with a clear purpose; (5) risk is characterised against well-defined criteria of hypothesis corroboration or falsification; and (6) risk assessment conclusions can be communicated clearly. However, problem formulation is still often hindered by the absence of clear policy goals and decision-making criteria (e.g. definition of protection goals and what constitutes harm) that are needed to guide the interpretation of scientific information. We therefore advocate further dialogue between risk assessors and risk managers to clarify how ERAs can address policy goals and decision-making criteria. Ideally, this dialogue should take place for all classes of regulated stressors, as this can promote alignment and consistency on the desired level of protection and maximum tolerable impacts across regulated stressors. (C) 2019 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.
Gene drives in plants: opportunities and challenges for weed control and engineered resilience
3887Barrett, LGL, Mathieu; Kumaran, Nagalingam; Glassop, Donna; Raghu, S.; Gardiner, Donald M., Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 286:9. 2019-01-05 00:00:00.
Plant species, populations and communities are under threat from climate change, invasive pathogens, weeds and habitat fragmentation. Despite considerable research effort invested in genome engineering for crop improvement, the development of genetic tools for the management of wild plant populations has rarely been given detailed consideration. Gene drive systems that allow direct genetic management of plant populations via the spread of fitness-altering genetic modifications could be of great utility. However, despite the rapid development of synthetic tools and their enormous promise, little explicit consideration has been given to their application in plants and, to date, they remain untested. This article considers the potential utility of gene drives for the management of wild plant populations, and examines the factors that might influence the design, spread and efficacy of synthetic drives. To gain insight into optimal ways to design and deploy synthetic drive systems, we investigate the diversity of mechanisms underlying natural gene drives and their dynamics within plant populations and species. We also review potential approaches for engineering gene drives and discuss their potential application to plant genomes. We highlight the importance of considering the impact of plant life-history and genetic architecture on the dynamics of drive, investigate the potential for different types of resistance evolution, and touch on the ethical, regulatory and social challenges ahead.
Gene driving the farm: who decides, who owns, and who benefits?
3907Montenegro de Wit, M, Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems, 43:1054-1074. 2019-01-05 00:00:00.
This commentary essay explores the social and ecological implications of gene-driving agriculture.
Two minutes to midnight-what international law can do about genome editing
3925Lee, TL, Asian Journal of Wto & International Health Law and Policy, 14:227-265. 2019-01-03 00:00:00.
With its ability to transform the ecosystem, gene drives, a powerful genome-editing technology, poses nuanced regulatory challenges. In particular, as gene drives can override the normal rule of inheritance, where the impacts of gene-drive modified organisms on the environment could be irreversible, leading to a permanent population change. Moreover, as these gene-drive modified organisms are designed to spread to large populations, they can also penetrate national and geographic borders, with global implications. Insofar as gene drive applications could be both potentially beneficial as well as hazardous to the world, this article seeks to explore ways in which international law could provide a useful platform to engage the relevant stakeholders in general, and encourage responsible science in specific.
Evaluating the Probability of CRISPR-based Gene Drive Contaminating Another Species
3904Courtier-Orgogozo, VD, Antoine; Gouyon, Pierre-Henri; Boëte, Christophe, bioRxiv, 776609:27. 2019-01-02 00:00:00.
The probability D that a given CRISPR-based gene drive element contaminates another, non-target species can be estimated by the following Drive Risk Assessment Quantitative Estimate (DRAQUE) Equation: D = (hyb+transf).express.cut.flank.immune.nonextinct withhyb = probability of hybridization between the target species and a non-target speciestransf = probability of horizontal transfer of a piece of DNA containing the gene drive cassette from the target species to a non-target species (with no hybridization)express = probability that the Cas9 and guide RNA genes are expressedcut = probability that the CRISPR-guide RNA recognizes and cuts at a DNA site in the new hostflank = probability that the gene drive cassette inserts at the cut siteimmune = probability that the immune system does not reject Cas9-expressing cellsnonextinct = probability of invasion of the drive within the population We discuss and estimate each of the seven parameters of the equation, with particular emphasis on possible transfers within insects, and between rodents and humans. We conclude from current data that the probability of a gene drive cassette to contaminate another species is not insignificant. We propose strategies to reduce this risk and call for more work on estimating all the parameters of the formula.CRISPRClustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic RepeatsDRAQUEDrive Risk Assessment Quantitative EstimateHGThorizontal gene transferHTThorizontal transfer of transposable elementTEtransposable element
An introduction to the proceedings of the environmental release of engineered pests: Building an international governance framewor
5646Brown, Z. S., L. Carter and F. Gould, BMC Proceedings, 12:10. 2018-12-17 17:44:54.
In October 2016, a two-day meeting of 65 academic, government and industry professionals was held at North Carolina State University for early-stage discussions about the international governance of gene drives: potentially powerful new technologies that can be used for the control of pests, invasive species and disease vectors. Presenters at the meeting prepared seven manuscripts elaborating on the ideas raised. This BMC Proceedings issue presents the collection of these peer-reviewed manuscripts.
Towards inclusive social appraisal: risk, participation and democracy in governance of synthetic biology
5642Stirling, A., K. R. Hayes and J. Delborne, BMC Proceedings, 12:15. 2018-12-17 17:05:25.
Frameworks that govern the development and application of novel products, such as the products of synthetic biology, should involve all those who are interested or potentially affected by the products. The governance arrangements for novel products should also provide a democratic mechanism that allows affected parties to express their opinions on the direction that innovation does or does not take. In this paper we examine rationales, obstacles and opportunities for public participation in governance of novel synthetic biology products. Our analysis addresses issues such as uncertainties, the considering of alternative innovations, and broader social and environmental implications. The crucial issues in play go beyond safety alone, to include contending social values around diverse notions of benefit and harm. The paper highlights the need for more inclusive social appraisal mechanisms to inform governance of Synthetic Biology and alternative products, and discusses a few practical methods to help achieve this goal.
Public engagement pathways for emerging GM insect technologies
5640Burgess, M. M., J. D. Mumford and J. V. Lavery, BMC Proceedings, 12(Suppl 8):12. 2018-12-17 17:02:52.
Policy and management related to the release of organisms generated by emerging biotechnologies for pest management should be informed through public engagement. Regulatory decisions can be conceptually distinguished into the development of frameworks, the assessment of the release of a specific modified organism, and implementation decisions such as location and timing. Although these decisions are often intertwined in practice, the negotiation takes place at different stages of technology development and suggests different roles for public engagement. Some approaches to public engagement are more appropriate for different purposes and situations, and it is not always obvious how to go about matching the approach to the purpose. In addition to the diverse technologies involved in generating modified organisms, there are diverse publics with particular interests and different kinds of knowledge. Institutional interests range from commercial development to public regulation and future uptake. Contextual features, such as agency mandates, may limit or structure the extent and approach to public engagement. Different convening groups (government agencies, public interest groups, academics, businesses) and the kind of decision that is being considered determine what kind of input is needed and how the engaging groups will be constituted. This paper considers how the context of the release of genetically modified insects for pest control requires expanding approaches to the design of the public engagement.
GM insect pests under the Brazilian regulatory framework: development and perspectives
5638Andrade, P. P., M. A. da Silva Ferreira, M. S. Muniz and A. de Casto Lira-Neto, BMC Proceedings, 12:15. 2018-12-17 17:00:23.
The emergence of new technologies for genetic modification has broadened the range of possible new products. The regulations of many countries that could benefit from these new products may not be prepared to assess risks and enable science-based decision-making. This is especially acute in the case of genetically modified insects with potential use in public health and agriculture. Modifications of the regulatory framework, sometimes necessary to allow a proper risk assessment of products from new technologies, are strongly influenced by political decisions derived from the balance of power and interest among stakeholders. This article discusses the genesis of the Brazilian regulatory framework, its applicability for the risk assessment of genetically modified insects and the scenarios that have shaped the two biosafety laws that established the basis for the use of modern biotechnology in the country. It is concluded that, for the adoption of the new technologies, it is important to carefully navigate the political tensions by seeking the engagement and empowerment of stakeholders supporting science-based decision-making in order to gather the necessary support for adoption of risk assessment as the basis for final decisions, allowing the use of new technologies.
Regulation of emerging gene technologies in India
5636Ahuja, V., BMC Proceedings, 12:14. 2018-12-17 16:57:35.
In India, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and the products thereof are regulated under the “Rules for the manufacture, use, import, export & storage of hazardous microorganisms, genetically engineered organisms or cells, 1989” (referred to as Rules, 1989) notified under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. These Rules are implemented by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Department of Biotechnology and State Governments though six competent authorities. The Rules, 1989 are supported by series of guidelines on contained research, biologics, confined field trials, food safety assessment, environmental risk assessment etc.
Gene drives breakthrough needs urgent restraint
4586Steinbrecher, R, GMWatch, 2018-09-24 00:00:00.
Gene drive researchers associated with Target Malaria and funded by US DARPA, the GATES Foundation and the UK BBSRC have just managed to crash a population of caged mosquitoes after 7-11 generations.(1); ; This is a first, and it has brought this technology beyond the proof of principle. However, in their effort to avoid any resistance to the gene drive, they have focused on a highly stable, ‘conserved’ and vital gene that is found in many species, especially closely related mosquito species. This could enable the gene drive to eliminate populations of multiple non-target species, with very serious implications indeed for biodiversity and ecosystems.; ; We begin by explaining something about gene drives before focusing on what is different about this latest research just published by Kyrou et al. 2018 in Nature Biotechnology.
A spatially discrete, integral projection model and its application to invasive carp
11503R. A. Erickson, E. A. Eager, P. M. Kocovsky, D. C. Glover, J. L. Kallis and K. R. Long, Ecological Modelling, 387:163-171. 2018-09-21 20:46:26.
Natural resource managers and ecologists often desire an understanding of spatial dynamics such as migration, dispersion, and meta-population dynamics. Network-node models can capture these salient features. Additionally, the state-variable used with many species may be appropriately modeled as a continuous variable (e.g., length) and management activities sometimes can only target individuals of certain sizes. Integral projection models (IPMs) can capture this life history characteristic and allow for the examination of size-specific management. We combined an IPM with a network-node model to capture both of these salient features. We then demonstrated how this model could be used to understand and manage populations of invasive species focusing on grass carp as an example. Grass carp disrupt ecosystems outside of their native range and have spread around much of the world, including North America. The impacts of grass carp include adversely changing aquatic plant communities, which in turn affect a wide range of endpoints ranging from water quality to waterfowl recruitment. We specifically examined two theoretical systems using parameters from the literature. First, we modeled a lake with two tributaries and examined how modified sterile males could be used as a control tool. We found that modified sterile males may be a feasible control tool to limit population growth. Second, we modeled a series of river pools and examined how harvest and deterrents could be used to decrease the risk of expanding grass carp's range within a river system. Within this system, we also compared the impacts of size specific harvest and uniform harvest across all sizes. We found that targeting the largest, spawning populations may be more important than targeting the populations close to the invasion front for reducing the risk of spreading grass carp. We also demonstrate that size of harvested fish was important for controlling populations.
Existing rules cover gene-drive usage
4728Strassheim, S.S., W., Nature, 2018-07-18 00:00:00.
Considerations for the governance of gene drive organisms
4727Rudenko, L.P., Megan J.; Oye, Kenneth, Pathogens and Global Health, 2018-07-05 00:00:00.
Governance is a broader and more flexible concept than statute-driven regulations as it incorporates components outside the latter?s remit. Considerations of governance are critical in the development of emerging biotechnologies such as gene drive organisms. These have been proposed or are being developed to address public and environmental health issues not addressed easily by conventional means. Here, we consider how the concept of governance differs from statute-driven regulation with reference to the role each may play in the development of gene drive organisms. First, we discuss existing statute-based regulatory systems. Second, we consider whether novel risks or different concerns derive from gene drive organisms, concentrating on characteristics that contribute to public health or environmental risk and uncertainties that may affect risk perceptions. Third, we consider public engagement, outlining how existing statute-driven regulatory systems and other governance mechanisms may provide opportunities for constructive interactions. Finally, we provide some observations that may help address science- and values-based concerns in a governance space larger than that of statute-driven regulatory systems.
Editing nature: Local roots of global governance
4726Kofler, N.C., James P.; Kuzma, Jennifer; Marris, Emma; Esvelt, Kevin; Nelson, Michael Paul; Newhouse, Andrew; Rothschild, Lynn J.; Vigliotti, Vivian S.; Semenov, Misha; Jacobsen, Rowan; Dahlman, James E.; Prince, Shannon; Caccone, Adalgisa; Brown, Timothy, Science, 2018-07-05 00:00:00.
RealSciLine | Gene Drives Media Briefing
6513Rick Weiss, RealSciLine, 2018-04-25 16:07:20.
Gene drives represent a new take on genetic engineering offering previously impossible means of fighting disease-spreading insects and invasive species but also raising the specter of ecological disruption. This briefing reviews the current status of gene-drive technology, applications under consideration, and related ethical, legal, and regulatory issues.
The ethical implications of population suppression and the irreversibility of gene drives
14167J. Kim, International Journal of Life Sciences Research, 2018-04-01 14:11:25.
This paper aims to examine the current situation by presenting important ethical arguments that include Chardin’s principle of irreversibility and Weiss’ beliefs on intergenerational equity, ideals upheld by the United Nations
Transgenic Mosquitoes – Fact or Fiction?
5907Wilke, A. B. B., J. C. Beier and G. Benelli, Trends in Parasitology, 34:456-465. 2018-03-08 16:14:34.
echnologies for controlling mosquito vectors based on genetic manipulation and the release of genetically modified mosquitoes (GMMs) are gaining ground. However, concrete epidemiological evidence of their effectiveness, sustainability, and impact on the environment and nontarget species is lacking; no reliable ecological evidence on the potential interactions among GMMs, target populations, and other mosquito species populations exists; and no GMM technology has yet been approved by the WHO Vector Control Advisory Group. Our opinion is that, although GMMs may be considered a promising control tool, more studies are needed to assess their true effectiveness, risks, and benefits. Overall, several lines of evidence must be provided before GMM-based control strategies can be used under the integrated vector management framework.
Gene Drives – Wundermittel? Biowaffe?
12380Swiss Academy of Sciences, 2018-02-19 21:02:40.
Gene drives are genetic elements that skew the pattern of inheritance of a given characteristic in sexually reproduc- ing organisms. They can be used to spread a characteristic that can alter or even reduce the numbers of individuals in wild populations of a certain species.
Population modification of Anopheline species to control malaria transmission
6694R. Carballar-Lejarazú and A. A. James, Pathogens and Global Health, 111:424-435. 2018-02-01 17:58:10.
Vector control strategies based on population modification of Anopheline mosquitoes may have a significant role in the malaria eradication agenda. They could consolidate elimination gains by providing barriers to the reintroduction of parasites and competent vectors, and allow resources to be allocated to new control sites while maintaining treated areas free of malaria. Synthetic biological approaches are being used to generate transgenic mosquitoes for population modification. Proofs-of-principle exist for mosquito transgenesis, the construction of anti-parasite effector genes and gene-drive systems for rapidly introgressing beneficial genes into wild populations. Key challenges now are to develop field-ready strains of mosquitoes that incorporate features that maximize safety and efficacy, and specify pathways from discovery to development. We propose three pathways and a framework for target product profiles that maximize safety and efficacy while meeting the demands of the complexity of malaria transmission, and the regulatory and social diversity of potential end-users and stakeholders.
Gene drives and the management of agricultural pests
13810R. F. Medina, Journal of Responsible Innovation, 5:S255-S262. 2018-01-24 16:01:13.
Like all pest control strategies, gene drives are not hazard-free. Ecological risk assessment of gene drives designed to control agricultural pests should be conducted before their deployment. The present commentary provides some thoughts on some of the issues one should consider when contemplating using gene drives in the management of agricultural pests.
Summary
13808Committee on Gene Drive Research in Non-Human Organisms: Recommendations for Responsible, Journal of Responsible Innovation, 5:S243-S254. 2018-01-24 15:58:19.
Scientists have studied gene drives for more than 50 years. The development of a powerful genome editing tool in 2012, CRISPR/Cas9,1 led to recent breakthroughs in gene drive research that built on that half century’s worth of knowledge, and stimulated new discussion of the potential applications and implications of gene drive technologies.
A Framework for the risk assessment and management of gene drive technology in contained use
4023van der Vlugt, CJBB, David D.; Lehmann, Kathleen; Leunda, Amaya; Willemarck, Nicolas, Applied Biosafety, 23:25-31. 2018-01-21 00:00:00.
The utilisation of the CRISPR/Cas9 technology has sparked a renewed interest in gene drive mechanisms. These mechanisms of biased inheritance may yield promising applications in the fields of vector control and nature conservation. However, the same properties that will enable these applications may also pose a risk if organisms that are equipped with gene drive cassettes are unintentionally released into the environment. Although several groups of scientists and regulators have started to address these safety concerns, there are currently no dedicated guidelines published on the required risk assessment and minimal control measures applicable to gene drive organisms in contained use. To fill this gap, this paper describes a fundamental approach to assessing the risks of these organisms while handled in a contained laboratory environment. Based on the likelihood that an adverse effect will arise from the handling of a gene drive organism and the severity of this effect, three risk classes for contained use activities are presented. Finally, specific minimum requirements regarding physical measures and working practices are proposed according to the presented risk classes and tailored to activities with rodents, insects, and fungi, which are most likely to be used for gene drive applications in the near future.
Using gene drive technologies to control vector-borne infectious diseases
3983James, ST, K. H., Sustainability, 10:4789. 2018-01-21 00:00:00.
After years of success in reducing the global malaria burden, the World Health Organization (WHO) recently reported that progress has stalled. Over 90% of malaria deaths world-wide occurred in the WHO African Region. New tools are needed to regain momentum and further decrease the burden of malaria. Gene drive, an emerging technology that can enhance the inheritance of beneficial genes, offers potentially transformative solutions for overcoming these challenges. Gene drives may decrease disease transmission by interfering with the growth of the malaria parasite in the mosquito vector or reducing mosquito reproductive capacity. Like other emerging technologies, development of gene drive products faces technical and non-technical challenges and uncertainties. In 2018, to begin addressing such challenges, a multidisciplinary group of international experts published comprehensive recommendations for responsible testing and implementation of gene drive-modified mosquitoes to combat malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa. Considering requirements for containment, efficacy and safety testing, monitoring, stakeholder engagement and authorization, as well as policy and regulatory issues, the group concluded that gene drive products for malaria can be tested safely and ethically, but that this will require substantial coordination, planning, and capacity development. The group emphasized the importance of co-development and co-ownership of products by in-country scientists.
Current CRISPR gene drive systems are likely to be highly invasive in wild populations
4002Noble, CA, Ben; Church, George M.; Esvelt, Kevin M.; Nowak, Martin A., eLife, 7:e33423. 2018-01-20 00:00:00.
Recent reports have suggested that self-propagating CRISPR-based gene drive systems are unlikely to efficiently invade wild populations due to drive-resistant alleles that prevent cutting. Here we develop mathematical models based on existing empirical data to explicitly test this assumption for population alteration drives. Our models show that although resistance prevents spread to fixation in large populations, even the least effective drive systems reported to date are likely to be highly invasive. Releasing a small number of organisms will often cause invasion of the local population, followed by invasion of additional populations connected by very low rates of gene flow. Hence, initiating contained field trials as tentatively endorsed by the National Academies report on gene drive could potentially result in unintended spread to additional populations. Our mathematical results suggest that self-propagating gene drive is best suited to applications such as malaria prevention that seek to affect all wild populations of the target species.
Means and ends of effective global risk assessments for genetic pest management
4022Turner, GB, Camilla; Roda, Lucia, BMC Proceedings, 12:13. 2018-01-20 00:00:00.
The development and use of genetic technologies is regulated by countries according to their national laws and governance structures. Legal frameworks require comprehensive technical evidence to be submitted by an applicant on the biology of the organism, its safety to human, animal health and the environment in which it will be released. Some countries also require information on socio-economic and trade impacts. One of the key elements that assists decision-making under those legal frameworks is the use of risk assessments. The risk assessment paradigm of problem formulation based on risk hypothesis, and the assessment of plausible scientific pathways leading to potential environmental and human harms being realised, has been used widely to assess potential risks of genetic technologies to human health and the environment, from crops to mosquitoes. This paper uses the case study of a genetically modified self-limiting olive fly (Bactrocera oleae) for a first deliberate release in Spain to examine the regulatory processes and stakeholders involved in the assessment of risk. It is anticipated that existing risk assessment frameworks are equally applicable to gene drive technologies that may spread and persist in the environment and cross-national borders, but it is the governance structures surrounding the involvement of civil society in regulatory processes that must be administered in a more transparent and defined manner.
Pathway to deployment of gene drive mosquitoes as a potential biocontrol tool for elimination of malaria in sub-Saharan Africa: Recommendations of a scientific working group
3982James, SC, Frank H.; Welkhoff, Philip A.; Emerson, Claudia; Godfray, H. Charles J.; Gottlieb, Michael; Greenwood, Brian; Lindsay, Steve W.; Mbogo, Charles M.; Okumu, Fredros O.; Quemada, Hector; Savadogo, Moussa; Singh, Jerome A.; Tountas, Karen H.; Touré, American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 98:1-49. 2018-01-20 00:00:00.
Gene drive technology offers the promise for a high-impact, cost-effective, and durable method to control malaria transmission that would make a significant contribution to elimination. Gene drive systems, such as those based on clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR)/CRISPR associated protein, have the potential to spread beneficial traits through interbreeding populations of malaria mosquitoes. However, the characteristics of this technology have raised concerns that necessitate careful consideration of the product development pathway. A multidisciplinary working group considered the implications of low-threshold gene drive systems on the development pathway described in the World Health Organization Guidance Framework for testing genetically modified (GM) mosquitoes, focusing on reduction of malaria transmission by Anopheles gambiae s.l. mosquitoes in Africa as a case study. The group developed recommendations for the safe and ethical testing of gene drive mosquitoes, drawing on prior experience with other vector control tools, GM organisms, and biocontrol agents. These recommendations are organized according to a testing plan that seeks to maximize safety by incrementally increasing the degree of human and environmental exposure to the investigational product. As with biocontrol agents, emphasis is placed on safety evaluation at the end of physically confined laboratory testing as a major decision point for whether to enter field testing. Progression through the testing pathway is based on fulfillment of safety and efficacy criteria, and is subject to regulatory and ethical approvals, as well as social acceptance. The working group identified several resources that were considered important to support responsible field testing of gene drive mosquitoes.
Development of community of practice to support quantitative risk assessment for synthetic biology products: contaminant bioremediation and invasive carp control as cases
4021Trump, BF, C.; Rycroft, T.; Wood, M. D.; Bandolin, N.; Cains, M.; Cary, T.; Crocker, F.; Friedenberg, N. A.; Gurian, P.; Hamilton, K.; Hoover, J.J.; Meyer, C.; Pokrzywinski, K.; Ritterson, R.; Schulte, P.; Warner, C. ; Perkins, E.; Linkov, I., Environmental Systems and Decisions, 38:517-527. 2018-01-19 00:00:00.
Synthetic biology has the potential for a broad array of applications. However, realization of this potential is challenged by the paucity of relevant data for conventional risk assessment protocols, a limitation due to to the relative nascence of the field, as well as the poorly characterized and prioritized hazard, exposure, and dose–response considerations associated with the development and use of synthetic biology-derived organisms. Where quantitative risk assessment approaches are necessarily to fulfill regulatory requirements for review of products containing genetically modified organisms, this paper reviews one potential avenue for early-stage quantitative risk assessment for biosafety considerations of synthetic biology organism deployment into the environment. Building from discussion from a March 2018 US Army Engineer Research and Development Center workshop on developing such quantitative risk assessment for synthetic biology, this paper reviews the findings and discussion of workshop participants. This paper concludes that, while synthetic biology risk assessment and governance will continue to refine and develop in the coming years, a quantitative framework that builds from existing practice is one potentially beneficial option for risk assessors that must contend with the technology’s limited hazard characterization or exposure assessment considerations in the near term.
Developing standard operating procedures for gene drive research in disease vector mosquitoes
15680Z. N. Adelman, D. Pledger and K. M. Myles, Pathogens and Global Health, 111:436-447. 2018-01-18 14:41:42.
Here we discuss information to be considered by principal investigators, biosafety officers, and institutional biosafety committees as they work together to develop SOPs for experiments involving gene drive in arthropods, and describe various courses of action that can be used to maintain the effectiveness of SOPs through evaluation and revision. The information provided herein will be especially useful to investigators and regulatory personnel who may lack extensive experience working with arthropods under containment conditions.
Identifying and detecting potentially adverse ecological outcomes associated with the release of gene-drive modified organisms
3980Hayes, KRH, G. R.; Dana, G. V.; Foster, S. D.; Ford, J. H.; Thresher, R.; Ickowicz, A.; Peel, D.; Tizard, M.; De Barro, P.; Strive, T.; Dambacher, J. M., Journal of Responsible Innovation, 5:S139-S158. 2018-01-18 00:00:00.
Synthetic gene drives could provide new solutions to a range of old problems such as controlling vector-borne diseases, agricultural pests and invasive species. In this paper, we outline methods to identify hazards and detect potentially adverse ecological outcomes at the individual (genotype, phenotype), population, community and ecosystem level, when progressing Gene Drive Modified Organisms through a phased test and release pathway. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of checklists and structured hazard analysis techniques, identify methods to help meet some of the challenges of detecting adverse ecological outcomes in experiments and confined field trials, and discuss ways to improve the efficiency and statistical rigour of post-release monitoring strategies.
Public engagement and communication: who is in charge?
3958Boëte, C, EMBO reports, 19:1. 2018-01-16 00:00:00.
The discovery of CRISPR has led to the development of gene drive systems that could be used to spread desired traits in a target species or to exterminate a population within a few generations. It is no surprise then that such a controversial and disruptive technology has raised hopes and fears regarding its application for public health, conservation, or agriculture. It has even prompted a call for a moratorium on genetically engineered gene drive last year that was signed by about 160 organizations (http://www.synbiowatch.org/gene-drives/gene-drives-moratorium/). In reaction to this call, an open letter was addressed to the Parties to the 13th meeting on the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in December 2016 in Mexico and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, requesting support on gene drive research. Interestingly, this call was presented on the website of Target Malaria (http://targetmalaria.org/open-letter/), a consortium that is developing a gene drive approach to suppress the populations of mosquito malaria vectors. About 80 scientists, most of whom are involved in insect research and malaria control, have signed this open letter. At the end, the call for a …
Switchable genome editing via genetic code expansion
4018Suzuki, TA, Maki; Patel, Sanjay G.; Luk, Louis Y. P.; Tsai, Yu-Hsuan; Perry, Anthony C. F., Scientific Reports, 8:10051. 2018-01-16 00:00:00.
Multiple applications of genome editing by CRISPR-Cas9 necessitate stringent regulation and Cas9 variants have accordingly been generated whose activity responds to small ligands, temperature or light. However, these approaches are often impracticable, for example in clinical therapeutic genome editing in situ or gene drives in which environmentally-compatible control is paramount. With this in mind, we have developed heritable Cas9-mediated mammalian genome editing that is acutely controlled by the cheap lysine derivative, Lys(Boc) (BOC). Genetic code expansion permitted non-physiological BOC incorporation such that Cas9 (Cas9BOC) was expressed in a full-length, active form in cultured somatic cells only after BOC exposure. Stringently BOC-dependent, heritable editing of transgenic and native genomic loci occurred when Cas9BOC was expressed at the onset of mouse embryonic development from cRNA or Cas9BOC transgenic females. The tightly controlled Cas9 editing system reported here promises to have broad applications and is a first step towards purposed, spatiotemporal gene drive regulation over large geographical ranges.
THE NATIONAL BIOSAFETY TECHNICAL COMMISSION (CTNBio) NORMATIVE RESOLUTION No. 16, OF JANUARY 15, 2018
16083CTNBio, National Biosafety Technical Commission of Brasil, 2018-01-15 15:17:02.
Sets forth the technical requirements for submitting an inquiry to the CTNBio concerning Precision Breeding Innovation Techniques. THE NATIONAL BIOSAFETY TECHNICAL COMMISSION (CTNBio), using its legal and regulatory powers and in observance of sections XV and XVI of article 14 of Law No. 11.105 of March 24, 2005; Whereas there is a need to assess Precision Breeding Innovation (PBI) techniques, which also comprise the so-called New Breeding Technologies (NBTs) in the light of Law No. 11.105 of March 24, 2005;
Anticipating complexity in the deployment of gene drive insects in agriculture
3956Baltzegar, JCB, Jessica; Elsensohn, Johanna E.; Gutzmann, Nicole; Jones, Michael S.; King, Sheron; Sudweeks, Jayce, Journal of Responsible Innovation, 5:S81-S97. 2018-01-14 00:00:00.
Insects cause substantial losses to agricultural crops each yearand require intensive management approaches. Genetic pestmanagement has emerged as a viable, non-chemical alternative formanaging insect pests. The development of engineered genedrives for agricultural use is promising, though unproven, and hasthe potential to impact farmers as well as broader socio-ecologicalsystems in several ways. Drawing on lessons from the deploymentof other pest control technologies, this paper considers howinsects containing gene drives could intersect with some of thecomplexities that characterize agricultural systems. Gene drives arebeing developed in a landscape of pest management shaped bypast and current approaches, experiences, regulations, publicopinion, and pest invasions. Because gene drive insects may spreadwell beyond their release area, stakeholder groups at differentspatial scales need to be engaged in decisions about theirdeployment. This new paradigm both complicates and offers greatpromise for future pest management efforts
Harnessing gene drive
3996Min, JS, Andrea L.; Najjar, Devora; Esvelt, Kevin M., Journal of Responsible Innovation, 5:S40-S65. 2018-01-14 00:00:00.
When scientists alter the genome of an organism, we typically reduce its ability to reproduce in the wild. This limitation has prevented researchers from rendering wild insects unable to spread disease, programing pests to ignore our crops, using genetics to precisely remove environmentally damaging invasive species, and much more. Gene drive occurs when a vertically transmitted genetic element reliably spreads through a population over generations despite providing no reproductive advantage to each host organism. Until recently, scientific efforts to take advantage of this natural phenomenon achieved only limited success. The advent of CRISPR genome editing has dramatically accelerated efforts to harness gene drive. Small groups of scientists may now be capable of unilaterally altering entire wild populations, and through them, the shared environment. Determining whether, when, and how to develop gene drive interventions responsibly will be a defining challenge of our time. Here we describe capabilities, safeguards, applications, and opportunities relevant to gene drive technologies.
Strengthening regulatory capacity for gene drives in Africa: leveraging NEPAD’s experience in establishing regulatory systems for medicines and GM crops in Africa
3975Glover, BA, Olalekan; Savadogo, Moussa; Timpo, Samuel; Lemgo, Godwin; Sinebo, Woldeyesus; Akile, Sunday; Obukosia, Silas; Ouedraogo, Jeremy; Ndomondo-Sigonda, Margareth; Koch, Muffy; Makinde, Diran; Ambali, Aggrey, BMC Proceedings, 12:1-10. 2018-01-13 00:00:00.
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Agency recognizes that Africa is in a period of transition and that this demands exploring and harnessing safe advances made in science-based innovations including modern biotechnology. To advance the science of biotechnology in Africa effectively, while at the same time safeguarding human health and the environment, the African Union (AU) adopted a High-Level Panel report on modern biotechnology entitled, Freedom to Innovate, which advocated for a coevolutionary approach where technology development goes hand in hand with regulation. Furthermore, most AU member states are Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB), a legally binding international agreement negotiated, concluded and adopted within the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity. This seeks to guide Parties in developing systems for the environmentally sound management of modern biotechnology applications. Currently, 49 AU Member States have signed and ratified the CPB, of which 12 have passed biosafety laws. African Union (AU) member states are at different stages in the development of regulatory frameworks for applications of modern biotechnology, which include genetically modified (GM) products and other emerging technologies. Biosafety regulatory frameworks comprise: biotechnology and/or biosafety policy; laws, regulations and guidelines; administrative systems; decision-making systems; and mechanisms for public engagement. To assist Member States to implement functional regulatory frameworks for both agriculture and health applications, the NEPAD Agency established the African Biosafety Network of Expertise (ABNE) and the African Medicines Regulatory Harmonization (AMRH). Currently, transgenic insects and GM crops are regulated by Competent National Authorities whose mandate derives from national biosafety laws. For GM crops, a lot of research has been conducted up to the confined field trial (CFT) and multi-location trials stages in a number of African countries. Burkina Faso has fully functional containment facilities for transgenic mosquitoes while Mali and Uganda are developing theirs. The Burkina Faso regulatory agency has granted permits and has already received sets of sterile mosquito eggs for trials in the contained facility. It is instructive to note that both ABNE and AMRH have worked with national and regional regulatory bodies in Africa to enhance their technical capacities for informed decision making, adoption of best practices, and compliance with international standards. It is against the backdrop of a rich blend of on-the-ground knowledge, experience, expertise, and insight into the context and political sensitivities of member states that the NEPAD Agency seeks to expand existing support. This would include capacity strengthening in the regulation of emerging technologies, such as the application of gene drives in the development of transgenic mosquito for the control of malaria transmission.
Synthetic gene drive: between continuity and novelty: Crucial differences between gene drive and genetically modified organisms require an adapted risk assessment for their use
4014Simon, SO, Mathias; Engelhard, Margret, EMBO Reports, 19:e45760. 2018-01-12 00:00:00.
Gene drive organisms differ from “classical” genetically modified organisms in several crucial aspects. It would require new approaches for risk assessment to gauge their potential impact on the environment. While some argue that current risk assessment frameworks can accommodate synthetic gene drives, others call for a moratorium owing to gene drives’ potentially detrimental impact on wildlife
Gene drives in our future: challenges of and opportunities for using a self-sustaining technology in pest and vector management
3971Collins, JP, BMC Proceedings, 12:9. 2018-01-09 00:00:00.
Gene drives are systems of biased inheritance that enhance the likelihood a sequence of DNA passes between generations through sexual reproduction and potentially throughout a local population and ultimately all connected populations of a species. Gaps in our knowledge of gene drive systems prompted the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Foundation for the NIH to ask the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) to convene an expert panel to provide an independent, objective examination of what we know about gene drive systems. The report, “Gene drives on the horizon: Advancing science, navigating uncertainty, and aligning research with public values,” outlines our understanding of the science, ethics, public engagement, governance, and risk assessment pertaining to gene drive research.
Rationally-engineered reproductive barriers using CRISPR & CRISPRa: an evaluation of the synthetic species concept in Drosophila melanogaster
4027Waters, AJC, Paolo; Gaboriau, David C. A.; Papathanos, Philippos Aris; Windbichler, Nikolai, Scientific Reports, 8:13125. 2018-01-05 00:00:00.
The ability to erect rationally-engineered reproductive barriers in animal or plant species promises to enable a number of biotechnological applications such as the creation of genetic firewalls, the containment of gene drives or novel population replacement and suppression strategies for genetic control. However, to date no experimental data exist that explores this concept in a multicellular organism. Here we examine the requirements for building artificial reproductive barriers in the metazoan model Drosophila melanogaster by combining CRISPR-based genome editing and transcriptional transactivation (CRISPRa) of the same loci. We directed 13 single guide RNAs (sgRNAs) to the promoters of 7 evolutionary conserved genes and used 11 drivers to conduct a misactivation screen. We identify dominant-lethal activators of the eve locus and find that they disrupt development by strongly activating eve outside its native spatio-temporal context. We employ the same set of sgRNAs to isolate, by genome editing, protective INDELs that render these loci resistant to transactivation without interfering with target gene function. When these sets of genetic components are combined we find that complete synthetic lethality, a prerequisite for most applications, is achievable using this approach. However, our results suggest a steep trade-off between the level and scope of dCas9 expression, the degree of genetic isolation achievable and the resulting impact on fly fitness. The genetic engineering strategy we present here allows the creation of single or multiple reproductive barriers and could be applied to other multicellular organisms such as disease vectors or transgenic organisms of economic importance.
Behavior of homing endonuclease gene drives targeting genes required for viability or female fertility with multiplexed guide RNAs
4005Oberhofer, GI, Tobin; Hay, Bruce A., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 115:e9343. 2018-01-03 00:00:00.
Homing endonuclease gene (HEG)-based gene drive can bring about population suppression when genes required for viability or fertility are targeted. However, these strategies are vulnerable to failure through mechanisms that create alleles resistant to cleavage but that retain wild-type gene function. We show that resistance allele creation can be prevented through the use of guide RNAs designed to cleave a gene at four target sites. However, homing rates were modest, and the HEGs were unstable during homing. In addition, use of a promoter active in the female germline resulted in levels of HEG carryover that compromised the viability or fertility of HEG-bearing heterozygotes, thereby preventing drive. We propose strategies that can help to overcome these problems in next-generation HEG systems.A gene drive method of particular interest for population suppression utilizes homing endonuclease genes (HEGs), wherein a site-specific, nuclease-encoding cassette is copied, in the germline, into a target gene whose loss of function results in loss of viability or fertility in homozygous, but not heterozygous, progeny. Earlier work in Drosophila and mosquitoes utilized HEGs consisting of Cas9 and a single guide RNA (gRNA) that together target a specific gene for cleavage. Homing was observed, but resistant alleles immune to cleavage, while retaining wild-type gene function, were also created through nonhomologous end joining. Such alleles prevent drive and population suppression. Targeting a gene for cleavage at multiple positions has been suggested as a strategy to prevent the appearance of resistant alleles. To test this hypothesis, we generated two suppression HEGs in Drosophila melanogaster targeting genes required for embryonic viability or fertility, using a HEG consisting of CRISPR/Cas9 and gRNAs designed to cleave each gene at four positions. Rates of target locus cleavage were very high, and multiplexing of gRNAs prevented resistant allele formation. However, germline homing rates were modest, and the HEG cassette was unstable during homing events, resulting in frequent partial copying of HEGs that lacked gRNAs, a dominant marker gene, or Cas9. Finally, in drive experiments, the HEGs failed to spread due to the high fitness load induced in offspring as a result of maternal carryover of Cas9/gRNA complex activity. Alternative design principles are proposed that may mitigate these problems in future gene drive engineering.
Advancing a new toolkit for conservation: From science to policy
4004Novak, BJM, T.; Phelan, R., CRISPR Journal, 1:11-15. 2018-01-02 00:00:00.
Climate change and non-native wildlife diseases are exacerbating persistent challenges to biodiversity such as habitat destruction, invasive species and over-harvesting. With these increasing threats there is a pressing need to expand the conservationists' toolbox. CRISPR-Cas9 genome editing (GE) offers a precise and potentially transformative tool to confront these challenges. Researchers, regulators, conservationists and the public are all needed to engage proactively in the thoughtful and responsible development and application of these new tools.
Gene Drives Can Wipe Out Entire Species… Or Save Them
5516Gizmodo, 2017-12-17 19:16:41.
Bill Gates and other investors have poured millions into gene drives. So what is the technology and why are scientists worried about it?
Open, Local, and Obligated
5467Yale University, 2017-12-13 17:04:29.
Kevin Esvelt, PhD, assistant professor at the MIT Media Lab and leader of the Sculpting Evolution Group talks about the need for new scientific structures based on transparency and open. This lecture was given at the 2017 Editing Nature Summit.
Informed consent in field trials of gene-drive mosquitoes
15682P. A. Kolopack and J. V. Lavery, Gates Open Research, 2017-12-11 14:46:00.
We argue that informed consent from individual research participants in gene drive trials may be required: (1) when blood and other forms of clinical data are collected from them, as will likely be the case in some studies involving epidemiological endpoints, such as the incidence of new infections with dengue and malaria; (2) when they participate in social science and/or behavioral research involving the completion of surveys and questionnaires; or (3) when their home or property is accessed and the location recorded as a spatial variable for the release or collection of mosquitoes because the precise location of the household is important for entomological reasons and these data constitute identifiable private information at the household level. Importantly, most regulations and guidelines allow these requirements to be waived or modified, to various degrees, according to the judgment of Institutional Review Boards.
Report of the ad hoc technical expert group on synthetic biology
16073Ad Hoc Technical Working Group, Convention on Biological Diversity, 2017-12-08 14:12:31.
In decision XIII/17, the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity commended the work of the online forum and the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Synthetic Biology (AHTEG) and welcomed the conclusions and recommendations of the report of the AHTEG as a basis for further discussion. The Conference of the Parties also considered the operational definition useful as a starting point for the purpose of facilitating scientific and technical deliberations under the Convention and its Protocols and took note of the conclusion of the AHTEG that living organisms developed through synthetic biology are similar to living modified organisms (LMOs) as defined in the Cartagena Protocol. The Conference of the Parties noted that the general principles and methodologies for risk assessment under the Cartagena Protocol and existing biosafety frameworks provide a good basis for risk assessment of living organisms developed through synthetic biology, but such methodologies might need to be updated and adapted.
Conservation demands safe gene drive
13629K. M. Esvelt and N. J. Gemmell, PLOS Biology, 15:e2003850. 2017-11-16 14:03:39.
Here, we explore the risk of accidental spread posed by self-propagating gene drive technologies, highlight new gene drive designs that might achieve better outcomes, and explain why we need open and international discussions concerning a technology that could have global ramifications.
The potential for the use of gene drives for pest control in New Zealand: a perspective
14253P. K. Dearden, N. J. Gemmell, O. R. Mercier, P. J. Lester, M. J. Scott, R. D. Newcomb, T. R. Buckley, J. M. E. Jacobs, S. G. Goldson and D. R. Penman, Journal of the Royal Society of New Zealand, 48:225-244. 2017-10-25 14:20:45.
Here we describe the current state of gene drive technologies and present a series of examples to examine the potential benefits and problems arising from gene drive approaches for pest control in New Zealand.
Using CRISPR-based gene drive for agriculture pest control
13621V. Courtier-Orgogozo, B. Morizot and C. Boëte, EMBO Reports, 18:1481. 2017-09-01 13:15:07.
The authors respond to comments to their publication 10.15252/embr.201744205
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNION Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session: DECISIONS, DECLARATIONS AND RESOLUTION
16078African Union, African Union, 2017-07-04 14:45:50.
Assembly/AU/Dec.649(XXIX): COMMITS to sustain the gains made in the fight against Malaria and monitor antimalarial drug resistance and insecticide resistance; COMMITS ALSO to invest in the development and regulation of the gene-drive technology as well as other new innovations including next generation insecticides for Indoor Residual Spraying and Long Lasting Insecticidal Nets, Rapid Diagnostic Tests and Artemisinin-based Combination Therapy for the elimination of malaria and REQUESTS the Commission, WHO and NEPAD Agency to support these initiatives;
CRISPR’s Gene Drive Could Revive Extinct Species–or Create New Ones | Jennifer Doudna
5522Jennifer Doudna, Big Think, 2017-06-26 19:28:41.
A leading gene editing scientist, Jennifer Doudna, discusses gene drive and their applications as well as de-extinction technologies.
Centre for Effective Altruism | Gene drive and the case for reforming research
5476K. Esvelt, N. Labenz, G. Church, Centre for Effective Altruism, 2017-06-17 17:50:19.
The wisdom with which we develop and deploy new technologies will define the future of our civilization. Why do we conduct reseearch in small teams of specialists who cannot reliably anticipate consequences on their own? Might it be better to share our best ideas and plans with others, actively inviting concerns, criticism, and possible improvements? Unfortunately, the current system has evolved to punish sharing. By highlighting the benefits of an open approach and the dangers of the status quo, gene drive may allow us to test a new approach and change the governing incentives. + Fireside Chat with George Church, Kevin Esvelt, Nathan Labenz
The use of gene editing to create gene drives for pest control in New Zealand
16070Royal Society Te Apārangi Gene Editing Panel, Royal Society of New Zealand, 2017-06-06 13:54:28.
to explore the implications of gene editing technology for New Zealand, the Royal Society Te Apārangi has convened a multidisciplinary panel of some of New Zealand’s leading experts to consider the social, cultural, legal and economic implications of revolutionary gene-editing technologies for New Zealand to: • Raise awareness of the scientific possibilities and associated public issues of new gene editing technologies to inform debate • Provide information and guidance for policy makers to address current and new issues needing to be clarified or resolved • Show where gene-editing applications are covered by established policies and regulations and where changes are needed • Provide a New Zealand perspective to the global discussion on this technology and identify where global consensus is important T
Agricultural pest control with CRISPR-based gene drive: time for public debate
13636V. Courtier-Orgogozo, B. Morizot and C. Boëte, EMBO Reports, 18:878-880. 2017-06-01 14:19:16.
Gene drive technology to control disease vectors or pests has great potential for addressing humanitarian and public health problems. Its application for pest control in agriculture, however, raises important environmental, social and ethical issues.
SCIENTIFIC OPINION: In response to the referral of 12 October 2015 concerning use of genetically modified mosquitoes for vector control
16065High Council for Biotechnology, High Council for Biotechnology (France), 2017-05-31 13:46:03.
The Scientific Committee’s opinion describes emerging vector control techniques using GM mosquitoes, the current state of research into and development of these techniques and the outcomes of initial experiments worldwide. To date, only one technique has been developed to an operational level: Oxitec’s RIDL technique, which sets out to reduce a mosquito population by repeated mass releases of sterilising transgenic males. Two other techniques at an earlier stage of research and development are based on gene drive, seeking to spread a genetic trait in a wild population, either to make the mosquitoes incapable of transmitting pathogens (gene drive for population modification) or to eliminate the population by spreading sterility (gene drive for population elimination).
Genome editing: scientific opportunities, public interests and policy options in the European Union
16075EASAC, European Academies Science Advisory Council, 2017-03-01 14:41:21.
In many of the areas in which EASAC, the European Academies’ Science Advisory Council, works, where a large and solid body of knowledge is needed to inform the action of our societies, it is important to recognise that there is an intimate mix of science and values involved in discussion. Such discussions are most fruitful when both knowledge and values are well identified. This report presents a broad synthesis of genome editing, one of the newer aspects of the biosciences. It is our hope that presenting clearly the science involved – the duty of academies – will serve the ongoing discussions within society that the report recommends be vigorously pursued.
Daisyfield gene drive systems harness repeated genomic elements as a generational clock to limit spread
13623J. Min, C. Noble, D. Najjar and K. M. Esvelt, bioRxiv, 104877. 2017-02-06 13:30:21.
Here we describe a novel form of gene drive based on the introduction of multiple copies of an engineered ‘daisy’ sequence into repeated elements of the genome. Each introduced copy encodes guide RNAs that target one or more engineered loci carrying the CRISPR nuclease gene and the desired traits. When organisms encoding a drive system are released into the environment, each generation of mating with wild-type organisms will reduce the average number of the guide RNA elements per ‘daisyfield’ organism by half, serving as a generational clock
Gene Drives: A scientific case for a complete and perpetual ban
4597Latham, J, GeneWatch, 2017-02-06 00:00:00.
One of the central issues of our day is how to safely manage the outputs of industrial innovation. Novel products incorporating nanotechnology, biotechnology, rare metals, microwaves, novel chemicals, and more, enter the market on a daily basis. Yet none of these products come with an adequate data set of scientific information. Nor do they come with a clear intellectual framework within which their risks can be placed, as disputes over the precautionary principle show. The majority of products receive no regulatory supervision at all. How will the product be disposed of? What populations and which ecosystems will be exposed in the course of its advertised uses? What will be the consequences of accidental, off-label or illegal uses? Typically, none of these kinds of questions are adequately asked by government regulatory agencies unless citizens actively prod them to do so.; ; In consequence of these defects, we expose our world to unique hazards with every product launch. In comparison with its tremendous importance, this is surely one of the least discussed issues of our day.
Sterile Insect Techniques, GE mosquitoes and gene drives
4595Hanson, J, GeneWatch, 2017-02-06 00:00:00.
One of the great temptations in any field is to promote your solution to a problem as the only solution. The recent application of gene drives to sterilize mosquitoes that transmit malaria or viruses like dengue and zika is an example of this tendency to first develop a technology and then look for applications that might justify its use.; ; For at least 70 years, scientists have been trying to sterilize insects to prevent them from spreading disease, especially mosquito-borne diseases like malaria, dengue and zika, an approach known as "sterile insect technique." Sterilizing some insects with irradiation has been successful in preventing their reproduction.[1] In the 1950s, it was used to rid the southeastern U.S. of the New World screwworm Cochliomyia hominivorax (Coquerel), a deadly parasite of livestock. During the next 43 years the technique was used to eradicate this screwworm from the U.S., Mexico, and Central America. Currently, the largest use of Sterile Insect Technique in the U.S. is for the control of Mediterranean fruit fly. Irradiated bollworms are also being released to control cotton boll weevils, and irradiated coddling moths are being released to help protect apples and pears.[2] Interestingly, Rachel Carson, in Silent Spring, warned that using the Sterile Insect Technique to control a population of insects that could rebuild from neighboring islands or other populations was especially challenging. Talking about a SIT effort to control houseflies in the Florida Keys, she wrote:; ; "In a test on an island in the Florida Keys in 1961, a population of flies was nearly wiped out within a period of only five weeks. Repopulation of course followed from nearby islands, but as a pilot project the test was successful....; ; One of the problems of sterilization by radiation is that this requires not only artificial rearing but the release of sterile males in larger number than are present in the wild population. This could be done with the screw-worm, which is actually not an abundant insect. With the housefly, however, more than doubling the population through releases could be highly objectionable [to the local people]."[3]
Principles for gene drive research
4041Emerson, CJ, Stephanie; Littler, Katherine; Randazzo, Filippo, Science, 358:1135. 2017-01-19 00:00:00.
The recent outbreak of Zika virus in the Americas renewed attention on the importance of vector-control strategies to fight the many vector-borne diseases that continue to inflict suffering around the world. In 2015, there were ?212 million infections and a death every minute from malaria alone (1). Gene drive technology is being explored as a potentially durable and cost-effective strategy for controlling the transmission of deadly and debilitating vector-borne diseases that affect millions of people worldwide, such as Zika virus and malaria. Additionally, its suitability is being evaluated for various potential applications in conservation biology, including a highly specific and humane method for eliminating invasive species from sensitive ecosystems (2, 3).
CRISPR/Cas9 gene drives in genetically variable and nonrandomly mating wild populations
4038Drury, DWD, A. L.; Siniard, D. J.; Zentner, G. E.; Wade, M. J., Science Advances, 3:e1601910. 2017-01-16 00:00:00.
Synthetic gene drives based on CRISPR/Cas9 have the potential to control, alter, or suppress populations of crop pests and disease vectors, but it is unclear how they will function in wild populations. Using genetic data from four populations of the flour beetle Tribolium castaneum, we show that most populations harbor genetic variants in Cas9 target sites, some of which would render them immune to drive (ITD). We show that even a rare ITD allele can reduce or eliminate the efficacy of a CRISPR/Cas9-based synthetic gene drive. This effect is equivalent to and accentuated by mild inbreeding, which is a characteristic of many disease-vectoring arthropods. We conclude that designing such drives will require characterization of genetic variability and the mating system within and among targeted populations.
Engineering species-like barriers to sexual reproduction
4057Maselko, MH, Stephen C.; Chacón, Jeremy M.; Harcombe, William R.; Smanski, Michael J., Nature Communications, 8:883. 2017-01-15 00:00:00.
Controlling the exchange of genetic information between sexually reproducing populations has applications in agriculture, eradication of disease vectors, control of invasive species, and the safe study of emerging biotechnology applications. Here we introduce an approach to engineer a genetic barrier to sexual reproduction between otherwise compatible populations. Programmable transcription factors drive lethal gene expression in hybrid offspring following undesired mating events. As a proof of concept, we target the ACT1 promoter of the model organism Saccharomyces cerevisiae using a dCas9-based transcriptional activator. Lethal overexpression of actin results from mating this engineered strain with a strain containing the wild-type ACT1 promoter.
Gene drives do not always increase in frequency: from genetic models to risk assessment
4036de Jong, TJ, Journal Fur Verbraucherschutz Und Lebensmittelsicherheit-Journal of Consumer Protection and Food Safety, 12:299-307. 2017-01-14 00:00:00.
Homing genes encode endonucleases that make a double stranded break in the DNA, destroying a target site on the homologous chromosome. When the cell repairs the break the homing allele is copied, converting a heterozygote into a homozygote. This results in gene drive (GD), an overrepresentation of the homing allele in the next generation. GD may propel CRISPR-Cas9 genes and new genes physically coupled to the GD through natural populations. I revisit the population genetic models of GD with the aim of making these models more understandable to non-specialists. What can we learn about risk evaluation from the models? A GD with no or a small effect on fitness (viability) always spreads in the population and goes to fixation. That is provided that no resistance mechanism evolves, for instance due to a mutation in the target site. However, when GDs have a large negative effect on fitness, their spread depends on a threshold or they may not spread at all. The chance of GDs increasing until fixation is much higher in systems with meiotic drive than in systems with embryo conversion. The presence or absence of a meiotic promoter is therefore relevant to take into account in the environmental risk assessment.
Agricultural pest control with CRISPR-based gene drive: time for public debate: Should we use gene drive for pest control?
4035Courtier?Orgogozo, VM, Baptiste; Boëte, Christophe, EMBO Reports, 18:878-880. 2017-01-13 00:00:00.
Gene drive based on the CRISPR/Cas-9 gene editing system is a powerful technology that promotes the inheritance of the gene drive tool itself via sexual reproduction and can therefore spread quickly through a population. It holds great potential for public health and humanitarian purposes, such as reducing the burden of vector-borne diseases like malaria. Here, we discuss another potential application of CRISPR-based gene drive, namely the control of pest species to increase crop production. We argue that gene drive-based pest control strategies should receive more attention from policymakers and the public given their enormous potential impact on the environment, their easy accessibility, and the current dearth of regulations.
Unintended consequences of 21st century technology for agricultural pest management
4075Young, SL, EMBO reports, 18:1478-1478. 2017-01-13 00:00:00.
Comment on Agricultural pest control with CRISPR-based gene drive: time for public debate by Courtier-Orgogozo et al.
Adaptive risk management of gene drive experiments: Biosafety, biosecurity, and ethics
4054Lunshof, JEB, A., Applied Biosafety, 22:97-103. 2017-01-12 00:00:00.
Emerging technologies in the life sciences call for new models of biosafety risk management. We examine the question of how to; address new developments in the life sciences and biosciences in a bottom-up manner—that is, from the concrete level of; biosafety practice with a focus on the risk management and risk assessment of emerging technologies in the biology laboratory.; We use research on “gene drives” as an example of challenging work with new constructs that have major biosafety implications; for the work in the laboratory and beyond. Gene drives are intended for use in ecosystems and require, at an early stage, the; consideration of potential future biosafety, biosecurity, and societal impact. We argue for an integrative approach, a truly collaborative; model that involves scientists, biosafety officers, institutional leadership, and ethics consultants, with the aim of; maximizing safety as well as scientific progress.
A transatlantic perspective on 20 emerging issues in biological engineering
4073Wintle, BCB, C. R.; Rhodes, C.; Molloy, J. C.; Millett, P.; Adam, L.; Breitling, R.; Carlson, R.; Casagrande, R.; Dando, M.; Doubleday, R.; Drexler, E.; Edwards, B.; Ellis, T.; Evans, N. G.; Hammond, R.; Haseloff, J.; Kahl, L.; Kuiken, T.; Lichman, B. R.; Matthewman, C. A.; Napier, J. A.; OhEigeartaigh, S. S.; Patron, N. J.; Perello, E.; Shapira, P.; Tait, J.; Takano, E.; Sutherland, W. J., eLife, 6:21. 2017-01-11 00:00:00.
Advances in biological engineering are likely to have substantial impacts on global society. To explore these potential impacts we ran a horizon scanning exercise to capture a range of perspectives on the opportunities and risks presented by biological engineering. We first identified 70 potential issues, and then used an iterative process to prioritise 20 issues that we considered to be emerging, to have potential global impact, and to be relatively unknown outside the field of biological engineering. The issues identified may be of interest to researchers, businesses and policy makers in sectors such as health, energy, agriculture and the environment.
Gene Drive 101: A Basic Guidance Resource for Biosafety Professionals
4053Krishnan, PG, David, Applied Biosafety, 22:181-184. 2017-01-11 00:00:00.
Biosafety risk assessment and containment framework strategies for research involving gene drives pose a challenge, as there are no published guidelines or regulatory information yet written specifically addressing biosafety and gene drive use. Since the risk is more at an ecologic population level than an individual risk to the researcher, this further confounds the typical risk assessment process, which traditionally places emphasis on evaluating biosafety risks to the user and how the agent is spread among permissible hosts. We also realize that many of the publications currently available for gene drive biosafety are written with the assumption that readers have a good grasp of molecular biology and genetics. We have good reason to believe that this assumption is neither correct nor justified among all biosafety professionals. Our goal here is to create a resource that would offer a basic primer on gene drive technology while providing enough resources to start the risk assessment process of a gene drive proposal. We developed several questions and answers that we believe will make tackling the biosafety aspects of a gene proposal less formidable.
Recommendations for Laboratory Containment and Management of Gene Drive Systems in Arthropods
4032Benedict, MQB, Austin; Capurro, Margareth L.; De Barro, Paul; Handler, Alfred M.; Hayes, Keith R.; Marshall, John M.; Tabachnick, Walter J.; Adelman, Zach N., Vector-Borne and Zoonotic Diseases, 18:2-13. 2017-01-10 00:00:00.
Versatile molecular tools for creating driving transgenes and other invasive genetic factors present regulatory, ethical, and environmental challenges that should be addressed to ensure their safe use. In this article, we discuss driving transgenes and invasive genetic factors that can potentially spread after their introduction into a small proportion of individuals in a population. The potential of invasive genetic factors to increase their number in natural populations presents challenges that require additional safety measures not provided by previous recommendations regarding accidental release of arthropods. In addition to providing physical containment, invasive genetic factors require greater attention to strain management, including their distribution and identity confirmation. In this study, we focus on insects containing such factors with recommendations for investigators who are creating them, institutional biosafety committees charged with ensuring safety, funding agencies providing support, those managing insectaries handling these materials who are responsible for containment, and other persons who will be receiving insects?transgenic or not?from these facilities. We give specific examples of efforts to modify mosquitoes for mosquito-borne disease control, but similar considerations are relevant to other arthropods that are important to human health, the environment, and agriculture.; Versatile molecular tools for creating driving transgenes and other invasive genetic factors present regulatory, ethical, and environmental challenges that should be addressed to ensure their safe use. In this article, we discuss driving transgenes and invasive genetic factors that can potentially spread after their introduction into a small proportion of individuals in a population. The potential of invasive genetic factors to increase their number in natural populations presents challenges that require additional safety measures not provided by previous recommendations regarding accidental release of arthropods. In addition to providing physical containment, invasive genetic factors require greater attention to strain management, including their distribution and identity confirmation. In this study, we focus on insects containing such factors with recommendations for investigators who are creating them, institutional biosafety committees charged with ensuring safety, funding agencies providing support, those managing insectaries handling these materials who are responsible for containment, and other persons who will be receiving insects?transgenic or not?from these facilities. We give specific examples of efforts to modify mosquitoes for mosquito-borne disease control, but similar considerations are relevant to other arthropods that are important to human health, the environment, and agriculture.
Evaluating strategies for reversing CRISPR-Cas9 gene drives
4071Vella, MRG, Christian E.; Lloyd, Alun L.; Gould, Fred, Scientific Reports, 7:11038. 2017-01-09 00:00:00.
A gene drive biases inheritance of a gene so that it increases in frequency within a population even when the gene confers no fitness benefit. There has been renewed interest in environmental releases of engineered gene drives due to recent proof of principle experiments with the CRISPR-Cas9 system as a drive mechanism. Release of modified organisms, however, is controversial, especially when the drive mechanism could theoretically alter all individuals of a species. Thus, it is desirable to have countermeasures to reverse a drive if a problem arises. Several genetic mechanisms for limiting or eliminating gene drives have been proposed and/or developed, including synthetic resistance, reversal drives, and immunizing reversal drives. While predictions about efficacy of these mechanisms have been optimistic, we lack detailed analyses of their expected dynamics. We develop a discrete time model for population genetics of a drive and proposed genetic countermeasures. Efficacy of drive reversal varies between countermeasures. For some parameter values, the model predicts unexpected behavior including polymorphic equilibria and oscillatory dynamics. The timing and number of released individuals containing a genetic countermeasure can substantially impact outcomes. The choice among countermeasures by researchers and regulators will depend on specific goals and population parameters of target populations.
Results from the Workshop “Problem Formulation for the Use of Gene Drive in Mosquitoes”
4066Roberts, ADA, P. P.; Okumu, F.; Quemada, H.; Savadogo, M.; Singh, J. A.; James, S., American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 96:530-533. 2017-01-04 00:00:00.
Reducing the incidence of malaria has been a public health priority for nearly a century. New technologies and associated vector control strategies play an important role in the prospect of sustained reductions. The development of the CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing system has generated new possibilities for the use of gene-drive constructs to reduce or alter vector populations to reduce malaria incidence. However, before these technologies can be developed and exploited, it will be necessary to understand and assess the likelihood of any potential harms to humans or the environment. To begin this process, the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health and the International Life Sciences Institute Research Foundation organized an expert workshop to consider the potential risks related to the use of gene drives in Anopheles gambiae for malaria control in Africa. The resulting discussion yielded a series of consensus points that are reported here.
Advances in vector control science: Rear-and-release strategies show promise… but don’t forget the basics
4065Ritchie, SAJ, B. J., Journal of Infectious Diseases, 215:S103-S108. 2017-01-03 00:00:00.
Both chikungunya and Zika viruses have recently swept from Africa across the Pacific to the Americas, causing major outbreaks of disease in humans. In the meantime, dengue epidemics continue throughout the tropics. Traditional vector control programs based on strategies from 1950s and 1960s have been relatively ineffective in combating recent epidemics. In response, new methods involving the rearing and releasing of large numbers of mosquitoes to eliminate or modify local Aedes populations are being developed, with several currently conducting field releases in high-risk countries. These advances, include the release of Wolbachia-infected Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus, for either its virus-blocking capabilities, sterilization by cytoplasmic incompatibility, or both; the release of Aedes carrying dominant lethal genes, such as the OX513A strain of A. aegypti; and other emerging techniques, such as advancing gene-drive technologies, are summarized, as well as current stages of development and primary operational and regulatory hurdles. Although these technologies show great promise, none are ready for widespread rollout for cities of millions of people. Thus, efforts should be made to avoid methods such as space sprays that have failed and improve existing technologies to increase their efficacy.
CRISPR-based gene drive in agriculture will face technical and governance challenges
4045Gutzmann, NE, Johanna E.; Barnes, Jessica Cavin; Baltzegar, Jennifer; Jones, Michael S.; Sudweeks, Jayce, EMBO reports, 18:1479-1480. 2017-01-03 00:00:00.
Comment on "Agricultural pest control with CRISPR-based gene drive: time for public debate" by Courtier-Orgogozo et al.
Gene drive and collective oversight
4594Esvelt, K, GeneWatch, 2017-01-01 00:00:00.
As one of the scientists who first described how CRISPR could create gene drive systems capable of altering wild; populations, I am morally responsible for the consequences. I'm writing to you in the hope that the people most; critical of the very idea can help. Bluntly, gene drive is an example of how the current scientific enterprise causes; our technological power to grow faster than our ability to ensure it is developed wisely. But because it affects the; shared environment, gene drive may also be the key to improving the system - namely, by causing it to favor; collective oversight. And to do that, we need your help.
Guidance on risk assessment of living modified organisms and monitoring in the context of risk assessment
16062Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group (AHTEG) on Risk Assessment and Risk Management,, Convention on Biological Diversity, 2016-09-14 21:27:35.
This document was developed by the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group (AHTEG) on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, with input from the Open-ended Online Expert Forum, in accordance with terms of reference set out by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (COP-MOP) in its decisions BS-IV/11 and BSV/12 in response to an identified need for further guidance on risk assessment of LMOs. 4 It is intended to be a “living document” that may be updated and improved as appropriate and when mandated by the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
Biodiversity, GMOs, Gene Drives and the Militarised Mind
4605Shiva, V, Inter Press Service, 2016-07-18 00:00:00.
A recent report from the National Academy of Science of The United States, titled Gene Drives on the Horizon : Advancing Science, Navigating Uncertainty, and Aligning Research with Public Values”, warns:; “One possible goal of release of a gene-drive modified organism is to cause the extinction of the target species or a drastic reduction in its abundance.”; Gene Drives have been called “mutagenic chain reactions”, and are to the biological world what chain reactions are to the nuclear world. The Guardian describes Gene Drives as the “gene bomb”.
Cas9-triggered chain ablation of cas9 as a gene drive brake
4106Wu, BL, L. Q.; Gao, X. J. J., Nature Biotechnology, 34:137-138. 2016-01-04 00:00:00.
We designed and synthesized a transgene system that we named Cas9-triggered chain ablation (CATCHA). The CATCHA transgene encodes a guide RNA (gRNA) that is expressed ubiquitously from a U6:2 promoter. The gRNA targets a site within the DNA sequence of cas9. The guide RNA is flanked by homology arms (of 1,042 bp and 1,003 bp) that match the cas9 sequences next to the gRNA-specified cleavage site (Fig. 1a). In the presence of both CATCHA and cas9, Cas9 proteins will be guided to cleave the cas9 genomic locus from which Cas9 proteins are expressed. Upon repair of the cleaved cas9 by homology-directed repair (HDR), the cas9 locus will be converted to CATCHA. Such conversion in heterozygous offspring favors amplification of CATCHA in the cas9- carrying population
Science and Technology Committee Genetically Modified Insects
16058UK Parliament, UK Parliament, 2015-12-17 21:18:14.
The UK is a world leader in the development of this technology. The European Union’s regulatory process, however, is likely to hold back progress. There is a moral duty to test the potential of the technology. We therefore support further research and call for action to test the efficiency of the EU process via a trial which should also be used to drive public engagement. GM insect technology has already been trialled for dengue transmitting mosquitoes.
CRISPR-Cas9: Safeguarding Gene Drives
5501Harvard University, 2015-11-16 18:44:48.
In this animation, learn how effective safeguarding mechanisms developed at the Wyss Institute and Harvard Medical School can be applied to ensure gene drive research is done responsibly in the laboratory. These safeguards enable responsible scientific investigation into how gene drives could one day be leveraged for the greater good of human health, agriculture, and the environment.
National Academies of Science | Workshop: Science, Ethics, and Governance Considerations for Gene Drive Research – 2015
5544National Academy of Sciences Engineering Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, 2015-10-28 21:53:14.
Can systematic reviews inform GMO risk assessment and risk management?
4121Kohl, CF, G.; Sweet, J.; Spok, A.; Haddaway, N.R.; Wilhelm, R.; Unger, S.; Schiemann, J., Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology, 3:113. 2015-01-19 00:00:00.
Systematic reviews represent powerful tools to identify, collect, synthesize, and evaluate primary research data on specific research questions in a highly standardized and reproducible manner. They enable the defensible synthesis of outcomes by increasing precision and minimizing bias whilst ensuring transparency of the methods used. This makes them especially valuable to inform evidence-based risk analysis and decision making in various topics and research disciplines. Although seen as a “gold standard” for synthesizing primary research data, systematic reviews are not without limitations as they are often cost, labor and time intensive and the utility of synthesis outcomes depends upon the availability of sufficient and robust primary research data. In this paper, we (1) consider the added value systematic reviews could provide when synthesizing primary research data on genetically modified organisms (GMO) and (2) critically assess the adequacy and feasibility of systematic review for collating and analyzing data on potential impacts of GMOs in order to better inform specific steps within GMO risk assessment and risk management. The regulatory framework of the EU is used as an example, although the issues we discuss are likely to be more widely applicable.
Opinion: Is CRISPR-based gene drive a biocontrol silver bullet or global conservation threat?
4131Webber, BLR, S.; Edwards, O. R., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 112:10565-10567. 2015-01-09 00:00:00.
Scientists have recognized the potential for applying gene drive technologies to the control of invasive species for several years, yet debate about the application of gene drive has been primarily restricted to mosquitoes. Recent developments in clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR)-Cas9 technology have restarted discussions of using gene drive for invasive species control.
Safeguarding CRISPR-Cas9 gene drives in yeast
4111DiCarlo, JEC, A.; Dietz, S. L.; Esvelt, K. M.; Church, G. M., Nature Biotechnology, 33:1250-1255. 2015-01-09 00:00:00.
RNA-guided gene drives capable of spreading genomic alterations made in laboratory organisms through wild populations could be used to address environmental and public health problems. However, the possibility of unintended genome editing occurring through the escape of strains from laboratories, coupled with the prospect of unanticipated ecological change, demands caution. We report the efficacy of CRISPR-Cas9 gene drive systems in wild and laboratory strains of the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae. Furthermore, we address concerns surrounding accidental genome editing by developing and validating methods of molecular confinement that minimize the risk of unwanted genome editing. We also present a drive system capable of overwriting the changes introduced by an earlier gene drive. These molecular safeguards should enable the development of safe CRISPR gene drives for diverse organisms.
Gene drive overdrive
4110DeFrancesco, L, Nature Biotechnology, 33:1019-1021. 2015-01-08 00:00:00.
The recent publication of a simple procedure for creating a CRISPR-Cas9-mediated gene drive has some researchers sounding the alarm. What are the risks to populations in the wild and what precautions are necessary? Laura DeFrancesco investigates.
Safeguarding gene drive experiments in the laboratory
4107Akbari, OSB, H. J.; Bier, E.; Bullock, S. L.; Burt, A.; Church, G. M.; Cook, K. R.; Duchek, P.; Edwards, O. R.; Esvelt, K. M.; Gantz, V. M.; Golic, K. G.; Gratz, S. J.; Harrison, M. M.; Hayes, K. R.; James, A. A.; Kaufman, T. C.; Knoblich, J.; Malik, H. S.; Matthews, K. A.; O'Connor-Giles, K. M.; Parks, A. L.; Perrimon, N.; Port, F.; Russell, S.; Ueda, R.; Wildonger, J., Science, 349:927-929. 2015-01-05 00:00:00.
Gene drive systems promote the spread of genetic elements through populations by assuring they are inherited more often than Mendelian segregation would predict (see the figure). Natural examples of gene drive from Drosophila include sex-ratio meiotic drive, segregation distortion, and replicative transposition. Synthetic drive systems based on selective embryonic lethality or homing endonucleases have been described previously in Drosophila melanogaster (1–3), but they are difficult to build or are limited to transgenic populations. In contrast, RNAguided gene drives based on the CRISPR/Cas9 nuclease can, in principle, be constructed by any laboratory capable of making transgenic organisms (4). They have tremendous potential to address global problems in health, agriculture, and conservation, but their capacity to alter wild populations outside the laboratory demands caution (4–7). Just as researchers working with self-propagating pathogens must ensure that these agents do not escape to the outside world, scientists working in the laboratory with gene drive constructs are responsible for keeping them confined (4, 6, 7).
Systematic evaluation of Drosophila CRISPR tools reveals safe and robust alternatives to autonomous gene drives in basic research
4124Port, FM, N.; Bullock, S. L., G3-Genes Genomes Genetics, 5:1493-1502. 2015-01-02 00:00:00.
The Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeat/CRISPR associated (CRISPR/Cas) technology allows rapid, site-specific genome modification in a wide variety of organisms. Proof-of-principle studies in Drosophila melanogaster have used various CRISPR/Cas tools and experimental designs, leading to significant uncertainty in the community about how to put this technology into practice. Moreover, it is unclear what proportion of genomic target sites can be modified with high efficiency. Here, we address these issues by systematically evaluating available CRISPR/Cas reagents and methods in Drosophila. Our findings allow evidence-based choices of Cas9 sources and strategies for generating knock-in alleles. We perform gene editing at a large number of target sites using a highly active Cas9 line and a collection of transgenic gRNA strains. The vast majority of target sites can be mutated with remarkable efficiency using these tools. We contrast our method to recently developed autonomous gene drive technology for somatic and germline genome engineering and conclude that optimized CRISPR with independent transgenes is as efficient, more versatile, and does not represent a biosafety risk.
Biosafety for human health and the environment in the context of the potential use of genetically modified mosquitoes (GMMs)
16044WHO/TDR, WHO/TDR Training Manual, 2015-01-01 20:09:55.
This Training manual: Biosafety for human health and the environment in the context of the potential use of genetically modified mosquitoes (GMMs) is based on biosafety training courses on GMMs undertaken in Africa, Asia and Latin America from 2008–2011. The courses were conceived by Yeya Touré, formerly Unit Leader (Vectors, Environment and Society), WHO/TDR, Geneva, Switzerland. Brij Kishore Tyagi (Asia course coordinator and Principal Investigator of the “Biosafety Manual-GMM Project”) prepared the first draft and compiled the Manual with invaluable assistance from the late Madama Bouaré (Africa course coordinator), Maria Corena-McLeod and Ivan Velez (Latin America course coordinators), and all those involved in preparing the courses
Guidance framework for testing of genetically modified mosquitoes
15162WHO, WHO-TDR, 2014-06-01 18:49:50.
As the research progresses, a need has been expressed both within the scientific community and by the public for additional standards and guidance. WHO-TDR and the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health (FNIH) co-sponsored a technical consultation meeting in 2009 to assess current progress and future development of genetically modified mosquito technologies. The meeting was attended by participants from around the world with expertise in molecular biology, medical entomology, ecology, regulatory requirements, ethical, social and cultural issues, as well as staff from WHO, FNIH and other research funders WHO-TDR, 2010). Participants recommended the establishment by WHO and FNIH of a working group to develop a comprehensive guidance framework to provide quality standards for assessing the safety and efficacy of genetically modified xv mosquitoes and addressing legal, ethical, social and cultural issues that arise during their development and deployment. A multidisciplinary effort was subsequently commissioned and over 40 experts recruited to contribute at various stages of development. In accordance with the recommendations, the group included many members who possessed a broad knowledge in their topic areas but were not involved directly in research on GMMs. A draft guidance framework was produced and opened for public comment in late 2012. Responses to public comment have been incorporated into this current version.
Regulatory experience and challenges for the release of GM insects
4135Beech, C, Journal Fur Verbraucherschutz Und Lebensmittelsicherheit-Journal of Consumer Protection and Food Safety, 9:S71-S76. 2014-01-13 00:00:00.
Genetically modified (GM) insects are a potentially valuable new tool for the biological control of insect pests of humans, animals and plants. Considerable progress has been made recently in transfer of GM insects from the laboratory to release and evaluation in the environment. As with other new genetic technologies, regulatory agencies have often found it challenging to determine the regulatory regime under which they should be evaluated, and have either adapted existing regulatory frameworks or adopted new ones. No country has legislation specifically for GM insects. However, irrespective of the regulatory regime under which they are evaluated, the purpose of their regulation remains the same; to protect human health and the environment. Consequently there are evaluation themes common to their regulatory scrutiny, which are elucidated here. There have also been some challenges and issues encountered during the risk evaluation for field release of GM insects, and this paper will highlight some of these to assist others when considering policy, regulation and assessment of GM insects. Useful regulatory and policy precedents also exist from the regulation of biological control agents and the global protection of plants from pests under the International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM) framework. Where countries do not have existing regulations, these evaluation instruments could have the potential to be adapted to form a suitable framework for the assessment of risk for GM insects. Finally, some considerations for future policy and regulation in this area are discussed.
Regulating gene drives
4151Oye, KAE, K.; Appleton, E.; Catteruccia, F.; Church, G.; Kuiken, T.; Lightfoot, S. B. Y.; McNamara, J.; Smidler, A.; Collins, J. P., Science, 345:626-628. 2014-01-09 00:00:00.
Regulatory gaps must be filled before gene drives could be used in the wild
Guidance on the environmental risk assessment of genetically modified animals
16055European Food Safety Authority, European Food Safety Authority, 2013-05-23 20:45:04.
This document describes the six sequential steps for the ERA of GM animals, as indicated in Directive 2001/18/EC: (1) problem formulation including hazard and exposure identification; (2) hazard characterisation; (3) exposure characterisation; (4) risk characterisation; (5) risk management strategies; and (6) an overall risk evaluation. The Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms of the European Food Safety Authority follows Annex II of Directive 2001/18/EC, considering specific areas of risk to be addressed by applicants and risk assessors during the ERA of GM fish, GM insects and GM mammals and birds.
Guidance on the environmental risk assessment of genetically modified animals.
4171EFSA GMO Panel (EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms), EFSA Journal, 11:3200. 2013-01-09 00:00:00.
This document provides guidance for the environmental risk assessment (ERA) of living genetically modified (GM) animals, namely fish, insects and mammals and birds, to be placed on the European Union (EU) market in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 or Directive 2001/18/EC. It provides guidance for assessing potential effects of GM animals on animal and human health and the environment and the rationales for data requirements for a comprehensive ERA. The ERA should be carried out on a case-by-case basis, following a step-by-step assessment approach. This document describes the six sequential steps for the ERA of GM animals, as indicated in Directive 2001/18/EC: (1) problem formulation including hazard and exposure identification; (2) hazard characterisation; (3) exposure characterisation; (4) risk characterisation; (5) risk management strategies; and (6) an overall risk evaluation. The Scientific Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms of the European Food Safety Authority follows Annex II of Directive 2001/18/EC, considering specific areas of risk to be addressed by applicants and risk assessors during the ERA of GM fish, GM insects and GM mammals and birds. Each specific area of risk is considered in a structured and systematic way following the aforementioned six steps. In addition, this Guidance Document describes several generic cross-cutting considerations (e.g. choice of comparators, use of non-GM surrogates, experimental design and statistics, long-term effects, uncertainty analysis) that need to be accounted for throughout the whole ERA.
Ethical issues in field trials of genetically modified disease-resistant mosquitoes
13538D. B. Resnik, Developing World Bioethics, 14:37-46. 2012-07-29 19:12:07.
Mosquito-borne diseases take a tremendous toll on human populations, especially in developing nations. In the last decade, scientists have developed mosquitoes that have been genetically modified to prevent transmission of mosquito-borne diseases, and field trials have been conducted. Some mosquitoes have been rendered infertile, some have been equipped with a vaccine they transmit to humans, and some have been designed to resist diseases.
The Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
5660Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention on Biodiversity, 2011:1-16. 2011-12-17 18:41:08.
Adopted as a supplementary agreement to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Supplementary Protocol aims to contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by providing international rules and procedures in the field of liability and redress relating to living modified organisms, as stated in its Article 1. The Protocol applies to damage resulting from living modified organism which find their origin in a transboundary movement (Article 3). The Supplementary Protocol provides a definition of ‘damage’, referring to an adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity that is measurable or otherwise observable and significant, taking also into account risks to human health. It provides for an indicative list of factors that should be used to determine the significance of an adverse effect. The Supplementary Protocol requires in Article 4 that a causal link between the damage and the living modified organism be established. States must require the appropriate operator or operators to take response measures in the event of damage resulting from living modified organisms which find their origin in a transboundary movement, as set out in Article 5. The ‘operator’ is defined as any person in direct or indirect control of the living modified organism. The operator must also take response measures where there is a sufficient likelihood that damage will result if timely response measures are not taken. Response measures may also be taken by the competent authority, for example when the operator has failed to do so. In such cases, the competent authority may recover the expenses and costs of such measures from the operator. In addition to the obligation to provide for response measures, Parties may develop civil liability rules and procedures to address damage. The Supplementary Protocol defines ‘response measures’ as reasonable actions to prevent, minimize, contain, mitigate or otherwise avoid damage, as appropriate, or reasonable actions to restore biological diversity. In addition to imposing a requirement for response measures, the Supplementary Protocol obliges Parties to continue to apply existing legislation on civil liability or to develop specific legislation concerning liability and redress for material or personal damage associated with damage to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, as defined in the Supplementary Protocol. As response measures can be imposed by the competent administrative authority, rather than by a judicial body, the Supplementary Protocol is known as having introduced an ‘administrative approach’ to liability and redress.
Biosafety for human health and the environment in the context of the potential use of genetically modified mosquitoes. Training Manual. A Tool for biosafety training (internet version) based on courses in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 2008-2011
34045World Health Organization, p. 242, 2011-06-15 00:00:00.
Progress and prospects for the use of genetically modified mosquitoes to inhibit disease transmission
16052A. A. James, J. D. Mumford, S. L. James and Y. T. Touré, WHO/TDR, 2010-04-01 20:29:20.
The use of genetically modified mosquitoes (GMMs) for disease control has social, economic and ethical implications, so it is important that the World Health Organization (WHO) and its partners provide guidance to countries on these issues. In collaboration with the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health (FNIH), TDR has developed a series of planning meetings on Progress and prospects for the use of genetically modified mosquitoes to inhibit disease transmission. These technical and public consultations will focus on current status and planning for future development.
Problem formulation in the environmental risk assessment for genetically modified plants
4219Wolt, JDK, Paul; Raybould, Alan; Fitzpatrick, Julie W.; Burachik, Moisés; Gray, Alan; Olin, Stephen S.; Schiemann, Joachim; Sears, Mark; Wu, Felicia, Transgenic Research, 19:425-436. 2010-01-17 00:00:00.
Problem formulation is the first step in environmental risk assessment (ERA) where policy goals, scope, assessment endpoints, and methodology are distilled to an explicitly stated problem and approach for analysis. The consistency and utility of ERAs for genetically modified (GM) plants can be improved through rigorous problem formulation (PF), producing an analysis plan that describes relevant exposure scenarios and the potential consequences of these scenarios. A properly executed PF assures the relevance of ERA outcomes for decision-making. Adopting a harmonized approach to problem formulation should bring about greater uniformity in the ERA process for GM plants among regulatory regimes globally. This paper is the product of an international expert group convened by the International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) Research Foundation.
Use of Genetically Engineered Fruit Fly and Pink Bollworm in APHIS Plant Pest Control Programs: Final Environmental Impact Statement—October 2008
16049USDA/APHIS, USDA/APHIS, 2008-10-01 20:18:57.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), in cooperation with several States and foreign countries, is proposing further development of genetically engineered fruit fly species and pink bollworm for use in various applications of the sterile insect technique (SIT) applied to agency invasive plant pest control programs. There have been laboratory and confined field studies to test the efficacy of certain genetic engineering applications that could provide benefits to these programs, but these techniques have not been applied in agency eradication actions or preventive release program (PRP) strategies.
Guidance for contained field trials of vector mosquitoes engineered to contain a gene drive system: Recommendations of a scientific working group
4232Benedict, MDA, P.; Dobson, S.; Gottlieb, M.; Harrington, L.; Higgs, S.; James, A.; James, S.; Knols, B.; Lavery, J.; O'Neill, S.; Scott, T.; Takken, W.; Toure, Y.; Core Working Grp Guidance, Containe, Vector-Borne and Zoonotic Diseases, 8:127-166. 2008-01-10 00:00:00.
The following recommendations represent the response of a group of involved scientists to the need for guidance to aid researchers, government authorities, and community leaders as they consider the design and implementation of field trials to assess the safety and efficacy of genetic strategies for reducing the transmission of diseases by mosquito vectors. Guidance is provided for contained (caged) field trials of genetically-engineered (GE) vector mosquitoes that are fertile and contain novel genetic constructs designed to spread through natural mosquito populations (“gene drive systems”). An effort is made to raise the practical issues that must be considered in advance of such testing, provide generalized recommendations based on currently available information, and identify “points to consider” regarding additional information that may be required in order to make informed decisions on a case-by-case basis. This guidance is intended to clarify the pathway for further assessment of the potential utility of such GE mosquitoes as a tool for the improvement of public health in disease-endemic regions.
Gene drive systems in mosquitoes: rules of the road
4275James, AA, Trends in Parasitology, 21:64-67. 2005-01-13 00:00:00.
Population replacement strategies for controlling transmission of mosquito-borne diseases call for the introgression of antipathogen effector genes into vector populations. It is anticipated that these genes, if present at high enough frequencies, will impede transmission of the target pathogens and result in reduced human morbidity and mortality. Recent laboratory successes in the development of virus- and protozoan-resistant mosquito strains make urgent research of gene drive systems capable of moving effector genes into wild populations. A systematic approach to developing safe and effective gene drive systems that includes defining the requirements of the system, identifying naturally occurring or synthetic genetic mechanisms for gene spread upon which drive systems can be based and the successful adaptation of a mechanism to a drive system, should mitigate concerns about using genetically engineered mosquitoes for disease control.
General principles for risk assessment of living modified organisms: Lessons from chemical risk assessment
4310Hill, RAS, C., Environ. Biosafety Res, 2:81-88. 2003-01-08 00:00:00.
Modern biotechnology has led to the development and use of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs) for agriculture and other purposes. Regulators at the national level are increasingly depending on risk assessment as a tool for assessing potential adverse effects of LMOs on the environment and human health. In addition, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an international agreement expected to enter into force in the near future, requires risk assessment as the basis for decision-making regarding import of some LMOs. While LMO risk assessment is relatively new, there are other risk assessment disciplines which have developed over longer time periods. The field of assessment of the environmental and human health risks of chemicals is particularly well developed, and is similar in application to LMO risk assessment. This paper aims to draw lessons for LMO risk assessment from the vast experience with chemical risk assessment. Seven general principles are outlined which should serve as a useful checklist to guide assessments of risks posed by LMOs.
Malaria Control with Genetically Manipulated Insect Vectors
16035L. Alphey, C. B. Beard, P. Billingsley, M. Coetzee, A. Crisanti, C. Curtis, P. Eggleston, C. Godfray, J. Hemingway, M. Jacobs-Lorena, A. A. James, F. C. Kafatos, L. G. Mukwaya, M. Paton, J. R. Powell, W. Schneider, T. W. Scott, B. Sina, R. Sinden, S. Sink, Science, 298:119. 2002-10-04 19:49:32.
At a recent workshop, experts discussed the benefits, risks, and research priorities associated with using genetically manipulated insects in the control of vector-borne diseases.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
5665Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention on Biodiversity, 2000:1-19. 2000-12-17 18:48:56.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity is an international agreement which aims to ensure the safe handling, transport and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health. It was adopted on 29 January 2000 and entered into force on 11 September 2003.
Genetics-driving genes and chromosomes
4463Charlesworth, B, Nature, 332:394-395. 1988-01-21 00:00:00.
Thereare several genetic and chromosomal systems in which Mendel's first law - the equal probability of transmission of maternal and paternal alternative alleles or homologues - is violated. This phenomenon was named 'meiotic drive' in 1957 by Sandler and Novitski, who drew attention to the fact that it operates as an evolutionary force which can cause an increase in the population frequency of the allele or chromosome which is favoured in transmission, even if it confers a disadvantage on its carriers in terms of fitness at the level of the individual
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